The error protection impact of inhibitory after-effects in a location-based task and its preservation with practice

In location-based tasks, responses related to (prime trial) distractor-occupied locations automatically undergo activation, followed by inhibition, which causes these responses to become execution-resistant (ER). Distractor-response ER takes time to override, delaying target reactions that later require this response (e.g., probe, ignored-repetition trials), causing the spatial negative priming (SNP) phenomenon. We learned in this study that distractor-response ER affords this output a degree of error protection. Specifically, when the probe target appeared at a new location, former (prime) distractor responses were used erroneously significantly less often than their control response counterparts, likely due to their ER feature, which discourages their inappropriate selection (i.e., “ER” provides error protection). This error protection also was evident when a previous distractor response was activated by a distractor on the probe (i.e., distractor-repeat trial). Notably, error protection remained effective over extensive practice, as did SNP size (i.e., ER override time) after an initial decline.     

Longitudinal relations among exuberance,externalizing behaviors,and attentional bias to reward: the mediating role of effortful control

The present study examined the associations between temperamental exuberance during toddlerhood (20 months), attention bias towards reward at the end of kindergarten (76 months), and externalizing behaviors across the kindergarten year. Moreover, we examined the role of effortful control at 48 months on the relation between early exuberance and attention bias. Attention bias towards reward was positively predicted by exuberance, negatively predicted by effortful control, and positively related to externalizing problems. Finally, the longitudinal path between exuberance and attention bias to reward was mediated by effortful control – such that higher toddler exuberance led to increased attention bias towards reward by way of lower effortful control. These results extend the attention bias and socioemotional functioning literature and have implications for the identification of children at risk for behavioral problems.     

Three ways of watching a sports video

It does not typically seem to be worthwhile rewatching a sport match, for example, in a video recording, once the result is known. Sports matches are like detective stories. Once one knows ‘whodunit’, there seems little point in revisiting the tale. By drawing on an argument from musicologist Edward T. Cone, this paper argues that certain sports matches may be revisited with profit. The initial experience of a game may be of a series of events that are often ambiguous or confusing as to their meaning or purpose. The full appreciation of a sport match requires, not just this initial familiarity with the immediately perceived events of the game, but also an awareness of the tactics being deployed by both sides. An understanding of tactics and strategy is akin to the analysis of a piece of music (or other art work). A further (third) viewing of the game, during which one can appreciate how the tactics inform the events naively experienced in the first viewing, will yield, it will be argued, an aesthetic pleasure. This takes the experience of sport beyond the merely entertaining or exciting. In certain games, the third viewing may also transcend an appreciation of the merely formal qualities of the game, and so offer substantial insights into what it is to be human.     

Do Smarter People Employ Better Decision Strategies? The Influence of Intelligence on Adaptive Use of the Recognition Heuristic

Within the adaptive toolbox approach, it has repeatedly been shown that, on average, people tend to adapt their decision strategies to the decision context. Building upon these results, we investigated whether individuals systematically differ in their ability to successfully adapt to the situation when applying the fast‐and‐frugal recognition heuristic (RH). In decisions between recognized and unrecognized choice objects, individuals can base their choices solely on recognition, as predicted by the RH, or they can use further knowledge retrieved from memory. Since intelligence has been conceived as the ability to successfully adapt to different situations, we expected intelligence to influence the degree of adaptive use of the RH. To test this hypothesis, we first re‐analyzed data that referred to a decision domain for which RH‐use is known to perform well. As expected, individual RH‐use increased with general intelligence. Next, we designed an experiment addressing individual RH‐use in two new decision domains, one domain for which RH‐use was less effective than knowledge‐use and another domain for which both strategies were about equally effective. In addition, we tested whether fluid or crystallized intelligence best predicts adaptive use of the RH. RH‐use was found to decrease with fluid but not crystallized intelligence when RH‐use was less effective than use of further knowledge. In contrast, there was no significant association between either type of intelligence and RH‐use when none of the two strategies was optimal. We conclude that adaptive use versus non‐use of the RH is moderated by fluid intelligence. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A matter of time: Antecedents of one-reason decision making based on recognition

The notion of adaptive decision making implies that strategy selection in both inferences and preferences is driven by a trade-off between accuracy and effort. A strategy for probabilistic inferences which is particularly attractive from this point of view is the recognition heuristic (RH). It proposes that judgments rely on recognition in isolation-ignoring any further information that might be available-and thereby allows for substantial effort-reduction. Consequently, it is herein hypothesized that and tested whether increased necessity of effort-reduction-as implemented via time pressure-fosters reliance on the RH. Two experiments corroborated that this was the case, even with relatively mild time pressure. In addition, this result held even when non-compliance with the response deadline did not yield negative monetary consequences. The current investigations are among the first to tackle the largely open question of whether effort-related factors influence the reliance on heuristics in memory-based decisions.     

Inhibited prime-trial distractor responses solely produce the visual spatial negative priming effect

Responding to a target??s current (probe trial) location is slower when it appears at a former distractor-occupied position (i.e., ignored-repetition [IR] trial), relative to when it arises at a new location (i.e., control trial). This RT(IR) > RT(Control) inequality defines the spatial negative priming (SNP) effect in latency terms. It is uncertain whether the elevated RT(IR) is due to the inhibition of the distractor-occupied location or to the inhibition of this location??s assigned manual response (SNP locus issue). The main aim here was to examine the SNP locus issue. Notably, our SNP design used centrally presented visual events and included having two locations share a common response (many:1 location-to-response mapping) and the use of informative (70?% validity) or uninformative probe-trial response cues. The many:1 mapping trials allowed for the detection of location and response inhibition presence. Results showed that the latter, but not the former, causes inhibitory aftereffects (e.g., SNP) following uninformative response cues. Consistent with this finding, when the informative response cue was valid and was assigned to the many:1 probe response that had just served as the prime distractor response, inhibitory aftereffects were eliminated, when the probe target appeared at the prime distractor position (IR trial) or at a new location (distractor?Cresponse repeat trial). Blocked retrieval of stored distractor-processing representations was proposed as the mechanism for inhibitory aftereffect prevention.     

The logic sense: exploring the role of executive functioning in belief and logic-based judgments

Abstract

The Default Interventionist account suggests that by default, we often generate belief-based responses when reasoning and find it difficult to draw the logical inference. Recent research, however, shows that in some instances belief judgments take longer, are more prone to error and are more affected by cognitive load. One interpretation is that some logical inferences are available automatically and require intervention in order to respond according to beliefs. In two experiments, we investigate the effortful nature of belief judgments and the automaticity of logical inferences by increasing the inhibitory demands of the task. Participants were instructed to judge conclusion validity, believability and either font colour or font style, to increase the number of competing responses. Results showed that conflict more strongly affects judgments of believability than validity and when inhibitory demands are increased, the validity of an argument impacts more on belief judgments. These findings align with the new Parallel Processing model of belief bias.