Testing visual short-term memory: Simultaneous versus sequential presentations

Two experiments testing immediate ordered recall are presented; in these experiments, subjects engaged in repetitive speech (“articulatory suppression”) during a visual presentation in order to prevent auditory recoding of the stimuli. In both experiments, a simultaneous presentation produced results that suggested the use of visual short-term memory, whereas a sequential presentation did not. In Experiment 1, visual confusion errors occurred more often than would be expected by chance for a simultaneous presentation but not for a sequential presentation. In Experiment 2, recall from visual short-term memory was expected to suffer more when subjects wrote a prefix than when they spoke a prefix; this effect occurred for a simultaneous presentation but not for a sequential presentation. These results suggest that existence of a visual short term store that retains a simultaneous presentation but not a sequential presentation.     

A new quantitative approach to the assessment of stages of vigilance as defined by spatiotemporal EEG patterning

Electroencephalographically oriented research on vigilance needs valid measures for assessing the level of vigilance between wakefulness and sleep. When studying different psychologically, psychopathologically, and pharmacologically induced states, special attention has to be paid to minor alterations of the level of vigilance which are reflected, essentially, in topographical changes of alpha-activity (Stage A). Since vigilance is a dynamic process, brief fluctuations in the range of a few seconds must also be recorded. In our opinion existing methods of quantification do not fully meet these demands. We have, therefore, developed a relatively simple procedure which can be characterized as an attempt quantitatively to reconstruct visually, i.e., spatiotemporally defined patterns of vigilance. The usefulness of this method, which also has certain limitations, has been demonstrated in psychopharmacological studies.     

Grading the ‘cultural literacy’ project

The essay examines the argument advanced by E.D. Hirsch, Jr., for instituting ‘cultural literacy’ as a fundamental priority of schools. A number of confusions and equivocations in Hirsch's reasoning are identified, and the propensity of his project to indoctrinate is exposed. Among the features of Hirsch's argument shown to be troubling are his shifting construal of ‘language’, his inconsistency about the requirements of cultural literacy, and his uncritical relation to traditional images of the American past and present. The upshot is to raise the question why Hirsch's project has elicited wide support and praise.     

Referenzsemantik in der Partnermodellierung

How can we explain that an assertion on something perceived can be understood in the same manner by somebody who cannot perceive that scene? This problem bases the interest in computational linguistics in how listener modeling could possibly be harmonized with reference semantics. Mental images substituting real perception appear as a way out. The architecture of the listener model has to be adapted to the creation and use of such pictorial data structures. Furthermore, the relation between the latter and a verbal (i. e., propositional) representation must be understood. The resulting architecture of a listener model with reference semantics can be employed to solve communicational problems from three general classes in a better way, as is demonstrated by an example implementation.     

Accepting the null hypothesis

This article concerns acceptance of the null hypothesis that one variable has no effect on another. Despite frequent opinions to the contrary, this null hypothesis can be correct in some situations. Appropriate criteria for accepting the null hypothesis are (1) that the null hypothesis is possible; (2) that the results are consistent with the null hypothesis; and (3) that the experiment was a good effort to find an effect. These criteria are consistent with the meta-rules for psychology. The good-effort criterion is subjective, which is somewhat undesirable, but the alternative—never accepting the null hypothesis—is neither desirable nor practical.