Dreaming and hallucinations - continuity or discontinuity? Perspectives from dementia with Lewy bodies

Comparing the phenomenology, neurochemical pathology, and psychopharmacology of hallucinations and dreaming is limited by the available data. Evidence to date reveals no simple correspondence between the two states. Differences in the phenomenology of visual hallucinations and the visual component of dreams may reflect variations in visual context acting on the same underlying mechanism – the minimal visual input during dreaming contrasts with the more substantial perceived context in hallucinations. Variations in cholinergic, dopaminergic and serotonergic neurotransmitter function during sleep and during hallucinations in Lewy body dementias, together with relevant drug effects suggest that, on the whole, different, potentially opposite, changes characterise the two states. A similar analysis of other psychotic features in Lewy body dementia and other disorders suggests that, in contrast to hallucinations, there may be more convincing parallels between dreaming and delusional states.     

Rationality as Effective Organisation of Interaction and Its Naturalist Framework

The point of this paper is to provide a principled framework for a naturalistic, interactivist-constructivist model of rational capacity and a sketch of the model itself, indicating its merits. Being naturalistic, it takes its orientation from scientific understanding. In particular, it adopts the developing interactivist-constructivist understanding of the functional capacities of biological organisms as a useful naturalistic platform for constructing such higher order capacities as reason and cognition. Further, both the framework and model are marked by the finitude and fallibility that science attributes to organisms, with their radical consequences, and also by the individual and collective capacities to improve their performances that learning organisms display. Part A prepares the ground for the exposition through a critique of the dominant Western analytic tradition in rationalising science, followed by a brief exposition of the naturalist framework that will be employed to frame the construction. This results in two sets of guidelines for constructing an alternative. Part B provides the new conception of reason as a rich complex of processes of improvement against epistemic values, and argues its merits. It closes with an account of normativity and our similarly developing rational knowledge of it, including (reflexively) of reason itself.     

Life Stories: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches

Motivation and Emotion -     

Attentional Bias for Threat: Evidence for Delayed Disengagement from Emotional Faces

The present paper reports three new experiments suggesting that the valence of a face cue can influence attentional effects in a cueing paradigm. Moreover, heightened trait anxiety resulted in increased attentional dwell-time on emotional facial stimuli, relative to neutral faces. Experiment 1 presented a cueing task, in which the cue was either an "angry", "happy", or "neutral" facial expression. Targets could appear either in the same location as the face (valid trials) or in a different location to the face (invalid trials). Participants did not show significant variations across the different cue types (angry, happy, neutral) in responding to a target on valid trials. However, the valence of the face did affect response times on invalid trials. Specifically, participants took longer to respond to a target when the face cue was "angry" or "happy" relative to neutral. In Experiment 2, the cue-target stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was increased and an overall inhibition of return (IOR) effect was found (i.e., slower responses on valid trials). However, the "angry" face cue eliminated the IOR effect for both high and low trait anxious groups. In Experiment 3, threat-related and jumbled facial stimuli reduced the magnitude of IOR for high, but not for low, trait-anxious participants.These results suggest that: (i) attentional bias in anxiety may reflect a difficulty in disengaging from threat-related and emotional stimuli, and (ii) threat-related and ambiguous cues can influence the magnitude of the IOR effect.     

Cognitive structure of emotion terms in Indonesia and The Netherlands

The rapid detection of facial expressions of anger or threat has obvious adaptive value. In this study, we examined the efficiency of facial processing by means of a visual search task. Participants searched displays of schematic faces and were required to determine whether the faces displayed were all the same or whether one was different. Four main results were found: (1) When displays contained the faces, people were slower in detecting the absence of a discrepant face when the faces displayed angry (or sad/angry) rather than happy expressions. (2) When displays contained a discrepant face people were faster in detecting this when the discrepant face displayed an angry rather than a happy expression. (3) Neither of these patterns for same and different displays was apparent when face displays were inverted, or when just the mouth was presented in isolation. (4) The search slopes for angry targets were significantly lower than for happy targets. These results suggest that detection of angry facial expressions is fast and efficient, although does not “pop-out” in the traditional sense.     

Working memory and behavioral inhibition in children with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD): an examination of varied central executive demands,construct overlap,and task impurity

The stop-signal paradigm is the premier metric of behavioral inhibition in contemporary attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) research. The stop-signal paradigm’s choice-reaction time component, however, arguably places greater demands on working memory processes (e.g., controlled-focused attention) relative to alternative inhibition metrics (i.e., go/no-go (GNG) tasks), and consequently obscures conclusions about inhibition and working memory deficits in affected children. The current study, therefore, aimed to determine whether shared variance between stop-signal behavioral inhibition and working memory performance in children with ADHD reflects overlap between the working memory and inhibition constructs or insufficient specificity of the stop-signal paradigm. Fifty-five children (8–12 years) with and without ADHD were administered established phonological (PH) and visuospatial (VS) working memory measures, as well as stop-signal and GNG tasks that vary with respect to demands on controlled-focused attention. Although working memory and GNG performance each uniquely predicted children’s inattention, stop-signal task performance was not a significant predictor of unique variance in inattention, above and beyond variance associated with working memory. Collectively, these findings suggest that performance on the stop-signal task, compared to the GNG task, is confounded by greater demands associated with working memory and consequently reflects an impure estimate of the inhibition construct.     

Revisiting Jung's concept of innate sensitiveness

Jung suggested that innate sensitiveness predisposes some individuals to be particularly affected by negative childhood experiences, so that later, when under pressure to adapt to some challenge, they retreat into infantile fantasies based on those experiences and become neurotic. Recent research by the author and others is reviewed to support Jung's theory of sensitiveness as a distinctly thorough conscious and unconscious reflection on experiences. Indeed, this probably innate tendency is found in about twenty percent of humans, and, in a sense, in most species, in that about this percentage will evidence a strategy of thoroughly processing information before taking action, while the majority depend on efficient, rapid motor activity. Given this thorough processing, sensitive individuals readily detect subtleties-including whatever is distressing or threatening. Hence, as Jung observed, given the same degree of stress in childhood as non-sensitive individuals, sensitive persons will develop more depression, anxiety, and shyness. Without undue stress, they evidence no more of these difficulties than the non-sensitive-or even less, being unusually aware of supportive as well as negative cues from caregivers. Given this interaction, one treatment task is to distinguish the effects of such childhood difficulties from what does not need treatment, which are the typical effects of the trait itself on an adult without a troubled developmental history.