Gender Categories as Dual-Character Concepts?

Seminal work by Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) distinguished a set of concepts, which they named “dual-character concepts.” Unlike traditional concepts, they require two distinct criteria for determining category membership. For example, the prototypical dual-character concept “artist” has both a concrete dimension of artistic skills, and an abstract dimension of aesthetic sensibility and values. Therefore, someone can be a good artist on the concrete dimension but not truly an artist on the abstract dimension. Does this analysis capture people's understanding of cornerstone social categories, such as gender, around which society and everyday life have traditionally been organized? Gender, too, may be conceived as having not only a concrete dimension but also a distinct dimension of abstract norms and values. As with dual-character concepts, violations of abstract norms and values may result in someone being judged as not truly a man/woman. Here, we provide the first empirical assessment of applying the dual-character framework to people's conception of gender. We found that, on some measures that primarily relied on metalinguistic cues, gender concepts did indeed resemble dual-character concepts. However, on other measures that depicted transgressions of traditional gender norms, neither “man” nor “woman” appeared dual-character-like, in that participants did not disqualify people from being truly a man or truly a woman. In a series of follow-up studies, we examined whether moral norms have come to replace gender role norms for the abstract dimension. Implications for the evolution of concepts and categories are explored.     

Longer,smaller, faster,stronger: On skills and intelligence

ABSTRACT

How does practice change our behaviors such that they go from being awkward, unskilled actions to elegant, skilled performances? This is the question that I wish to explore in this paper. In the first section of the paper, I will defend the tight connection between practice and skill and then go on to make precise how we ought to construe the concept of practice. In the second section, I will suggest that practice contributes to skill by structuring and automatizing the motor routines constitutive of skilled actions. I will cite how this fact about skilled action has misled many philosophers to conclude that skills are mindless or bodily. In the third section of the paper, I will challenge this common misconception about automaticity by appealing to empirical evidence of motor chunking. This evidence reveals that there are two opposing processes involved in the automaticity of skilled action: one process that is largely associative, which I will call “concatenation,” and a second which is a controlled cognitive process, which I will call “segmentation.” As a result of this evidence, we will be in a position to see clearly why skills are minded and intelligent not merely during their acquisition and not simply in virtue of their connection to intentional states but, rather, in their very nature. I will end by reflecting on some theoretical reasons for why this is exactly what we should expect to be the case when it comes to skilled action.     

Investigating the Interaction Between Sleep Symptoms of Arousal and Acquired Capability in Predicting Suicidality

Heightened arousal significantly interacts with acquired capability to predict suicidality. We explore this interaction with insomnia and nightmares independently of waking state arousal symptoms, and test predictions of the Interpersonal Theory of Suicide (IPTS) and Escape Theory in relation to these sleep arousal symptoms. Findings from our e‐survey (n = 540) supported the IPTS over models of Suicide as Escape. Sleep‐specific measurements of arousal (insomnia and nightmares) showed no main effect, yet interacted with acquired capability to predict increased suicidality. The explained variance in suicidality by the interaction (1%–2%) using sleep‐specific measures was comparable to variance explained by interactions previously reported in the literature using measurements composed of a mix of waking and sleep state arousal symptoms. Similarly, when entrapment (inability to escape) was included in models, main effects of sleep symptoms arousal were not detected yet interacted with entrapment to predict suicidality. We discuss findings in relation to treatment options suggesting that sleep‐specific interventions be considered for the long‐term management of at‐risk individuals.