The functional architecture of instrumental conditional reflexes

The author holds the opinion that the so-called operant, or instrumental, conditional reflexes, in spite of differences in specific features, do not differ in principle from classical conditional reflexes, and therefore they should not be opposed to them, or be placed in a special or separate group. In support of this opinion, this paper presents data which show that:

1. 1.
   In the establishment of classical and operant conditional reflexes, two-way conditional connections—direct and reverse—are formed.     

The effect of angle between the oblique lines on the decrement of the Müller-Lyer illusion with extended practice

Early work on the Müller-Lyer illusion had indicated that it disappears with extended practice. The present experiment failed to confirm this finding. The magnitude of the illusion decreased for approximately 500 trials, but showed no further change over an additional 500 trials. The rate of the practice decrement was inversely related to the size of the angle formed by the oblique lines of the figure.     

Population norms of top sensory magnitudes and S. S. Stevens’ exponents

If S. S. Stevens’ exponents indicate the rates at which sensations grow with increases in sensory intensity, they ought to correlate with the population norms of top sensory magnitudes. Using a comprehensive sample of eight sensory dimensions, the tau coefficient of rank correlation between Stevens’ exponents and the medians of the top sensory magnitudes reported by 305 observers was found to be only +.15 (p>05). With the geometric means tau fell to ?.04. A split-half consistency check on the medians of the population norms suggested that they were not to blame for the low correlation. Direct comparisons of pairs of sensory dimensions on 146 additional observers produced results which confirmed the population norms. Since there is no way of comparing most of the top physical stimuli experienced in everyday life, it is not possible to make a joint prediction from exponents and top stimuli. S. S. Stevens’ exponents thus appear to have little predictive value outside the experimental conditions under which they were measured.     

BRIDGING PHYSIOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY

R asmussen , E. T ranekjær . Bridging physiology and phenomenology in dynamic psychology. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1961, 2, 161–166.—It is important to distinguish between the immediately experienced (the phenomenological) and the physiological-neurological basis for the phenomenological world, e.g. between beta needs (subjectively experienced states of needing or wanting) and alpha needs (objectively defined, physiological needs). The concept of psychon is introduced and defined as a necessary and sufficient condition in the physiological-neurological system for the existence of a subjective experience; psychon bridges the gap between the physiological and the phenomenological world.