首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   175758篇
  免费   7904篇
  国内免费   157篇
  183819篇
  2021年   1497篇
  2020年   2788篇
  2019年   3454篇
  2018年   3569篇
  2017年   4025篇
  2016年   4672篇
  2015年   3943篇
  2014年   4823篇
  2013年   23558篇
  2012年   4695篇
  2011年   3882篇
  2010年   3958篇
  2009年   4815篇
  2008年   4009篇
  2007年   3609篇
  2006年   4206篇
  2005年   4154篇
  2004年   3671篇
  2003年   3258篇
  2002年   3123篇
  2001年   3280篇
  2000年   3096篇
  1999年   3121篇
  1998年   2848篇
  1997年   2681篇
  1996年   2591篇
  1995年   2430篇
  1994年   2393篇
  1993年   2335篇
  1992年   2563篇
  1991年   2408篇
  1990年   2272篇
  1989年   2218篇
  1988年   2182篇
  1987年   2210篇
  1986年   2176篇
  1985年   2446篇
  1984年   2536篇
  1983年   2344篇
  1982年   2382篇
  1981年   2370篇
  1980年   2207篇
  1979年   2225篇
  1978年   2204篇
  1977年   2153篇
  1976年   1975篇
  1975年   2018篇
  1974年   2063篇
  1973年   1967篇
  1972年   1532篇
排序方式: 共有10000条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
131.
One possible explanation for the association between Cook-Medley Hostility Scale (Ho Scale; W. W. Cook & D. M. Medley, 1954) scores and premature coronary artery disease (CAD) morbidity and mortality is that hostile persons also have elevations on CAD risk factors. Meta-analyses with fixed and random-effects models were used to evaluate the relationship between Ho Scale scores and CAD risk factors in the empirical literature. Ho Scale scores were significantly related to body mass index, waist-to-hip ratio, insulin resistance, lipid ratio, triglycerides, glucose, socioeconomic status (SES), alcohol consumption, and smoking. Although there was also heterogeneity among study outcomes, the results of conservative random effects models provide confidence in the obtained relationships. On the basis of available evidence, researchers might give attention to obesity, insulin resistance, damaging health behaviors, and SES as potential contributing factors in understanding the association between Ho Scale scores and CAD.  相似文献   
132.
133.
134.
135.
Two experiments examined repetition priming in the recognition of famous voices. In Experiment 1, reaction times for fame decisions to famous voice samples were shorter than in an unprimed condition, when voices were primed by a different voice sample of the same person having been presented in an earlier phase of the experiment. No effect of voice repetition was observed for non-famous voices. In Experiment 2, it was investigated whether this priming effect is voice-specific or whether it is related to post-perceptual processes in person recognition. Recognizing a famous voice was again primed by having earlier heard a different voice sample of that person. Although an earlier exposure to that person's name did not cause any priming, there was some indication of priming following an earlier exposure to that person's face. Finally, earlier exposure to the identical voice sample (as compared to a different voice sample from the same person) caused a considerable bias towards responding 'famous'-i.e. performance benefits for famous but costs for nonfamous voices. The findings suggestthat (1) repetition priming invoice recognition primarily involves the activation of perceptual representations of voices, and (2) it is important to determine the conditions in which priming causes bias effects that need to be disentangled from performance benefits.  相似文献   
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
Do the conditions under which promises are made determine whether they ought to be kept? Philosophers have placed a number of conditions on promising which, they hold, must be met in order to make promise-keeping obligatory. In so doing, they have distinguished valid promises from invalid promises and justified promises from promises that are not justified. Considering such conditions, one by one, we argue that they are mistaken. In the first place, the conditions they lay down are not necessary for either valid or justified promise-making. In the second place, promises need not meet such conditions in order to create moral obligations. In general, such analyses of promising fail because they suffer from a confusion between promise-making and promise-keeping. Philosophers have wrongly supposed that obligations to keep promises are dependent upon, or derivable from, the quality of the promises themselves, at the time they are made, instead of focusing on conditions that must be satisfied at the time when promises are supposed to be kept. It is not the quality of a promise that determines an obligation to keep it but the rightness or wrongness of performing the promised act.  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号