Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

Cance and luck are not the same

In the mind of many people chance and luck act as real but different causes of events. Even in strictly defined situations as casino gambling, people may perceive influences of luck that help to overcome the negative expectancy defined by the rules of chance. Interviews with gamblers in casinos confirmed this idea. In two experiments it was established that the distinction between chance and luck are also made by ordinary subjects in everyday situations. The results revealed that chance is perceived to operate when an event is surprising, an unexpected coincidence. Luck is perceived when an event implies the escape from negative consequences, or the achievement of something that is important and difficult. The distinction between chance and luck can explain why people are trapped by the illusion of control, even when it is clear that they have no influence on the physical causation determining the outcomes of events. They cannot change the outcome of the roulette wheel, but they can employ their luck, which helps them to place their bets on the winning number.     

Individual differences in reverse Hindsight bias: I never thought something like chernobyl would happen. Did I?

Hindsight bias was studied in the context of the accident in the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which took place on April 26th 1986. An individual difference factor which relates to the motivation to process information, need for cognition, was expected to moderate the occurrence of hindsight bias. Probability estimates of many casualties due to the use of nuclear power in The Netherlands were obtained from 212 individuals two months before the accident in Chernobyl. These estimates were compared with similar estimates made in hindsight by the same individuals five months after the accident. Loglinear Analyses reveal a systematic hindsight bias. However, the direction of the bias was contrary to expectations. In hindsight, individuals gave lower probabilities than they actually did two months before the Chernobyl accident. These results reveal a reverse hindsight bias. As hypothesized, need for cognition moderates hindsight bias: individuals low and medium in need for cognition express a systematic reverse hindsight bias, while individuals high in need for cognition do not. High need for cognition individuals also show higher literal consistency between the two measurements, which supports a memory explanation of the moderating effect of need for cognition.     

Effectiveness of the GOFER course in decision making for high school students

The paper describes and evaluates the GOFER course in decision making for high school students (Mann, Harmoni and Power, 1988). The course was based on principles from the conflict theory of decision making (Janis and Mann, 1977) and was designed to provide adolescents with an understanding of factors that produce good and poor decision making as well as knowledge and practice of sound decision skills. Two evaluation studies were conducted to examine effectiveness of the course. Study 1 was conducted with young adolescents (12 year olds). It found a significant difference between students trained in the course and a control group on measures of self-esteem as a decision maker, self reported decision habits and knowledge of decision strategy. Study 2 was conducted with mid-adolescents (15 year olds). It, too, found a significant difference between students who took the course and a control group on measures of self esteem as a decision maker and self-reported decision habits. It is concluded that while the evaluation study fell short of an ideal test, the GOFER course met the criteria of improving student knowledge, raising confidence in decision making and changing self reported decision habits.     

Does Women's Liberation Imply Children's Liberation?

Shulamith Firestone argues that for women to embrace equal rights without recognizing them for children is unjust. Protection of children is merely repressive control: they are infantilized by our treatment of them. I maintain that many children no longer get much protection, but neither are they being provided with an environment conducive to learning prudence or morality. Recognizing equal rights for children is likely to worsen this situation, not make it better.     

Retroactive interference in the retention of prose: A reconsideration and new evidence

The sensitivity of naturalistic prose material to retroactive interference (RI) was investigated in three experiments, with due consideration given to the conditions known to produce RI in non-prose material. In experiment 1, unrelated, related, and nearly identical (parapharase) prose passage conditions yielded a pattern of results very similar to those obtained with non-prose material, with only the related condition associated with significant amounts of RI. Based upon these results and a few simple assumptions, a classificatory scheme was developed within which predictions were made regarding RI in related prose material. Several such predictions were tested and confirmed in Experiments 2 and 3. It was concluded that the many previous failures to detect RI in the retention of prose may be attributed to factors other than any inherent insensitivity of the material itself, and that RI may be just as predictable in prose as it is non-prose material.     

Learning from lectures: The effect of varying the detail in lecture handouts on note-taking and recall

Previous research on the effect of lecture handouts on student learning indicates that students who are given skeletal handouts usually perform better in course examinations than students who take all their own notes. The present study investigates whether the amount of detail in the handout is a critical factor in this. A randomized groups experiment was conducted in the context of a course on dental surgery. Four lecture handout conditions (headings and full text; headings and key points; headings only; no supplementary materials) were compared on tests 2 days and 2 weeks after the lecture. The significant differences between conditions were: ‘headings only’ better than ‘headings and key points’ on the first test; ‘headings only’ better than ‘no supplementary materials’ on the second test; and ‘headings and full text’ better than ‘no supplementary materials’ on the second test. These results indicate that the amount of detail is a critical factor in handout effectiveness.     

Expert knowledge as mnemonic cues

It is proposed that expert knowledge can operate as a cognitive cueing structure for the acquisition and retention of new information in memory. Two experiments are reported which demonstrate that expert knowledge about football and clothing can act as mnemonic cues for the recall of information newly associated with that knowledge. In Experiment 1 expert terms from the domains of football and clothing and those neutral nouns paired with them were both better recalled by experts than by non-experts. In Experiment 2 passages containing information contrary to factual knowledge about football and clothing were recalled better by experts than by non-experts, in spite of the fact that information in the passages contradicted what the experts already knew. The results of the two experiments were interpreted as showing that expert knowledge provides mental cues that have desirable mnemonic properties such as constructibility, associability, discriminability and invertibility. Also, the interpretation of expert knowledge as a cognitive cueing structure is compared to Ausubel's ideas regarding advance organizers.     

Counselor Self-Disclosure

Self-disclosure in the counseling-therapy relationship has been an important area of research and study, with considerable emphasis placed on counselor self-disclosure. This study was initiated to explore further the phenomenon of counselor-therapist disclosure through direct assessment of potential clients' desires for disclosure and through development of a measure of counselor disclosure. Implications for counselor disclosure and for the counselor-client therapy relationship are discussed.