Genetic and adoptive motherhood: Stress,marital relationship,and child care support

In this paper we characterize adoptive and genetic motherhood with or without stress indicators. Participants were 86 mothers (36 adoptive, 50 genetic) with children from 0 to 12 years old. They answered questions about focal child and mother profile, marital relationship, child care support and the Lipp's Stress Symptoms Inventory for Adults. Results showed that mothers in both groups reported child care support, but there was more participation of nonrelatives in the care of adoptive children and relatives in the care of genetic children. There was greater marital stability and less conflict with the arrival of the child in the adoptive families and predominance of stress indicators in genetic mothers. We concluded that, although there are differences between adoptive and genetic motherhood, these do not imply advantages for one versus the other. Moreover, marital stability related to the adoption process and sociodemographic characteristics of adoptive mothers may have contributed to lower prevalence of stress.     

Cognitive model decomposition of the BART: Assessment and application

The Balloon Analogue Risk Task, or BART, aims to measure risk taking behavior in a controlled setting. In order to quantify the processes that underlie performance on the BART, Wallsten, Pleskac, and Lejuez (2005) proposed a series of mathematical models whose parameters have a clear psychological interpretation. Here we examine a 2-parameter simplification of Wallsten et al.’s preferred 4-parameter model. A parameter recovery study shows that — with plausible restrictions on the number of participants and trials — both parameters (i.e., risk taking γ⁺ and response consistency β) can be estimated accurately. To demonstrate how the 2-parameter model can be used in practice, we implemented a Bayesian hierarchical version and applied it to an empirical data set in which participants performed the BART following various amounts of alcohol intake.     

A diffusion model decomposition of the practice effect

When people repeatedly perform the same cognitive task, their mean response times (RTs) invariably decrease. The mathematical function that best describes this decrease has been the subject of intense debate. Here, we seek a deeper understanding of the practice effect by simultaneously taking into account the changes in accuracy and in RT distributions with practice, both for correct and error responses. To this end, we used the Ratcliff diffusion model, a successful model of two-choice RTs that decomposes the effect of practice into its constituent psychological processes. Analyses of data from a 10,000-trial lexical decision task demonstrate that practice not only affects the speed of information processing, but also response caution, response bias, and peripheral processing time. We conclude that the practice effect consists of multiple subcomponents, and that it may be hazardous to abstract the interactive combination of these subcomponents in terms of a single output measure such as mean RT for correct responses. Supplemental materials may be downloaded from http://pbr .psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

LESSONS ON SENTENTIAL MEANING FROM MEDIAEVAL SOLUTIONS TO THE LIAR PARADOX

Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially Bradwardine's and Buridan's, raise issues concerning the meaning of sentences, in particular about closure of sentential meaning under implication, semantic pluralism and the ontological status of 'meanings', which are still topical for current theories of meaning. I outline ways in which they tend to be overlooked, raising issues that must be addressed by any respectable theory of meaning as well as pointing in the direction of possible answers. I analyse a Bradwardinian theory of sentential meaning as it emerges from his treatment of liar sentences, exploring where it requires more thorough elaboration if it is to be a fully developed theory of sentential meaning.     

Medieval <Emphasis Type="Italic">Obligationes</Emphasis> as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance

I argue that the medieval form of dialectical disputation known as obligationes can be viewed as a logical game of consistency maintenance. The game has two participants, Opponent and Respondent. Opponent puts forward a proposition P; Respondent must concede, deny or doubt, on the basis of inferential relations between P and previously accepted or denied propositions, or, in case there is none, on the basis of the common set of beliefs. Respondent loses the game if he concedes a contradictory set of propositions. Opponent loses the game if Respondent is able to maintain consistency during the stipulated period of time. The obligational rules are here formalised by means of familiar notational devices, and the application of some game-theoretical concepts, such as (winning) strategy, moves, motivation, allows for an analysis of some crucial properties of the game. In particular, the primacy of inferential (syntactic) relations over semantic aspects and the dynamic character of obligations are outlined.     

Testing theories of post-error slowing

People tend to slow down after they make an error. This phenomenon, generally referred to as post-error slowing, has been hypothesized to reflect perceptual distraction, time wasted on irrelevant processes, an a priori bias against the response made in error, increased variability in a priori bias, or an increase in response caution. Although the response caution interpretation has dominated the empirical literature, little research has attempted to test this interpretation in the context of a formal process model. Here, we used the drift diffusion model to isolate and identify the psychological processes responsible for post-error slowing. In a very large lexical decision data set, we found that post-error slowing was associated with an increase in response caution and-to a lesser extent-a change in response bias. In the present data set, we found no evidence that post-error slowing is caused by perceptual distraction or time wasted on irrelevant processes. These results support a response-monitoring account of post-error slowing.     

Buridan's Consequentia: Consequence and Inference Within a Token-Based Semantics

I examine the theory of consequentia of the medieval logician, John Buridan. Buridan advocates a strict commitment to what we now call proposition-tokens as the bearers of truth-value. The analysis of Buridan's theory shows that, within a token-based semantics, amendments to the usual notions of inference and consequence are made necessary, since pragmatic elements disrupt the semantic behaviour of propositions. In my reconstruction of Buridan's theory, I use some of the apparatus of modern two-dimensional semantics, such as two-dimensional matrices and the distinction between the context of formation and the context of evaluation of utterances.     

A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences

Two periods in the history of logic and philosophy are characterized notably by vivid interest in self-referential paradoxical sentences in general, and Liar sentences in particular: the later medieval period (roughly from the 12th to the 15th century) and the last 100 years. In this paper, I undertake a comparative taxonomy of these two traditions. I outline and discuss eight main approaches to Liar sentences in the medieval tradition, and compare them to the most influential modern approaches to such sentences. I also emphasize the aspects of each tradition that find no counterpart in the other one. It is expected that such a comparison may point in new directions for future research on the paradoxes; indeed, the present analysis allows me to draw a few conclusions about the general nature of Liar sentences, and to identify aspects that would require further investigation.     

Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

In this paper, I highlight the significance of practices of refutation in philosophical inquiry, that is, practices of showing that a claim, person or theory is wrong. I present and contrast two prominent approaches to philosophical refutation: refutation in ancient Greek dialectic (elenchus), in its Socratic variant as described in Plato’s dialogues, and as described in Aristotle’s logical texts; and the practice of providing counterexamples to putative definitions familiar from twentieth century analytic philosophy, focusing on the so-called Gettier problem. Moreover, I discuss Lakatos’ method of proofs and refutations, as it offers insightful observations on the dynamics between arguments, refutations, and counterexamples. Overall, I argue that dialectic, in particular in its Socratic variant, is especially suitable for the philosophical purpose of questioning the obvious, as it invites reflection on one’s own doxastic commitments and on the tensions and inconsistencies within one’s set of beliefs. By contrast, the counterexample-based approach to philosophical refutation can give rise to philosophical theorizing that is overly focused on hairsplitting disputes, thus becoming alienated from the relevant human experiences. Insofar as philosophical inquiry treads the fine line between questioning the obvious while still seeking to say something significant about human experiences, perhaps a certain amount of what Lakatos describes as ‘monster-barring’—a rejection of overly fanciful, artificial putative counterexamples—has its place in philosophical argumentation.