A Puzzle about Consent in Research and in Practice

In this paper, I will examine a puzzling discrepancy between the way clinicians are allowed to treat their patients and the way researchers are allowed to treat their subjects: in certain cases, researchers are legally required to disclose quite a bit more information when obtaining consent from prospective subjects than clinicians are when obtaining consent from prospective patients. I will argue that the proper resolution of this puzzling discrepancy must appeal to a pragmatic criterion of disclosure for informed consent: that what needs to be disclosed in order for consent to be valid depends on what the patient/subject needs to know in order to make a decision. I will then use this pragmatic criterion of disclosure to argue that when obtaining consent researchers should be permitted to omit the same information clinicians are, given certain qualifications. I will also examine how this puzzle forces us to confront some perhaps surprising truths about valid consent. My broader aim in this paper is to examine, not so much the puzzle itself, but rather what this particular puzzle can teach us about more theoretical issues surrounding informed consent.     

EMPIRICAL EQUIVALENCE IN THE QUINE-CARNAP DEBATE

Abstract:  Alexander George has put forward a novel interpretation of the Quine-Carnap debate over analyticity. George argues that Carnap's claim that there exists an analytic-synthetic distinction was held by Carnap to be empty of empirical consequences. As a result, Carnap understood his position to be empirically indistinguishable from Quine's. Although George defends his interpretation only briefly, I show that it withstands further examination and ought to be accepted. The consequences of accepting it undermine a common understanding of Quine's criticism of Carnap, and I argue that it is difficult to find a perspective from which Quine can criticize Carnap in a non-question-begging way.