Reliabilism in philosophy

The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.

Episodic Memory in Schizophrenia

Episodic memory impairments in individuals with schizophrenia have been well documented in the literature. However, despite the abundance of findings, constituent cognitive, neural, behavioral, and genetic components of the deficits continue to elude full characterization. This review provides a characterization of these deficits by organizing findings within three frameworks of interest: 1) neuroanatomical; 2) genetic; and 3) behavioral. Within each approach, evidence from imaging studies as well as behavioral studies is examined. The hope is that by synthesizing the cognitive science paradigms, molecular genetic neurophysiological findings, and computational algorithms applied to medial temporal lobe subregions, we will be able to expand our understanding of the types of compromises in episodic memory systems of individuals with schizophrenia.     

Constructions as categories of language

What causes children to categorize distinct utterances they hear into a constructional generalization? That is, what makes subjects create a constructional category instead of treating each utterance as a distinct unrelated idiom? One simple factor that encourages the learning of abstract categories is shared concrete similarity. When instances share concrete attributes, learners are more likely to categorize them together, and moreover are more likely to attend to their abstract commonalities [Gentner, D., & Medina, J. (1998). Similarity and the development rules. Cognition, 66, 236-297; Markman, A.B., & Gentner D. (1993). Splitting the difference: A structural alignment view of similarity. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 517-535]. This paper reports results that confirm the prediction that presentation of items with concrete shared similarity early in training enhances language learning in adults.     

Loneliness and Dread as Time Sense Disturbances

Our consciousness of time is created by our longing over duration for the care of a nurturing other. By means of a case study, it is shown here that the experience of abject loneliness is dependent upon a disturbed consciousness of time: unmet needs over the passage of time. Loneliness as such is the denial of the present moment—its possibilities and its demands. The loss of the present moment fosters a disturbed judgment of time: the sense that the present moment has stopped—is virtually endless, since the present moment has no future toward which to intend. This time disturbance diminishes the subject's capacity for agency.     

Concerning Madness and Human Suffering

Pastoral Psychology - Few behavioral scientists have attempted a penetrating examination of the problem of suffering. Eschewing its etiology as a moral issue, they have left it to philosophers and...     

Can Asserting that p Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position (And Is That a Good Thing)?

In this paper I argue that there are cases in which a speaker S's observation of the fact that her assertion that p is accepted by another person enhances the strength of S's own epistemic position with respect to p, as compared to S's strength of epistemic position with respect to p prior to having made the assertion. I conclude by noting that the sorts of consideration that underwrite this (happy) possibility may go some distance towards explaining several (unhappy) aspects of our group life as epistemic subjects—in particular, groupthink and group polarization.     

Scientific Meeting of the American Institute for Psychoanalysis

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis -     

The dark side of analytic conviction: impasses of omniscience and complacency

It is common for analysts to struggle with substantial periods of impasse, and with the associated subjective feelings of shame and failure, while analyzing patients who rely heavily on narcissistic defenses. Facing the feelings that accompany periods of impasse, while at the same time pushing oneself to take necessary creative risks, is a huge and painful task for the analyst if it is deeply confronted. These patients engage in false uses of the analytic process in which the pursuit of understanding is systematically undermined. In response, the analyst is susceptible to being drawn in to processes of mutual seduction, false conviction, and impasse. Through the analyst's partial living out of the patient's projective identifications (and eventually observing the patient's living out of the analyst's projective identifications), the analyst is able to gain a depth of understanding of the patient, of him- or herself, and of the interaction that might not otherwise be possible. Because analysts tend to employ theory defensively, it is essential that they attend, through self-analysis and consultation, to the ways in which they use it. Two cases are presented in which prolonged impasses were eventually understood and resolved.