Antiskeptical Conditionals

Empirical knowledge exists in the form of antiskeptical conditionals , which are propositions like [if I am not undetectably deceived, then I am holding a pen]. Such conditionals, despite their trivial appearance, have the same essential content as the categorical propositions that we usually discuss, and can serve the same functions in science and practical reasoning. This paper sketches out two versions of a general response to skepticism that employs these conditionals. The first says that our ordinary knowledge attributions can safely be replaced by statements using antiskeptical conditionals, which provides a way around the standard sort of skeptical argument while accepting its soundness with respect to the usual targets. The second analyzes the objects of our ordinary knowledge attributions as antiskeptical conditionals, which allows us to refute, not just evade, the skeptic's argument. Both versions compare favorably to the best-known current approaches to skepticism, including semantic contextualism.     

Pretense, Existence, and Fictional Objects

There has recently been considerable interest in accounts of fiction which treat fictional characters as abstract objects. In this paper I argue against this view. More precisely I argue that such accounts are unable to accommodate our intuitions that fictional negative existentials such as "Raskolnikov doesn't exist" are true. I offer a general argument to this effect and then consider, but reject, some of the accounts of fictional negative existentials offered by abstract object theorists. I then note that some of the sort of data invoked by the abstract object theorist in fact cuts against her position. I conclude that we should not regard fictional characters as abstract objects but rather should adopt a make-believe theoretic account of fictional characters along the lines of those developed by Ken Walton and others.     

Anatomy of the Two Subdisciplines of Communication Study

Evidence is summarized here for the degree to which the field of communication study is divided into two Subdisciplines: mass communication versus interpersonal communication. This division is expressed (a) in the general lack of cross-citations between five mass communication journals and five interpersonal communication journals, (b) by separation of the two Subdisciplines in communication associations, and (c) by the awarding of doctoral degrees in programs specializing mainly in interpersonal communication or in mass communication. The historical and other reasons for this bifurcation of communication study and the functions and dysfunctions of this division are discussed.     

Interpersonal Versus Mass Media Communication A False Dichotomy

We challenge the intellectual separation of interpersonal and mass media communication, arguing that this division of communication research rests primarily on grounds of historical convenience and university politics. There is little theoretical justification for the dichotomous division of our field, yet we provide evidence that communication scholars seldom cross-cite research articles between the two subdisciplines, rarely attend scientific conferences in ways that span this distinction, and often are segregated in separate university departments. The intellectual costs of this division are discussed, and possible means of furthering intellectual exchange between the two subdisciplines are discussed.