Discussion of “Melancholic Psychosis”

Derek Hook’s paper (this issue) represents an important discussion of the Lacanian perspective on melancholia and its close and often forgotten clinical link to psychosis. Hook’s paper provides a critical insight into how melancholia is understood as a surrender to the jouissance of the Other. The reviewer only disagrees with Hook’s idea that there is no object loss in melancholia because the melancholic knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in the absent object. This unknown loss leaves him exposed to an erotogenic masochism proper and a self-annihilating kind of jouissance.     

Psychology,community, and the recovering racist

This study adds to the tradition of studying race talk in the context of a flash point in biculturalism in Aotearoa New Zealand. The research examined constructions of the Mayor of New Plymouth (Andrew Judd) following his advocacy for extended Māori representation on the New Plymouth District Council. Data comprised reports, editorials, opinion pieces, and letters to the local newspaper immediately after Judd's appearance on a nationally broadcast current affairs television show when he announced the end of his mayoralty. The analysis considered constructions of Judd as both hero and anti‐hero, with complimentary constructions of the local community as racist, or not. In subscribing to the view for extended representation on the grounds of cultural constituency, Judd was variously positioned as culturally and politically naïve, as a hero for the cause for greater political representation for Māori, and an anti‐hero responsible for letting his own community down and bringing negative publicity to the town he was meant to serve. Judd was the target of abuse that prompted him to end his mayoralty, and this abuse stimulated constructions of widespread community racism. The discussion includes an interrogation of what it means to be a recovering racist, and finally, it is argued that the analysis provides further evidence of the sinuousness of racism.     

Different Realities: What Is Reality and What Difference Does It Make?

Consciousness does not exist apart from psyche; it reflects it. Different realities are not interchangeable with other manifestations of psychic reality. “Borderland consciousness” is the term I have conceived for people who, in one way or another, have a living dynamic connection to and relationship with nature. Given this understanding, the oral traditional and Native American cultures manifest a reciprocity psyche, and are today the closest manifestation of the psychic reality in Genesis, pre-expulsion from Eden. Navajo language contains no words for religion, guilt, human, inanimate, psyche, or ego. The Western psyche manifests a dominion psyche; that is, a binary consciousness borne as a result of the expulsion in Genesis, and wedded to logic as an uncompromising characteristic of sanity and health. This kind of consciousness too often crushes the spirit dimension, which is transrational. An awareness of borderland consciousness is entering into the Western cultural collective. This is the telos of the Garden of Eden expulsion, and itself represents the dominion psyche and the reciprocity psyche in dialogue. This dialogue offers a critical counterbalance to the rogue behavior of the overspecialized Western ego of the dominion psyche. This article urges Jungians to develop new methods of connecting with borderland consciousness since the dominion psyche and its technology alone cannot save our species in the face of the threat of a global climate change disaster.     

The consequences of suggesting false childhood food events

We combined data across eight published experiments (N = 1369) to examine the formation and consequences of false autobiographical beliefs and memories. Our path models revealed that the formation of false autobiographical belief fully mediated the pathway between suggesting to people that they had experienced a positive or negative food-related event in the past and current preference for that food. Suggestion indirectly affected intention to eat the food via change in autobiographical belief. The development of belief with and without memory produced similar changes in food preferences and behavior intention, indicating that belief in the event drives changes in suggestion-related attitudes. Finally, positive suggestions (e.g., “you loved asparagus the first time you tried it”) yielded stronger effects than negative suggestions (e.g., “you got sick eating egg salad”). These findings show that false autobiographical suggestions lead to the development of autobiographical beliefs, which in turn, have consequences for one's attitudes and behaviors.     

Incremental validity of mindfulness-based attention in relation to the concurrent prediction of anxiety and depressive symptomatology and perceptions of health

This investigation evaluated the role of mindfulness-based attention in concurrently predicting anxiety and depressive symptomatology and perceived health functioning in a community sample of 170 young adults (95 females; mean age (Mage) = 22.2 years, SD = 7.6). Partially consistent with prediction, results indicated that, relative to negative and positive affectivity and emotional expression and processing associated with approach-oriented coping, mindfulness-based attention incrementally predicted anhedonic depressive, but not anxious arousal, symptoms. Additionally, consistent with prediction, mindfulness-based attention demonstrated incremental validity in relation to perceived health, and the degree of impairment of health in terms of physical and mental functioning. Results are discussed in relation to the construct development of mindfulness-based attention, and specifically, the role(s) of this factor in emotional and physical health processes.     

Hypo-egoic self-regulation: exercising self-control by diminishing the influence of the self

Theory and research dealing with self-regulation have focused primarily on instances of self-regulation that involve high levels of self-reflection and effortful self-control. However, intentionally trying to control one's behavior sometimes reduces the likelihood of achieving one's goals. This article examines the process of hypo-egoic self-regulation in which people relinquish deliberate, conscious control over their own behavior so that they will respond more naturally, spontaneously, or automatically. An examination of spontaneously occurring hypo-egoic states (such as flow, deindividuation, and transcendence) suggests that hypo-egoic states are characterized by lowered self-awareness and/or an increase in concrete and present-focused self-thoughts. In light of this, people may intentionally foster hypo-egoism via two pathways-(a) taking steps to reduce the proportion of time that they are self-aware (such as repeating a behavior until it is automatic or practicing meditation) or (b) increasing the concreteness of their self-thoughts (such as inducing a concrete mindset or practicing mindfulness). In this way, people may deliberately choose to regulate hypo-egoically when effortful control might be detrimental to their performance.     

Fluency misattribution and visual hindsight bias

We tested a fluency-misattribution theory of visual hindsight bias, and examined how perceptual and conceptual fluency contribute to the bias. In Experiment 1a observers identified celebrity faces that began blurred and then clarified (Forward baseline), or indicated when faces that began clear and then blurred were no longer recognisable (Backward baseline). In surprise memory tests that followed, observers adjusted the degree of blur of each face to match what the faces looked like when identified in the corresponding baseline condition. Hindsight bias was observed in the Forward condition: During the memory test observers adjusted the faces to be more blurry than when originally identified during baseline. These same observers did not show hindsight bias in the Backward condition: Here, they adjusted faces to the exact blur level at which they identified the faces during baseline. Experiment 1b tested a combined condition in which faces were viewed in a Forward progression at baseline but in a Backward progression at test. Hindsight bias was observed in this condition but was significantly less than the bias observed in the Experiment 1a Forward condition. Experiments 1a and 1b provide support for the fluency-misattribution account of visual hindsight bias: When observers are made aware of why fluency has been enhanced (i.e., in the Backward condition) they are better able to discount it, and as a result show reduced or no hindsight bias. In Experiment 2, observers viewed faces in a Forward progression at baseline and then in a Forward upright or inverted progression at test. Hindsight bias occurred in both conditions, but was greater for upright than inverted faces. We conclude that both conceptual and perceptual fluency contribute to visual hindsight bias.