Explanatory exclusion and mental explanation

Jaegwon Kim once refrained from excluding distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient physical cause of the effect (Kim, 1984 Kim, J. (1984). "Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9, p. 257–270.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). At that time, Kim also refrained from excluding distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect (Kim, 1988 Kim, J. (1988). Explanatory realism, causal realism, and explanatory exclusion. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12, 225–239.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 1989 Kim, J. (1989). Mechanism, purpose, and explanatory exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives, 3, 77–108.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]). More recently, he has excluded distinct mental causes of effects that depend upon the sufficient cause of the effect, since the physical cause is individually sufficient for the effect (Kim, 2005 Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [Google Scholar]). But there has been, to this point, no parallel shift in the explanatory realm, such that distinct mental explanations of effects that depend upon complete physical explanations of the effect are excluded since the physical explanation is objectively complete. In this paper I consider, defend, and apply this update to the principle of explanatory exclusion—an update, which, in the final analysis, demonstrates a significant advantage that non-reductive physicalism has over reductive physicalism.     

Web-based image norming: How do object familiarity and visual complexity ratings compare when collected in-lab versus online?

It has been demonstrated previously that, for some experimental paradigms, Web-based research can reliably replicate lab-based results. Yet questions remain as to what types of research can be reproduced, and where differences arise when they cannot be. The present article examines the effect of research location (laboratory vs. online) on normative data collection tasks. Specifically, participants were randomly assigned to a laboratory or online condition and were asked to rate 593 photorealistic images on the basis of object familiarity (N=5 103) and object visual complexity (N=5 98). Dependent measures were compared across location conditions, including response latencies and image rating agreement. Our results suggest that norming data collected online are reliable, but an interesting interplay between task type and research location was observed. Specifically, we found that participating online (i.e., a more familiar environment) leads to systematically higher familiarity ratings than in the lab (i.e., an unfamiliar environment). These differences are not found when the alternate complexity rating task is used.     

Comments on Justin Barrett’s Why would anyone believe in God?

This review discussion outlines Justin Barrett??s Preparedness Model. This evolutionary model for belief in God is shown to posit a maladaptive mind for infants. Questions about its implications and the supporting data are considered.     

Counterfactuals, Autonomy and Downward Causation: Reply to Zhong

In recent papers, Lei Zhong argues that the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem is unavailable to anyone that endorses the counterfactual model of causation. The linchpin of his argument is that the counterfactual theory entails the downward causation principle, which conflicts with the autonomy solution. In this note I argue that the counterfactual theory does not entail the downward causation principle, so it is possible to advocate for the autonomy solution to the causal exclusion problem from within the counterfactual theory of causation.     

A two-study examination of work–family conflict,production deviance and gender

Building on the spillover and crossover literatures of work–family conflict and the theoretical framework of Conservation of Resources Theory (Hobfoll, 1989) we examine the effects of conflict on production deviance. Using a two-study constructive replication and extension design, we examine how partner work-to-family conflict contributes to job incumbent family-to-work conflict and subsequent engagement in production deviance. In addition, we examine the moderating role of gender on the incumbent family-to-work conflict to production deviance relationship. Study 1 of 344 job incumbents supported the positive relationship between incumbent family-to-work conflict and deviance. In addition, this was moderated by gender such that men engaged in more deviant behaviors in response to family-to-work conflict. Study 2 consisted of 190 matched job incumbents and their partners. These findings supported the mediation of partner work-to-family conflict to production deviance through incumbent family-to-work conflict. Again gender was supported using moderated mediation analysis such that men engaged in more deviant behaviors in response to family-to-work conflict. Implications for practice and future research are discussed.     

The Generalization Problem and the Identity Solution

For some time now, Jaegwon Kim has argued that irreducible mental properties face the threat of causal inefficacy. The primary weapon he deploys to sustain this charge is the supervenience/exclusion argument. This argument, in a nutshell, states that any mental property that irreducibly supervenes on a physical property is excluded from causal efficacy because the underlying physical property takes care of all of the causal work itself. Originally intended for mental properties alone, it did not take long for his critics to suggest the argument generalizes across all of the special science properties as well. Kim responds in two different ways to the generalization problem. The first response, which I call the higher-level solution, is ably dismissed by numerous critics. The second response, which I call the identity solution, has not faced comparable scrutiny. In this paper I argue that the identity solution faces numerous problems of its own.     

Turning the process-dissociation procedure inside-out: A new technique for understanding the relation between conscious and unconscious influences

While there is now general agreement that memory gives rise to both conscious and unconscious influences, there remains disagreement concerning the process architecture underlying these distinct influences. Do they arise from independent underlying systems (e.g., Jacoby, 1991) or from systems that are interactive (e.g., Joordens & Merikle, 1993)? In the current paper we present a novel “inside-out” technique that can be used with the process-dissociation paradigm to arrive at more concrete conclusions concerning this central question and demonstrate this technique via a meta-analysis of currently published findings. Our results suggest that the data presented in these studies vary in ways most consistent with the assumption that conscious and unconscious influences behave independently.