Distinct discrimination learning strategies and their relation with spatial memory and attentional control in 4- to 14-year-olds

Behavioral, psychophysiological, and neuropsychological studies have revealed large developmental differences in various learning paradigms where learning from positive and negative feedback is essential. The differences are possibly due to the use of distinct strategies that may be related to spatial working memory and attentional control. In this study, strategies in performing a discrimination learning task were distinguished in a cross-sectional sample of 302 children from 4 to 14 years of age. The trial-by-trial accuracy data were analyzed with mathematical learning models. The best-fitting model revealed three learning strategies: hypothesis testing, slow abrupt learning, and nonlearning. The proportion of hypothesis-testing children increased with age. Nonlearners were present only in the youngest age group. Feature preferences for the irrelevant dimension had a detrimental effect on performance in the youngest age group. The executive functions spatial working memory and attentional control significantly predicted posterior learning strategy probabilities after controlling for age.     

Intentional response distortion on personality tests: using eye-tracking to understand response processes when faking

Intentional response distortion or faking among job applicants completing measures such as personality and integrity tests is a concern in personnel selection. The present study aimed to investigate whether eye-tracking technology can improve our understanding of the response process when faking. In an experimental within-participants design, a Big Five personality test and an integrity measure were administered to 129 university students in 2 conditions: a respond honestly and a faking good instruction. Item responses, response latencies, and eye movements were measured. Results demonstrated that all personality dimensions were fakeable. In support of the theoretical position that faking involves a less cognitively demanding process than responding honestly, we found that response times were on average 0.25 s slower and participants had less eye fixations in the fake good condition. However, in the fake good condition, participants had more fixations on the 2 extreme response options of the 5-point answering scale, and they fixated on these more directly after having read the question. These findings support the idea that faking leads to semantic rather than self-referenced item interpretations. Eye-tracking was demonstrated to be potentially useful in detecting faking behavior, improving detecting rates over and beyond response extremity and latency metrics.     

Even simple forms of social learning rely on intention attribution in marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus)

Intention attribution guides the cognitively most demanding forms of social learning, such as imitation, thereby scaffolding cumulative cultural evolution. However, it is not thought to be necessary for more basic forms of social learning. Here we present evidence that in marmoset monkeys (Callithrix jacchus) even most basic forms of social learning such as enhancement depend on intention attribution. Marmosets perceived the behavior of a conspecific and a conspecific-like robot, but not that of a moving black box, as goal directed. Their subsequent choice behavior was shaped by social facilitation and stimulus enhancement, that is, by very simple forms of social learning, but only when exposed to the conspecific and robot, which they previously had perceived as intentional agents. We discuss the implications of this finding for contemporary debates about social learning, including emulation learning and ghost control studies, the necessity of goal-directed copying for cumulative cultural evolution, and the limits of current classification systems of social learning for the evolution of social and asocial learning.     

Refusing intergroup help from the morally superior: How one group's moral superiority leads to another group's reluctance to seek their help

We examine how group members paradoxically refuse intergroup help where they might need it most: in the moral status domain. Based on the Sacred Value Protection Model (Tetlock, 2002), we predicted and found that group members felt stronger group-based anger and a stronger motivation to reaffirm their group's moral status when an outgroup was morally superior to them. Despite this moral motivation, however, we also predicted and found that group members more strongly refused intergroup help to improve their moral status vis-à-vis the morally superior outgroup (compared to an uninvolved outgroup). Consistent with the Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects (Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995), group members thus strategically refused intergroup help to defend their group identity. Supporting this interpretation, particularly highly identified group members were most likely to refuse intergroup help when they needed it most. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our findings.     

Diversifying experiences enhance cognitive flexibility

Past research has linked creativity to unusual and unexpected experiences, such as early parental loss or living abroad. However, few studies have investigated the underlying cognitive processes. We propose that these experiences have in common a “diversifying” aspect and an active involvement, which together enhance cognitive flexibility (i.e., creative cognitive processing). In the first experiment, participants experienced complex unusual and unexpected events happening in a virtual reality. In the second experiment, participants were confronted with schema-violations. In both experiments, comparisons with various control groups showed that a diversifying experience – defined as the active (but not vicarious) involvement in an unusual event – increased cognitive flexibility more than active (or vicarious) involvement in normal experiences. Our findings bridge several lines of research and shed light on a basic cognitive mechanism responsible for creativity.     

Another fundamental social category? Spontaneous categorization of people who uphold or violate moral norms

Studies of social categorization have shown that humans robustly categorize others along dimensions of sex, age, kinship, and coalition. Drawing on a functional perspective, we predicted that humans should also categorize others along the dimension of morality (i.e., violating vs. upholding moral norms). In a study employing the memory confusion paradigm, university undergraduate participants (N = 39) were presented with same-sex targets randomly matched with sentences indicating violation or upholding of moral norms, and with sentences indicating competence or incompetence. Results showed that participants spontaneously categorized along morality but not along competence, suggesting that morality (beyond general valence) may be an important dimension of social categorization.     

"The referents of trait inferences: The impact of trait concepts versus actor-trait links on subsequent judgments": Retraction of Stapel, Koomen, and van der Pligt (1996)

Reports the retraction of "The referents of trait inferences: The impact of trait concepts versus actor-trait links on subsequent judgments" by Diederik A. Stapel, Willem Koomen and Joop van der Pligt (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1996[Mar], Vol 70[3], 437-450). This retraction follows the results of an investigation into the work of Diederik A. Stapel (further information on the investigation can be found here: https://www.commissielevelt.nl/). The Drenth Committee has found evidence of fraud, leading to the conclusion that fraud is most likely in the data supplied by Diederik A. Stapel. His co-authors were unaware of his actions and were not involved in the collection of the likely fraudulent data. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1996-03014-002.) The authors investigated the hypothesis that when trait inferences refer to abstract behavior labels they act as a general interpretation frame and lead to assimilation in subsequent judgments of an ambiguous target, whereas when they refer to a specific actor-trait link they will be used as a scale anchor and lead to contrast. Similar to G. B. Moskowitz and R. J. Roman's (see record 1992-31124-001) study, participants who were instructed to memorize trait-implying sentences showed assimilation, and participants who were instructed to form an impression of the actors in these sentences showed contrast. However, exposure to trait-implying sentences that described actors with real names and were accompanied with photos of the actors resulted in contrast under both memorization and impression instructions (Experiment 1). Furthermore, contrast ensued when trait-implying sentences were accompanied with information that suggested a person attribution, whereas assimilation ensued when that information suggested a situation attribution, independent of processing goals (Experiment 2). These findings are interpreted as support for referent-based explanations of the consequences of trait inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Speed-Accuracy Response Models: Scoring Rules based on Response Time and Accuracy

Starting from an explicit scoring rule for time limit tasks incorporating both response time and accuracy, and a definite trade-off between speed and accuracy, a response model is derived. Since the scoring rule is interpreted as a sufficient statistic, the model belongs to the exponential family. The various marginal and conditional distributions for response accuracy and response time are derived, and it is shown how the model parameters can be estimated. The model for response accuracy is found to be the two-parameter logistic model. It is found that the time limit determines the item discrimination, and this effect is illustrated with the Amsterdam Chess Test II.     

Sahlqvist Correspondence for Modal mu-calculus

We define analogues of modal Sahlqvist formulas for the modal mu-calculus, and prove a correspondence theorem for them.