Twelve students from APA-accredited counseling psychology doctoral programs were interviewed about their experiences with peers in their program, and about their values and beliefs about peer relationships in graduate school. Interview data were analyzed using consensual qualitative research. Participants reported a wide range of positive (e.g. collaborative and supportive) and negative (e.g. competitive and hostile) interactions with peers inside and outside of the classroom, in research, and in clinical work. Compared to advisory and supervisory relationships, peer relationships were typically less formal and more open. The sharing of common training experiences generally facilitated mutual understanding among trainees. In addition, a visual analog scale, the peer relationship scale (PRS), was used to measure participants’ closeness with peers. Results from the PRS appeared to be useful in distinguishing participants with the most positive and negative peer relationships, warranting further investigation of its psychometric properties and application in program evaluation and research on training. Implications for training are discussed. 相似文献
The present study investigated whether oculomotor behavior is influenced by attachment styles. The Relationship Scales Questionnaire was used to assess attachment styles of forty‐eight voluntary university students and to classify them into attachment groups (secure, preoccupied, fearful, and dismissing). Eye‐tracking was recorded while participants engaged in a 3‐seconds free visual exploration of stimuli presenting either a positive or a negative picture together with a neutral picture, all depicting social interactions. The task consisted in identifying whether the two pictures depicted the same emotion. Results showed that the processing of negative pictures was impermeable to attachment style, while the processing of positive pictures was significantly influenced by individual differences in insecure attachment. The groups highly avoidant regarding to attachment (dismissing and fearful) showed reduced accuracy, suggesting a higher threshold for recognizing positive emotions compared to the secure group. The groups with higher attachment anxiety (preoccupied and fearful) showed differences in automatic capture of attention, in particular an increased delay preceding the first fixation to a picture of positive emotional valence. Despite lenient statistical thresholds induced by the limited sample size of some groups (p < 0.05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons), the current findings suggest that the processing of positive emotions is affected by attachment styles. These results are discussed within a broader evolutionary framework. 相似文献
Evidence from the study of attention among persons with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically developing (TD) children suggests a rethinking of the notion that performance inherently reflects disability, ability, or capacity in favor of a more nuanced story that involves an emphasis on styles and biases that reflect real-world attending. We provide examples from behavioral and physiological research in which performance on attention tasks is not solely a function of abilities, or disabilities, per se but rather is also a function of the ways in which they are implemented. Thus, the study of attention both among persons with ASD and in typical development might best be recast in terms of the question of “how” rather than “how well.” 相似文献
In this paper we present the results of a simulation study of credence developments in groups of communicating Bayesian agents, as they update their beliefs about a given proposition p. Based on the empirical literature, one would assume that these groups of rational agents would converge on a view over time, or at least that they would not polarize. This paper presents and discusses surprising evidence that this is not true. Our simulation study shows that these groups of Bayesian agents show group polarization behavior under a broad range of circumstances. This is, we think, an unexpected result, that raises deeper questions about whether the kind of polarization in question is irrational. If one accepts Bayesian agency as the hallmark of epistemic rationality, then one should infer that the polarization we find is also rational. On the other hand, if we are inclined to think that there is something epistemically irrational about group polarization, then something must be off in the model employed in our simulation study. We discuss several possible interfering factors, including how epistemic trust is defined in the model. Ultimately, we propose that the notion of Bayesian agency is missing something in general, namely the ability to respond to higher-order evidence.