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301.
Benjamin C. Jantzen 《Synthese》2011,181(3):433-450
In a naïve realist approach to reading an ontology off the models of a physical theory, the invariance of a given theory under permutations of its property-bearing objects entails the existence of distinct possible worlds from amongst which the theory cannot choose. A brand of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) attempts to avoid this consequence by denying that objects possess primitive identity, and thus worlds with property values permuted amongst those objects are really one and the same world. Assuming that any successful ontology of objects is able to describe a universe containing a determinate number of them, I argue that no version of OSR which both retains objects and understands ‘structure’ in terms of relations can be successful. This follows from the fact that no set of relational facts is sufficient to fix the cardinality of the collection of objects implied by those facts. More broadly, I offer reasons to believe that no version of OSR is compatible with the existence of objects, no matter how ontologically derivative they are taken to be. Any such account would have to attribute a definite cardinality to a collection of objects while denying that those objects are possessed of a primitive identity. With no compelling reason to abandon the classical conception of cardinality, such an attribution is incoherent. 相似文献
302.
Prasanta S. Bandyoapdhyay Davin Nelson Mark Greenwood Gordon Brittan Jesse Berwald 《Synthese》2011,181(2):185-208
There are three distinct questions associated with Simpson’s paradox. (i) Why or in what sense is Simpson’s paradox a paradox? (ii) What is the proper analysis of the paradox? (iii) How one should proceed when confronted with a typical case of the paradox? We propose a “formal” answer to the first two questions which, among other things, includes deductive proofs for important theorems regarding Simpson’s paradox. Our account contrasts sharply with Pearl’s causal (and questionable) account of the first two questions. We argue that the “how to proceed question?” does not have a unique response, and that it depends on the context of the problem. We evaluate an objection to our account by comparing ours with Blyth’s account of the paradox. Our research on the paradox suggests that the “how to proceed question” needs to be divorced from what makes Simpson’s paradox “paradoxical.” 相似文献
303.
Stathis Psillos 《Synthese》2011,181(1):23-40
The aim of this paper is to articulate, discuss in detail and criticise Reichenbach’s sophisticated and complex argument for
scientific realism. Reichenbach’s argument has two parts. The first part aims to show how there can be reasonable belief in
unobservable entities, though the truth of claims about them is not given directly in experience. The second part aims to
extent the argument of the first part to the case of realism about the external world, conceived of as a world of independently
existing entities distinct from sensations. It is argued that the success of the first part depends on a change of perspective,
where unobservable entities are viewed as projective complexes vis-à-vis their observable symptoms, or effects. It is also
argued that there is an essential difference between the two parts of the argument, which Reichenbach comes (somewhat reluctantly)
to accept. 相似文献
304.
James F. Woodward 《Synthese》2011,182(1):165-179
This paper provides a restatement and defense of the data/ phenomena distinction introduced by Jim Bogen and me several decades
ago (e.g., Bogen and Woodward, The Philosophical Review, 303–352, 1988). Additional motivation for the distinction is introduced,
ideas surrounding the distinction are clarified, and an attempt is made to respond to several criticisms. 相似文献
305.
We describe an ontology of philosophy that is designed to aid navigation through philosophical literature, including literature
in the form of encyclopedia articles and textbooks and in both printed and digital forms. The ontology is designed also to
serve integration and structuring of data pertaining to the philosophical literature, and in the long term also to support
reasoning about the provenance and contents of such literature, by providing a representation of the philosophical domain
that is oriented around what philosophical literature is about. 相似文献
306.
Brigitte Falkenburg 《Synthese》2011,182(1):149-163
Depending on different positions in the debate on scientific realism, there are various accounts of the phenomena of physics. For scientific realists like Bogen and Woodward, phenomena are matters
of fact in nature, i.e., the effects explained and predicted by physical theories. For empiricists like van Fraassen, the
phenomena of physics are the appearances observed or perceived by sensory experience. Constructivists, however, regard the
phenomena of physics as artificial structures generated by experimental and mathematical methods. My paper investigates the
historical background of these different meanings of “phenomenon” in the traditions of physics and philosophy. In particular,
I discuss Newton’s account of the phenomena and Bohr’s view of quantum phenomena, their relation to the philosophical discussion,
and to data and evidence in current particle physics and quantum optics. 相似文献
307.
Jaakko Hintikka 《Synthese》2011,183(1):69-85
The modern notion of the axiomatic method developed as a part of the conceptualization of mathematics starting in the nineteenth
century. The basic idea of the method is the capture of a class of structures as the models of an axiomatic system. The mathematical
study of such classes of structures is not exhausted by the derivation of theorems from the axioms but includes normally the
metatheory of the axiom system. This conception of axiomatization satisfies the crucial requirement that the derivation of
theorems from axioms does not produce new information in the usual sense of the term called depth information. It can produce
new information in a different sense of information called surface information. It is argued in this paper that the derivation
should be based on a model-theoretical relation of logical consequence rather than derivability by means of mechanical (recursive)
rules. Likewise completeness must be understood by reference to a model-theoretical consequence relation. A correctly understood
notion of axiomatization does not apply to purely logical theories. In the latter the only relevant kind of axiomatization
amounts to recursive enumeration of logical truths. First-order “axiomatic” set theories are not genuine axiomatizations.
The main reason is that their models are structures of particulars, not of sets. Axiomatization cannot usually be motivated
epistemologically, but it is related to the idea of explanation. 相似文献
308.
The distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and Woodward (Philosophical Review 97(3):303–352, 1988) was
meant to help accounting for scientific practice, especially in relation with scientific theory testing. Their article and
the subsequent discussion is primarily viewed as internal to philosophy of science. We shall argue that the data/phenomena
distinction can be used much more broadly in modelling processes in philosophy. 相似文献
309.
Cedric Paternotte 《Synthese》2011,183(2):249-276
Defined and formalized several decades ago, widely used in philosophy and game theory, the concept of common knowledge is
still considered as problematic, although not always for the right reasons. I suggest that the epistemic status of a group
of human agents in a state of common knowledge has not been thoroughly analyzed. In particular, every existing account of
common knowledge, whether formal or not, is either too strong to fit cognitively limited individuals, or too weak to adequately
describe their state. I provide a realistic definition of common knowledge, based on a formalization of David Lewis’ seminal
account and show that it is formally equivalent to probabilistic common belief. This leads to a philosophical analysis of
common knowledge which answers several common criticisms and sheds light on its nature. 相似文献
310.
Aidan Lyon 《Synthese》2011,182(3):413-432
Some have argued that chance and determinism are compatible in order to account for the objectivity of probabilities in theories
that are compatible with determinism, like Classical Statistical Mechanics (CSM) and Evolutionary Theory (ET). Contrarily,
some have argued that chance and determinism are incompatible, and so such probabilities are subjective. In this paper, I
argue that both of these positions are unsatisfactory. I argue that the probabilities of theories like CSM and ET are not
chances, but also that they are not subjective probabilities either. Rather, they are a third type of probability, which I
call counterfactual probability. The main distinguishing feature of counterfactual-probability is the role it plays in conveying important counterfactual
information in explanations. This distinguishes counterfactual probability from chance as a second concept of objective probability. 相似文献