Inwiefern Fordern Moderne Wissenschaft und Technik die Philosophische Ethik Heraus?

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Oculomotor atypicalities in Developmental Coordination Disorder

Children with Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD) fail to acquire adequate motor skill, yet surprisingly little is known about the oculomotor system in DCD. Successful completion of motor tasks is supported by accurate visual feedback. The purpose of this study was to determine whether any oculomotor differences can distinguish between children with and without a motor impairment. Using eye tracking technology, visual fixation, smooth pursuit, and pro‐ and anti‐saccade performance were assessed in 77 children that formed three groups: children with DCD (aged 7–10), chronologically age (CA) matched peers, and a motor‐match (MM) group (aged 4–7). Pursuit gain and response preparation in the pro‐ and anti‐saccade tasks were comparable across groups. Compared to age controls, children with DCD had deficits in maintaining engagement in the fixation and pursuit tasks, and made more anti‐saccade errors. The two typically developing groups performed similarly, except on the fast speed smooth pursuit and antisaccade tasks, where the CA group outperformed the younger MM group. The findings suggest that children with DCD have problems with saccadic inhibition and maintaining attention on a visual target. Developmental patterns were evident in the typically developing groups, suggesting that the pursuit system and cognitive control develop with age. This study adds to the literature by being the first to systematically identify specific oculomotor differences between children with and without a motor impairment. Further examination of oculomotor control may help to identify underlying processes contributing to DCD. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/NinXa2KlB4M . [Correction added on 27 January 2017, after first online publication: The video abstract link was added.]     

Recognition-induced forgetting does not occur for temporally grouped objects unless they are semantically related

Recent evidence has shown that practice recognizing certain objects hurts memories of objects from the same category, a phenomenon called recognition-induced forgetting. In all previous studies of this effect, the objects have been related by semantic category (e.g., instances of vases). However, the relationship between objects in many real-world visual situations stresses temporal grouping rather than semantic relations (e.g., a weapon and getaway car at a crime scene), and temporal grouping is thought to cluster items in models of long-term memory. The goal of the present study was to determine whether temporally grouped objects suffer recognition-induced forgetting. To this end, we implemented a modified recognition-induced forgetting paradigm in which the objects were temporally clustered at study. Across four experiments, we found that recognition-induced forgetting occurred only when the temporally clustered objects were also semantically related. We conclude by discussing how these findings relate to real-world vision and inform models of memory.     

Age of avatar modulates the altercentric bias in a visual perspective-taking task: ERP and behavioral evidence

Despite being able to rapidly and accurately infer their own and other peoples’ visual perspectives, healthy adults experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives are in conflict; they experience egocentric and altercentric interference. We examine for the first time how the age of an observed person (adult vs. child avatar) influences adults’ visual perspective-taking, particularly the degree to which they experience interference from their own or the other person’s perspective. Participants completed the avatar visual perspective-taking task, in which they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar’s perspective (Experiments 1 and 2) or only from their own perspective (Experiment 3), where the two perspectives could be consistent or in conflict. Age of avatar was manipulated between (Experiment 1) or within (Experiments 2 and 3) participants, and interference was assessed using behavioral (Experiments 1–3) and ERP (Experiment 1) measures. Results revealed that altercentric interference is reduced or eliminated when a child avatar was present, suggesting that adults do not automatically compute a child avatar’s perspective. We attribute this pattern to either enhanced visual processing for own-age others or an inference on reduced mental awareness in younger children. The findings argue against a purely attentional basis for the altercentric effect, and instead support an account where both mentalising and directional processes modulate automatic visual perspective-taking, and perspective-taking effects are strongly influenced by experimental context.     

Underlying Spatial Skills to Support Navigation Through Large,Unconstrained Environments

Studies of spatial navigation in real‐world settings have been limited to neighborhoods, campuses, and buildings. These locations have structural components, such as roads or hallways, which may direct navigation. The current study assessed navigational skills within a large‐scale forested environment that contained few pre‐established paths. Participants were asked to find flags using only a map and compass; dependent variables included target‐finding accuracy and efficiency. In addition, measurements of sense of direction, strategy, and working memory were taken to identify how these cognitive abilities influence performance. The results demonstrate the expected correlations between sense of direction and navigational success. An unexpected correlation between spatial working memory and navigational success was also found, which was the only significant predictor of performance when all measures were regressed together. These results suggest that studies should not forget basic cognitive abilities, which may predict success more than measures of sense of direction. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mental imagery, reasoning, and blindness

Although reasoning seems to be inextricably linked to seeing in the “mind's eye”, the evidence is equivocal. In three experiments, sighted, blindfolded sighted, and congenitally totally blind persons solved deductive inferences based on three sorts of relation: (a) visuo-spatial relations that are easy to envisage either visually or spatially, (b) visual relations that are easy to envisage visually but hard to envisage spatially, and (c) control relations that are hard to envisage both visually and spatially. In absolute terms, congenitally totally blind persons performed less accurately and more slowly than the sighted on all such tasks. In relative terms, however, the visual relations in comparison with control relations impeded the reasoning of sighted and blindfolded participants, whereas congenitally totally blind participants performed the same with the different sorts of relation. We conclude that mental images containing visual details that are irrelevant to an inference can even impede the process of reasoning. Persons who are blind from birth—and who thus do not tend to construct visual mental images—are immune to this visual-impedance effect.