Identification of letters in the predesignated target paradigm: a word superiority effect for the common word the

The size of the perceptual unit used in reading was addressed using the predesignated target paradigm. Sixteen subjects viewed the following stimuli in random order: the words tee, the, tie, and toe; the nonwords eet, eht, eit, and eot; and the letters e, h, i, and o. Subjects fixated on the location of the center letter and identified the letter as e, h, i, or o, alternatives which were known to them at the onset. A word superiority effect was obtained for the common word the but not for the less common words tee, tie, and toe. The word superiority effect was attributable to bias rather than discriminability: Subjects exhibited a bias to perceive the words in this experiment as the (i.e., there was a bias to perceive h in the t e stimulus presentations). These results suggest that the common word the is processed in reading units that are larger than the letter, and that the system is biased to perceive common rather than uncommon words in data-limited conditions.     

On the putative uniqueness of cancer pain: do psychological principles apply?

A large volume of evidence has supported the important role of psychological principles and variables related to the perception of, and response to, nociceptive stimulation. On the basis of this research, a number of psychological interventions have been developed and used successfully with pain patients. Despite the evidence, there has been a tendency for practitioners to neglect the contributing role of cognitive, affective, and behavioral factors in reports of pain by cancer patients. Cancer seems to hold a unique status in medicine and society at large. In this paper, the cancer pain literature is briefly reviewed and evidence is presented for various psychological determinants of the pain report and response that may be extended to pain associated with cancer. The implications of these data for understanding and treatment of cancer patients are described.     

Pessimistic explanatory style and response to illness

Previous studies have shown that a pessimistic explanatory style is a risk factor for illness, but the factors linking explanatory style and illness are unknown. One's characteristic response to poor health may mediate this relationship. Perhaps pessimistic individuals act helplessly in the face of their symptoms, thereby exacerbating disease. In the present study, we investigated this possibility by asking 96 young adults to complete measures of explanatory style, habitual response to illness, and ways of coping during their most recent episode of illness. Subjects who explain bad events pessimistically (with internal, stable, and global causes) reported more frequent illnesses during the past year and rated their overall health more poorly than those who habitually favor external, unstable, and specific explanations. When ill, the pessimistic subjects were less likely than their optimistic counterparts to take active steps to combat their illness. Our results suggest that one pathway leading from pessimistic explanatory style to poor health is mundane: passivity in the face of disease.     

Is the match/mismatch model based on a statistical artefact?

In the match/mismatch model, recently formulated by Rachman and coworkers, it is stated that incorrectly predicted aversive experiences are generally followed by an immediate adjustment of the predictions concerning aversiveness of the next experience. This model can be considered to reflect a psychological process of the formation of expectations. In the present article it is argued that a simple H0 model, assuming that predictions are completely randomly generated by the subject, may account for the same effects. This H0 model is used in a stringent test of empirical data to determine if there are any effects of the discrepancy between prediction and experience on next prediction that exceed the effects explained by the H0 model. Although the H0 model produces effects very similar to the empirically observed effects, there is clear support for the hypothesized influence of the discrepancy between prediction and experience. Therefore, the model appears to reflect 'real' psychological processes and not chance findings.     

How wide is the widening scope of psychoanalysis and how solid is its structural model? Some concerns and observations

The author advances the thesis that in the past 35 years there has been a relatively silent but nonetheless significant movement within the mainstream of American psychoanalysis toward a more "modest" position. This movement has been stimulated from different sources, sometimes with diverse goals and different programs. One determinant was the reaction to the post-World War II euphoria in regard to psychoanalysis and its possible therapeutic powers. Another element has been the ongoing consolidation of our knowledge and understanding of the ego-psychological, structural-model approach to analytic theory and technique, an approach which emphasizes both intrapsychic conflict and compromise formations. A consequence of this more modest position has been a greater appreciation of the limitations of psychoanalysis as well as the significance of those limitations. This more realistic appraisal of psychoanalysis may not have encouraged the widening scope of the indications for analysis, but the enhanced understanding of its limitations offers the promise of more effective psychoanalytic work in areas that have not been considered ideal for the so-called "traditional" analysis. It is suggested that more sophisticated approaches in the analysis of resistance and character, of "conflict" (in distinction to "diagnoses"), together with a more applicable understanding of the psychoanalytic process, can all contribute to a deepening, if not necessarily widening, of our psychoanalytic endeavors.     

Unconscious fantasy: developmental and self-psychological considerations

The authors view unconscious fantasy from the perspective of self psychology as a significant addition and emendation of the classical framework. A selective review of the pertinent literature is presented, followed by clinical material illustrating the contribution of self-psychological concepts to the understanding of unconscious fantasy formation.     

Additive latency effects of selective and nonselective restricted priming types

The purpose of this investigation was to examine further the contention of Alain et al. (1988) that a third priming type exists, called nonselective restricted (NSR) and controlled by response probability, which is distinct from those types influenced by foreperiod duration (nonselective general priming) and prediction probability (selective priming). In a four-choice reaction time (RT) task, prediction probability (.5, .7, & .9, indicating the likelihood of a particular response) and response probability (.5, .9, denoting the likelihood that a response would be needed at all) exerted significant but noninteractive effects on RTs for prepared responses (most probable), suggesting that each of these probabilities influence different priming types (Sternberg, 1969; selective and NSR, respectively). This was further indicated by the fact that prediction probability, but not response probability, significantly altered RTs for the unprepared (lesser probable) responses. Finally, the hypothesized nonselective character of NSR priming (i.e., all outputs controlled by response probability are equally affected by its value changes) was supported when responses were equiprobable, and, while the null effect of response probability just mentioned seemingly argued against this property when selective priming took place, the interpretation provided herein negated this opposition.     

Idioms and mental imagery: the metaphorical motivation for idiomatic meaning

We conducted three experiments to investigate the mental images associated with idiomatic phrases in English. Our hypothesis was that people should have strong conventional images for many idioms and that the regularity in people's knowledge of their images for idioms is due to the conceptual metaphors motivating the figurative meanings of idioms. In the first study, subjects were asked to form and describe their mental images for different idiomatic expressions. Subjects were then asked a series of detailed questions about their images regarding the causes and effects of different events within their images. We found high consistency in subjects' images of idioms with similar figurative meanings despite differences in their surface forms (e.g., spill the beans and let the cat out of the bag). Subjects' responses to detailed questions about their images also showed a high degree of similarity in their answers. Further examination of subjects' imagery protocols supports the idea that the conventional images and knowledge associated with idioms are constrained by the conceptual metaphors (e.g., the MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE ENTITIES) which motivate the figurative meanings of idioms. The results of two control studies showed that the conventional images associated with idioms are not solely based on their figurative meanings (Experiment 2) and that the images associated with literal phrases (e.g., spill the peas) were quite varied and unlikely to be constrained by conceptual metaphor (Experiment 3). These findings support the view that idioms are not "dead" metaphors with their meanings being arbitrarily determined. Rather, the meanings of many idioms are motivated by speakers' tacit knowledge of the conceptual metaphors underlying the meanings of these figurative phrases.     

Numerical abstraction by human infants

Across several experiments, 6- to 8-month-old human infants were found to detect numerical correspondences between sets of entities presented in different sensory modalities and bearing no natural relation to one another. At the basis of this ability, we argue, is a sensitivity to numerosity, an abstract property of collections of objects and events. Our findings provide evidence that the emergence of the earliest numerical abilities does not depend upon the development of language or complex actions, or upon cultural experience with number.     

Analysis of transference in Gestalt group psychotherapy

In Gestalt therapy, transference is viewed as a contact boundary disturbance which impairs the patient's ability to accurately perceive the present therapy situation. The boundary disturbances in Gestalt therapy most closely related to the analytic notion of transference are projection, introjection, and confluence. In Gestalt group psychotherapy, group members interfere with the process of need identification and satisfaction by distorting their contact with each other through projecting, introjecting, and being confluent. The Gestalt group therapist uses interventions directed to individuals and to the group to increase participants' awareness of these boundary disturbances and of the present contact opportunities available to them when these disturbances are resolved. In formulating interventions, the leader is mindful of the function of boundary disturbances to the group-as-a-whole as well as to individuals.