Piaget's Grouping II: The model, its assessment, and the effects of training

Although Piaget emphasized the importance of negation in equilibration theory, few data are available pertaining to children's use of Grouping II (Gr. II) logic, which relies on negation. Three approaches to assessing Gr. II capability are reviewed in light of Piaget's (1949, Traité de logique: Essai de logistique opératoire, Paris: Colin) discussion of Gr. II. The paper describes a new task to assess three aspects of Gr. II thought: (a) naming secondary classes, (b) comparing a secondary class with a primary class contained within it, and (c) reasoning about vicariance relationships. An experimental group of third graders trained to use Gr. II logic performed significantly better on post-test tasks than did an untrained control group. Training included rule instruction, evaluative and informative feedback, and manipulative activities.     

‘In fairy tales fairies can disappear’: Children's reasoning about the characteristics of humans and fantasy figures

Two studies assessed whether children share with adults a concept of fantasy figures as entities that violate causal principles. Inferences about the characteristics of humans and fantasy figures were elicited with a forced‐choice questionnaire. Items from the biological, psychological, and physical domains pitted possible against impossible abilities; social domain items pitted conventional against unconventional behaviours. Older children (6–9 years) and adults attributed few non‐human characteristics from any domain to humans and attributed more impossible than unconventional characteristics to fantasy figures. Younger children (3–5 years) attributed fewer non‐human characteristics to humans than to fantasy figures, but attributed similar patterns of impossible and unconventional characteristics to humans and fantasy figures. Results are discussed in terms of cognitive changes between 3–5 and 6–9 years, and between 6–9 years and adulthood, that promote awareness that impossible abilities are uniquely associated with fantasy.     

The cognitive profile of Sotos syndrome

Sotos syndrome is a congenital overgrowth disorder, associated with intellectual disability. Previous research suggests that Sotos syndrome may be associated with relative strength in verbal ability and relative weakness in non-verbal reasoning ability but this has not been explicitly assessed. To date, the cognitive profile of Sotos syndrome is unknown. Cognitive abilities of a large and representative sample of individuals with Sotos syndrome (N = 52) were assessed using the British Ability Scales (BAS3). The majority of participants had intellectual disability or borderline intellectual functioning. The cluster score profile analysis revealed a consistent verbal ability > non-verbal reasoning ability profile. Four specific criteria were proposed as the Sotos syndrome cognitive profile (SSCP): verbal ability > non-verbal reasoning ability; quantitative reasoning T-score or matrices T-score <20th percentile; quantitative reasoning T-score < mean T-score; recognition of designs T-score or recognition of pictures T-score > mean T-score. Of the 35 participants included in the profile analysis, 28 met all four SSCP criteria, yielding a sensitivity of 0.8. The sensitivity of each of the SSCP criteria was >0.9. Individuals with Sotos syndrome display a clear and consistent cognitive profile, characterized by relative strength in verbal ability and visuospatial memory but relative weakness in non-verbal reasoning ability and quantitative reasoning. This has important implications for the education of individuals with Sotos syndrome.     

Dupes of Patriarchy: Feminist Strong Substantive Autonomy's Epistemological Weaknesses

Feminist strong substantive autonomy (FSSA), as presented by Natalie Stoljar and Anita Superson, pronounces judgment on the autonomy status of certain women living under oppression. These women act on deformed desires, Superson explains, and as deformed desires cannot be the agent's own, the women are heteronomous. Stoljar argues that some women's choices violate the Feminist Intuition; by acting on false and oppressive values, these women render themselves heteronomous. I argue against Stoljar and Superson on epistemological grounds. I present six different ways in which agents' choices can be related to deformed desires, with varying results for their autonomy statuses. I show that Stoljar and Superson are not able to distinguish properly among the differing autonomy statuses in these six cases, because doing so requires attention to agents' inner processes of decision‐making, as those processes are enacted in the agents' social and temporal contexts. Stoljar and Superson judge others' autonomy statuses based on abstract generalizations rather than via empirical attention to agents' actual decision‐making processes. Consequently, their judgments are not adequate to the lived self‐direction of real persons. Assessing others' autonomy status requires consideration of agents' inner choice‐making in sociotemporal context, which favors a procedural or weak substantive account of autonomy.