Family therapy and the glamour of science

It is argued that family therapy has adopted esoteric and unrelated theories from 'New Science' in order to maintain its glamour and individuality in comparison with other therapies. One unfortunate consequence of this is to limit the development of the practice of family therapy by prejudicing empirical validation. An alternative approach which attempts to integrate linear and systemic viewpoints is suggested.     

Tension within Triangulation

Philosophers disagree about how meaning connects with history. Donald Davidson, who helped deepen our understanding of meaning, even disagreed with himself. As Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig note, Davidson's account of radical interpretation treats meaning as ahistorical; his Swampman thought experiment treats it as historical. Here I show that while Lepore and Ludwig are right that Davidson's views are in tension, they are wrong about its extent. Unbeknownst to them, Davidson's account of radical interpretation and Swampman thought experiment both rely—in different ways—on the same model of triangulation. I revise one of those ways to resolve the tension within Davidson's views. I close by detailing what role history should play in Davidson's views overall.     

Curiosity as an Agent of Conscience

Public outcry against social outrages in our nation in the past few years have called for solutions that suggest that we as a nation believe that by strengthening the observational and punishing components of the superego of the American Psyche we can successfully overthrow our moral failings. By using data in regard to Adolph Eichman and other Nazis as clinical examples, it is suggested that the problem of our moral failings resides not in a deficient superego (a refluent moral agent) but in the insufficient development of conscience (a reflective consciousness). The roles that curiosity and impeded curiosity take in the development of morality are shown to be central to an understanding of how conscience differs from superego.     

Can Asserting that p Improve the Speaker's Epistemic Position (And Is That a Good Thing)?

In this paper I argue that there are cases in which a speaker S's observation of the fact that her assertion that p is accepted by another person enhances the strength of S's own epistemic position with respect to p, as compared to S's strength of epistemic position with respect to p prior to having made the assertion. I conclude by noting that the sorts of consideration that underwrite this (happy) possibility may go some distance towards explaining several (unhappy) aspects of our group life as epistemic subjects—in particular, groupthink and group polarization.     

Episodic Memory in Schizophrenia

Episodic memory impairments in individuals with schizophrenia have been well documented in the literature. However, despite the abundance of findings, constituent cognitive, neural, behavioral, and genetic components of the deficits continue to elude full characterization. This review provides a characterization of these deficits by organizing findings within three frameworks of interest: 1) neuroanatomical; 2) genetic; and 3) behavioral. Within each approach, evidence from imaging studies as well as behavioral studies is examined. The hope is that by synthesizing the cognitive science paradigms, molecular genetic neurophysiological findings, and computational algorithms applied to medial temporal lobe subregions, we will be able to expand our understanding of the types of compromises in episodic memory systems of individuals with schizophrenia.     

Reliabilism in philosophy

The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified. I explore the nature and scope of the problem, examine and reject some candidate solutions, compare the issue with ones arising in discussions about disagreement, and offer a brief assessment of our predicament.

Experts,Semantic and Epistemic

In this paper I argue that the tendency to defer in matters semantic is rationalized by our reliance on the say‐so of others for much of what we know about the world. The result, I contend, is a new and distinctly epistemic source of support for the doctrine of attitude anti‐individualism.