You see, the ends don't justify the means: visual imagery and moral judgment

We conducted three experiments indicating that characteristically deontological judgments-here, disapproving of sacrificing one person for the greater good of others-are preferentially supported by visual imagery. Experiment 1 used two matched working memory tasks-one visual, one verbal-to identify individuals with relatively visual cognitive styles and individuals with relatively verbal cognitive styles. Individuals with more visual cognitive styles made more deontological judgments. Experiment 2 showed that visual interference, relative to verbal interference and no interference, decreases deontological judgment. Experiment 3 indicated that these effects are due to people's tendency to visualize the harmful means (sacrificing one person) more than the beneficial end (saving others). These results suggest a specific role for visual imagery in moral judgment: When people consider sacrificing someone as a means to an end, visual imagery preferentially supports the judgment that the ends do not justify the means. These results suggest an integration of the dual-process theory of moral judgment with construal-level theory.     

Development of a Brief Cognitive Screen for Mild Cognitive Impairment and Neurocognitive Disorder

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to develop and evaluate a brief cognitive screen for possible Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) and other neurocognitive impairment in a sample of general medical patients. Two hundred community-dwelling general medical patients aged 65 or older participated in this study. Age and education corrected scores from the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test and Mattis Dementia Rating Scale were used to classify participants into three groups: MCI, neurocognitive disorder, cognitively intact. Groups were then compared on an independent set of measures: the Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s Disease (CERAD) neuropsychological battery, Mini-Mental State Examination, and Clock Drawing Test. The MCI group constituted 9% of the sample, while 10.5% of the sample was classified into the neurocognitive disorder group. The CERAD Verbal Category Fluency and CERAD Word List Memory Test Delayed Recall measures were individually and collectively the most effective in differentiating cognitively intact elders from persons in both the MCI and neurocognitive disorder groups. We conclude that these two brief measures appear to be effective for detecting possible MCI or neurocognitive disorder, thereby facilitating identification of candidates who would benefit from more detailed neuropsychological assessment.     

Early literacy among Arabic-speaking kindergartners: The role of socioeconomic status,home literacy environment and maternal mediation of writing

We explored the sociocultural context of early literacy development among Arabic-speaking kindergartners in Israel, focusing on the nature of mother–child joint writing. Eighty-nine kindergartners and their mothers participated. Mothers were videotaped in their homes while helping their children write words. Early literacy was evaluated by alphabetic knowledge, concepts about print, phonological awareness, and vocabulary. Kindergartners’ early literacy was related to socioeconomic status (SES), home literacy environment (HLE) and maternal mediation level. Hierarchical regressions indicate that HLE predicted alphabetic knowledge, phonological awareness, and vocabulary beyond SES. Maternal mediation of writing predicted all children's early literacy measures except vocabulary, after controlling for SES and HLE. We discuss maternally mediated joint writing interactions as a possible context for early literacy enhancement among young Arabic-speaking children in Israel.     

A truth that’s told with bad intent: An ERP study of deception

Human social cognition critically relies on the ability to deceive others. However, the cognitive and neural underpinnings of deception are still poorly understood. Why does lying place increased demands on cognitive control? The present study investigated whether cognitive control processes during deception are recruited due to the need to inhibit a tendency to state the truth, or reflect deceptive intent more generally. We engaged participants in a face-to-face interaction game and examined event-related brain potentials (ERPs) while participants lied and told the truth with or without deceptive intention. The same medial frontal negative deflection (N450) occurred when participants lied and when they told the truth with deceptive intent. This suggests that the main challenge of lying is not to inhibit a tendency to state the truth. Rather, the challenge is to handle the cognitive conflict resulting from the need to keep others’ mental states in mind while deceiving them.     

A retrospective longitudinal study of cognitive and language skills in poor reading comprehension

Fifty‐six specific poor reading comprehenders (SPRC) were selected in Grade 4 and retrospectively compared to good comprehenders at preschool (age 5) and at the end of kindergarten, Grade 1, and Grade 2. The results revealed deficits in vocabulary, grammar, verbal memory and early deficits in phonological awareness in most of the SPRC sample, beginning in preschool. The reading comprehension deficits in children with SPRC were not as marked in earlier assessments in Grade 1 and 2, probably because of the greater dependence on word decoding in reading comprehension in the early grades.     

Recycling Religion: Lance Armstrong’s Postmodern Spirituality of Suffering and Survivorship

For much of his triple career as heroic cancer survivor, sports champion, and, latterly, fallen idol, Lance Armstrong, a professed atheist, has worn a silver necklace with a cross pendant. Why does he wear this Ur-symbol of Christian religious faith? Speculative answers range from ‘residual superstition’ to ‘fashion jewellery’ and ‘tactical deception’. Here, Armstrong’s own declared beliefs as refracted through his autobiographical accounts are analysed within a mono-mythic framework, with particular emphasis on ‘survivorship’, his implicit spirituality of suffering. The Armstrong case of a personalised construction of faith praxis sheds light on the eclectic ‘liquid’ religio-spiritual style of postmodernism. It helps portray the negotiation of the religious-in-the-secular, the sacred-in-the-profane (and vice versa), and illuminates the problematic nature of dualistic accounts of religion and spirituality in contemporary culture. Armstrong’s ‘recycling’ of traditional religious iconography out of context of origin demonstrates the persistence, durability, and elasticity of religio-spiritual symbolic culture.     

Embodied reflexivity: discerning ethical practice through the Six-Part Story Method

Early reflective practice drew on the work of John Dewey and the concept of learning-by-doing involving individual reflection on, and in, action. More recently the practice of reflection has also been taken into a more socially constructed, and emergent, sense of knowing where the individual ‘reflexes’ in, and through, experiences as felt ways of knowing. This concept forms the basis of this article. We will explore a process of learning called the Six-Part Story Method (6PSM). Originally created in the field of dramatherapy as a diagnostic tool to enable child victims of trauma to be supported, Elinor further developed it in 2017 to support education professionals and leaders to enhance their reflective practice and create new opportunities to develop greater self-awareness. Warren then utilized it in teaching a course on ethical practice in a graduate programme; the course’s epistemological underpinning is the concept of ‘ethical know-how’. We then include the work of Helen, a student in the programme, as she explores the story she developed through the 6PSM and then analyzes the effect of it on herself one year later.     

Does jury deliberation really improve jurors' memories?

The courts assume that jury deliberation corrects errors in jurors' memories, so that the verdict is based on accurate memory for the trial. We evaluated the validity of this assumption by examining jurors' memories and verdicts both before and after deliberation. Unlike previous studies, we tracked how event memories changed as a function of how they were discussed in deliberation. Overall, deliberation resulted in only a slight memory improvement. Deliberation corrected errors and did not introduce distortions. Reasons for such slight memory improvement are that jurors did not think they had memory gaps and thus did not use the deliberation process to improve their memory, and jurors who controlled deliberation were not always the most accurate in their memories. Finally, those most likely to change their verdict as a result of deliberation were not those who had the least accurate memories, but rather those who had the least confidence in their memories. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.