The foundations of epistemological probability

Epistemological probability is the kind of probability relative to a body of evidence. Many philosophers, including Henry Kyburg and Roderick Chisholm, hold that all epistemological probabilities reflect a relation between an evidential body of propositions and other propositions. But this article argues that some epistemological probabilities for empirical propositions must be relative to non-propositional evidence, specifically the contents of non-propositional perceptual states. In doing so, the article distinguishes between internalism and externalism regarding epistemological probability, and argues for a version of awareness internalism. The article draws three main concluding lessons. First, epistemological probability is not to be identified with the sort of objective, experience-independent probability that is familiar from statistical and propensity interpretations of probability. Second, it is doubtful that epistemological probability is measurable, in any useful way, by real numbers, even if it admits of comparative assessments. Third, contrary to the familiar claim of C. I. Lewis, epistemological probability should not be viewed as requiring a basis of certainty.     

Powers, causation, and modality

A complex theory concerning powers, natures, and causal necessity has emerged from the writings of P. H. Hare, E. H. Madden, and R. Harré. In the course of rebutting objections that other critics have raised to the power account of causation, I correct three of its genuine difficulties: its attempt to analyze power attributions in terms of conditional statements; its characterization of the relation between something's powers and its nature; and its doctrines concerning conceptual necessity. The resulting interpretation of causal modalities is then subsumed under a more general power account of modality, related at a number of points to considerations concerning powers, and further illustrating their philosophical importance.     

Memory and awareness in a patient with multiple personality disorder

We studied an individual with multiple personality disorder in whom each of several personalities claimed to have no direct awareness of the others and to be unable to consciously remember the experiences of other personalities. A broad selection of implicit and explicit memory tests was used to determine the extent to which one personality had access to knowledge acquired by another and the circumstances in which that knowledge would be expressed. The implicit assessment of memory was a necessary but not sufficient condition for demonstrating interpersonality access. The degree of compartmentalization of knowledge in this patient depended largely on whether the interpretation of presented information was likely to differ across personalities.     

Subject knowledge of the Experimenter''s interest in handedness and familial sinistrality variables and laterality test outcomes

We investigated the possible influence of common "demand characteristics" on the results on behavioral language laterality tasks. The demand characteristics were (1) whether Ss were or were not recruited for study according to their handedness, and (2) whether a detailed familial sinistrality inquiry was conducted before or after the tasks. Tasks were the Dichotic Consonant Vowel Task (DCVT) and the Bilateral Object Naming Latency Task (BONLT). Results showed no effect of demand characteristics on the BONLT. On the DCVT, however, prior inquiry regarding familial sinistrality was associated with significantly reduced right ear advantages (REAs). Interactions showed that the greatest reduction in REAs occurred in Ss with left-handedness in their families, who were asked about familial sinistrality prior to the tasks, who took the DCVT after the BONLT, and who were also recruited by handedness. Results, though generally reassuring regarding the robustness of the tasks against these sources of bias, raise some cautions for the DCVT.     

On not knowing what or who one is: Reflections on the intelligibility of dualism

Beginning with Descartes' caution not imprudently to take some other object in place of myself, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by variousamnesiacs, both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting thatcogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of body-switching thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of psychological connectedness or unity of consciousness as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability to apply any notion of personal identity is parasitic upon the existence of a conceptual apparatus for individuating, identifying, and reidentifying objects. Finally, I argue that, if person is a proper sortal predicate to begin with, Descartes'res cogitans cannot be understood as a species of the (metaphysical) genusres, distinct fromres extensa and only problematically in interaction with it. Cartesian dualism is a multiply untenable doctrine.