Reliability of self-reported service use: Test-retest consistency of children's responses to the Child and Adolescent Services Assessment (CASA)

This paper reports on the reliability of children's responses on the Child and Adolescent Services Assessment (CASA) — a self-report instrument for use with 8– to 18-year-olds that gathers information about services used to address mental health problems. Findings were based on interviews completed by 77 children at a one week test-retest interval. Results showed that reports of lifetime service use were as reliable as were reports of service use in the preceding three months. Children reported restrictive and intrusive services more reliably than services that were provided in their natural environment. Reliability appeared to be associated more strongly with characteristics of the type of service than with characteristics of the child. Children also could report reliably on some details about their encounters with service providers (e.g., length of stay, number of visits, and onset of service use).     

Accessible Spiritual Practices to Aid in Recovery from Moral Injury

Pastoral Psychology - This article is based on the claim that spiritual practices can help sustain and rebuild even deeply wounded human spirits. It introduces simple spiritual practices,...     

Logic and Existence: Timothy Williams

The paper defends the intelligibility of unrestricted quantification. For any natural number n , 'There are at least n individuals' is logically true, when the quantifier is unrestricted. In response to the objection that such sentences should not count as logically true because existence is contingent, it is argued by consideration of cross-world counting principles that in the relevant sense of 'exist' existence is not contingent. A tentative extension of the upward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem to proper classes is used to argue that a sound and complete axiomatization of the logic of unrestricted universal quantification results from adding all sentences of the form 'There are at least n individuals' as axioms to a standard axiomatization of the first-order predicate calculus.
Of the many questions on which logic is neutral, one is usually supposed to be this: 'How many individuals are there?' On the alternative view defended below, truths about the number of individuals are logically true. They are not contingent logical truths, for it is not contingent what individuals there are.