Menatal addition: A test of three verification models

Three explanations of adults’ mental addition performance, a counting-based model, a direct-access model with a backup counting procedure, and a network retrieval model, were tested. Whereas important predictions of the two counting models were not upheld, reaction times (RTs) to simple addition problems were consistent with the network retrieval model. RT both increased with problem size and was progressively attenuated to false stimuli as the split (numerical difference between the false and correct sums increased. For large problems, the extreme level of split (13) yielded an RT advantage for false over true problems, suggestive of a global evaluation process operating in parallel with retrieval. RTs to the more complex addition problems in Experiment 2 exhibited a similar pattern of significance and, in regression analyses, demonstrated that complex addition (e.g., 14+12=26) involves retrieval of the simple addition components (4+2=6). The network retrieval/decision model is discussed in terms of its fit to the present data, and predictions concerning priming facilitation and inhibition are specified. The similarities between mental arithmetic results and the areas of semantic memory and mental comparisons indicate both the usefulness of the network approach to mental arithmetic and the usefulness of mental arithmetic to cognitive psychology.     

Optimal learning strategies and their spontaneous use: The importance of task-appropriate processing

College students were given three verbal learning tasks to perform, with some subjects instructed to use a particular verbal or imaginal encoding strategy for all three tasks and other subjects not instructed to use any particular strategy. It was found that the relative effectiveness of the assigned encoding strategies varied as a function of the learning task. In addition, “uninstructed” subjects, for the most part, spontaneously employed strategies that produced recall comparable to that observed for subjects assigned the most effective strategy for a particular learning task. In Experiment 2, subjects were instructed to perform a different encoding strategy for each learning task. Subjects who were assigned the strategies in a “task-appropriate” fashion recalled more, in general, than subjects who were assigned the same strategies paired with the learning tasks in a haphazard fashion. Subjects not instructed to use a particular strategy again demonstrated relatively high recall and were found to vary processing across learning tasks. It was concluded that optimal learning for a range of tasks can require deployment of several semantic/elaborative strategies in a task-appropriate fashion. Furthermore, mature learners seem to spontaneously utilize semantic and imaginal strategies and do so task appropriately.     

Autonomy and coercion in disease prevention and health promotion

Most of the attention regarding the balance between autonomy and paternalism has been focused on the therapeutic relation. Much less attention has been devoted to the problem of autonomy in the application of medical knowledge for preventive purposes. Here, because the good to be achieved is social as well as individual, an unavoidable dilemma ensues. Effective preventive measures of benefit to all must necessarily limit autonomy and involve some coercion. I argue that there are principles which can be established to guide society in a moral use of coercion. The question of employing medical knowledge is not, as it is in therapeutic medicine, to preserve or enhance autonomy. Rather its aim is to enhance voluntary co-operation. Principles for moral use of coercion must thereby be derived from health as a moral value.     

Simultaneously contrasting anchors

Subjects were required to judge a series of weights in the presence of two opposing anchor weights, one heavier and one lighter than the series members. It was predicted that the anchors would enhance each other’s effectiveness (contrast). The findings are similar to that found for the single-anchor experiment, with the exception that, and contrary to prediction, the heavier-weight anchor reduced the effectiveness of the lighter-weight anchor. The opposite effect was not true. It is suggested that a pair of opposing anchors could be identified that would completely cancel each other’s effectiveness.     

Ethical dilemmas in the treatment of adolescent gang members

Therapists treating adolescent gang members face unique ethical dilemmas. These dilemmas arise from clinical issues that inevitably emerge in the treatment of this population. Clinical issues related to the adolescent gang member having great difficulty trusting, having experienced and observed much violence, and usually having participated in criminal activities are central to the treatment process. In this article I discuss the ethical problems that subsequently emerge: maintaining confidentiality, discharging one's duty to warn or protect, and imposing one's personal values. Suggestions for future research are offered.     

Secondary reinforcement and number of primary reinforcements

Pigeons' pecks on either of two concurrently available response keys produced secondary reinforcers according to independent one-minute variable-interval schedules. Different secondary reinforcers, in the presence of which the rates of primary reinforcement were equal, were associated with each key. The rate of pecking maintained by each secondary reinforcer varied directly, but nonproportionally, with the number of primary reinforcements given in the presence of the secondary reinforcer.     

Timmermann,Forschler, and The Attempt to Bridge the Kantian‐Consequentialist Gap

Scott Forschler defends R. M. Hare's rationalist‐universalizing‐utilitarian moral approach against Jens Timmermann's critique of it. He argues that Timmermann fails to see that Kant's ethical rationalism might be consistent with utilitarianism, and argues that Timmermann merely assumes that Kant's deontology follows logically from his ethical rationalism. In Forschler's estimation, it has not been established that either Kant's or Hare's ethical rationalism is inconsistent with utilitarianism. This article, however, argues that, in his response to Timmermann on behalf of Hare's rationalist‐universalizing‐utilitarian approach, Forschler has overlooked something very significant at the foundational level of Hare's moral approach, and that this oversight undercuts his response to Timmermann. The analysis also invites a metaethical investigation of preference satisfaction as it is found in Hare's moral approach. The article uncovers some fundamental metaethical presuppositions in Hare's normative approach, presuppositions overlooked by Forschler.