Psychoanalysis in Austria after 1933-34

Our essay focuses on major developments of the history of psychoanalysis during the fascist and National Socialist years in Austria and sheds light on the re-establishment of psychoanalysis after World War II. With the consolidation of National Socialism in Germany in 1933 and Austro-fascism in 1934, any psychoanalytical reflection that was critical of political and cultural trends was extinguished. Vienna - once again - became the center of the psychoanalytical movement in Central Europe, taking over the role Berlin had played during the twenties. But, during the Austro-fascist system, psychoanalysis was isolated from an important part of its public. Psychoanalysts reacted by adopting an attitude of political abstinence, accompanied by self-censorship, they concentrated on training and clinical work, or they went into exile. Austria's Anschluß to the National Socialist Third Reich led to the final destruction of psychoanalysis. Nearly all Viennese analysts were affected by the anti-Jewish measures of the National Socialists and almost all of them fled the country. During the war years, a small group of people under the leadership of August Aichhorn tried to continue psychoanalytic training. Its members refounded the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society in early 1946. But, scientific traditions were broken and tendencies of anti-enlightenment, especially clerical and catholic prejudices, had continued from the time of Austrofascism and Nationalsocialism. The last chapter of our essay summarizes the research topics and the main historiographical studies done in the field.     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivational Antecedents and Consequences of the Mother–Adolescent Communication

Communication between parents and their children represents an important factor of family socialization. Nevertheless, little is known about why parents communicate in different ways and how these qualitative differences in parent–child communication may affect the child. Building on self-determination theory, the present study focuses on motivational antecedents of need-supportive communication as a function of parental child-related beliefs (i.e., long-term goals that parents have set for their children’s future, and parental child-related behavior expectations in terms of parental dissatisfaction or satisfaction with child behavior). Moreover, the effect of perceived need-supportive communication on children’s prosocial behavior and (externalizing and internalizing) behavioral difficulties will be addressed. Three waves of data from 1125 mothers and adolescents aged between 10 and 17 years were analyzed using growth-curve modeling. We found linearly increasing trajectories in extrinsic parental goals for children and dissatisfaction with child behavior, and decreasing trajectories of need-supportive communication. Individual differences do not vary significantly over time. In addition, holding extrinsic parental goals for children positively predicts parents’ dissatisfaction with their child’s behavior and negatively predicts need-supportive communication. Parents’ dissatisfaction with their child’s behavior also contributes to decreasing need-supportive communication. As expected, need-supportive communication predicts prosocial behavior and externalizing behavioral difficulties. When need-supportive communication decreases over time, both externalizing and internalizing behavioral difficulties increase. Furthermore, the effect of mothers beliefs on adolescents socioemotional development was mediated through perceived mother’s communication quality. These results suggest that parental child-related beliefs are important motivational antecedents of parent–child communication that may prevent behavioral difficulties.     

Public understanding of climate change in the United States

This article considers scientific and public understandings of climate change and addresses the following question: Why is it that while scientific evidence has accumulated to document global climate change and scientific opinion has solidified about its existence and causes, U.S. public opinion has not and has instead become more polarized? Our review supports a constructivist account of human judgment. Public understanding is affected by the inherent difficulty of understanding climate change, the mismatch between people's usual modes of understanding and the task, and, particularly in the United States, a continuing societal struggle to shape the frames and mental models people use to understand the phenomena. We conclude by discussing ways in which psychology can help to improve public understanding of climate change and link a better understanding to action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).     

Olfactory predator recognition in predator-naïve gray mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus)

Olfactory cues of predators, such as feces, are known to elicit antipredator responses in animals (e.g., avoidance, activity). To date, however, there is little information on olfactory predator recognition in primates. We tested whether the odor of feces of different predator categories (historical Malagasy predators and introduced predators) and of Malagasy nonpredators (control) induces antipredator behavior in captive born, predator-na?ve gray mouse lemurs. In an olfactory predator experiment a mouse lemur was exposed to a particular odor, fixed at a preferred location, where the animal was trained to get a reward. The behavior of the mouse lemur toward the respective stimulus category was videotaped and quantified. Results showed that mouse lemurs avoided the place of odor presentation when the odor belonged to a predator. They reacted with a significantly enhanced activity when exposed to odors of carnivores compared to those of nonpredatory controls. These findings are in favor of a genetic predisposition of olfactory predator recognition that might be based on the perception of metabolites from meat digestion.     

Traumatic memories of war veterans: not so special after all

Several authors have argued that traumatic experiences are processed and remembered in a qualitatively different way from neutral events. To investigate this issue, we interviewed 121 Croatian war veterans diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) about amnesia, intrusions (i.e., flashbacks and nightmares), and the sensory qualities of their most horrific war memories. Additionally, they completed a self-report scale measuring dissociative experiences. In contrast to what one would expect on the basis of theories emphasizing the special status of traumatic memories, amnesia, and high frequency intrusions were not particularly typical for our sample of traumatized individuals. Moreover, traumatic memories were not qualitatively different from neutral memories with respect to their stability and sensory qualities. The severity of PTSD symptoms was not significantly correlated with dissociative experiences. Our findings do not support the existence of special memory mechanisms that are unique to experiencing traumatic events.     

A New Solution to the Recovered Memory Debate

ABSTRACT— The controversy regarding recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) has been characterized by two perspectives. According to one perspective, some people repress their memories of abuse because these experiences have been so emotionally traumatic, and they become capable of recalling the CSA only when it is psychologically safe to do so many years later. According to the other perspective, many reports of recovered memories of sexual abuse are false memories, often inadvertently fostered by therapists. In this article, we provide evidence for a third interpretation that applies to a subset of people reporting recollections of CSA; it does not require the concepts of repression, trauma, or false memory. These people did not experience their CSA as traumatic; they either failed to think about their abuse for years or forgot their previous recollections, and they recalled their CSA spontaneously after encountering reminders outside of psychotherapy. Their recovered memories are corroborated at the same rate as those of people who never forgot their abuse. Hence, recalling CSA after many years is not the same thing as having recalled a previously repressed memory of trauma.     

When Cheap Isn't the Same as Not Expensive: Generic Price Terms and Their Negations

Generic price terms such as cheap, not expensive, not cheap, and expensive are used frequently in marketing, but little is known about how consumers interpret them. In typical consumer contexts, in which lower prices are preferred, we find that not cheap means essentially the same as expensive (i.e., not cheap = expensive). In contrast, not expensive does not mean the same as cheap, in that cheap is associated with lower prices (i.e., cheap < not expensive). As an implication, in a consumer survey we find different response distributions for rating scales that are anchored with endpoint labels of not expensive versus expensive as compared to cheap versus expensive or cheap versus not cheap (the latter two are equivalent). Furthermore, although cheap is associated with lower prices than not expensive, this does not necessarily translate into higher preferences for options that are described as cheap (vs. not expensive), because cheap may also evoke negative quality perceptions. Finally, we demonstrate an interesting reversal in the way price terms are interpreted: when higher prices are preferred, cheap is equal to not expensive (i.e., cheap = not expensive), whereas not cheap is associated with lower prices than expensive (i.e., not cheap < expensive).