Neuroimaging and disorders of consciousness: envisioning an ethical research agenda

The application of neuroimaging technology to the study of the injured brain has transformed how neuroscientists understand disorders of consciousness, such as the vegetative and minimally conscious states, and deepened our understanding of mechanisms of recovery. This scientific progress, and its potential clinical translation, provides an opportunity for ethical reflection. It was against this scientific backdrop that we convened a conference of leading investigators in neuroimaging, disorders of consciousness and neuroethics. Our goal was to develop an ethical frame to move these investigative techniques into mature clinical tools. This paper presents the recommendations and analysis of a Working Meeting on Ethics, Neuroimaging and Limited States of Consciousness held at Stanford University during June 2007. It represents an interdisciplinary approach to the challenges posed by the emerging use of neuroimaging technologies to describe and characterize disorders of consciousness.     

Social networks and adult social identities: Profiles and correlates of support and rejection

The growth of interest in social networks has underscored the need for integrative analyses of network dimensions. A three-pronged strategy to achieve this objective was pursued in a study of 261 married women nurses. First, network variables related to important adult social identities were differentiated. Factor analyses revealed four network interaction factors: work support, work rejection, general support, and general rejection. An additional factor analysis differentiated work associates from nonwork network members. Second, cluster analysis of these factor scores identified five different network profiles. The profiles differed in the importance of the woman's work to her nonwork ties as well as the frequency and pattern of different positive and negative interactions. Third, individuals with these contrasting network profiles differed on levels of life satisfaction and psychological symptomatology. The discussion emphasizes social network differences within the broader context of the ecology of human development.     

Development and validation of the Eating Behavior Inventory

The Eating Behavior Inventory (EBI) is a self-report instrument for assessing behaviors that have been theoretically implicated in weight loss, e.g., self-monitoring of food intake and of weight, refusing offers of food, eating at only one place, shopping from a list, eating in response to emotions. Thirty items were constructed in the form of first-person statements, e.g., I eat in the middle of the night. Each item was to be rated with a 5-point scale according to how often it was true for the respondent. Items were scored such that higher scores always reflected more appropriate (theoretically facilitative of weight control) eating patterns. Validity of individual items and total score was assessed in four studies. Twenty-six of the original items appeared valid and were retained. The resulting total score demonstrated validity in these studies and in two cross-validational comparisons. Internal consistency as measured by split-half reliability and correlations of item scores with total score was acceptable. One month test-retest reliability of item and total scores was satisfactory. Clinical and research applications of the EBI are discussed.An early version of this article was presented at the Taos International Conference on Treatment of Addictive Behaviors, Taos, New Mexico, February 1979.     

Adolescent coping and support across multiple social environments

This paper considers how research on stress, coping, and social support in adolescence may be informed by a social ecological perspective. Two case studies are presented which examine contrasting strategies by which adolescents at risk may cope successfully. One strategy focuses on the use of a strong peer social network, the other on the use of school involvements. In both cases, the analyses emphasize coping and social network processes across multiple social environments. Preventive social-community interventions are suggested to circumvent potential trouble spots associated with the use of these strategies.     

Selection for central excitation in Drosophila melanogaster

In two populations of Drosophila melanogaster, bidirectional selection and single-pair matings for high and low expression of central excitatory state (CES) succeeded in producing from one a high, but not a low, CES line, and from the other a low, but not a high, CES line. Compared with results from the selection studies of the blow fly, Phormia regina, in which one major gene correlate of CES has been found, the results from this study suggest that in D. melanogaster there are several gene correlates of CES, opposite alleles of some of which have become fixed in the divergent lines.     

A cognitive model of pathological worry

We present an evidence-based model of pathological worry in which worry arises from an interaction between involuntary (bottom-up) processes, such as habitual biases in attention and interpretation favouring threat content, and voluntary (top-down) processes, such as attentional control. At a pre-conscious level, these processes influence the competition between mental representations when some correspond to the intended focus of attention and others to threat distracters. Processing biases influence the probability of threat representations initially intruding into awareness as negative thoughts. Worry in predominantly verbal form then develops, influenced by conscious processes such as attempts to resolve the perceived threat and the redirection of attentional control resources to worry content, as well as the continuing influence of habitual processing biases. After describing this model, we present evidence for each component process and for their causal role in pathological worry, together with implications for new directions in the treatment of pathological worry.     

On the relevance of folk intuitions: a commentary on Talbot

In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.