Ideological belief bias with political syllogisms

Abstract

The belief bias in reasoning occurs when individuals are more willing to accept conclusions that are consistent with their beliefs than conclusions that are inconsistent. The present study examined a belief bias in syllogisms containing political content. In two experiments, participants judged whether conclusions were valid, completed political ideology measures, and completed a cognitive reflection test. The conclusions varied in validity and in their political ideology (conservative or liberal). Participants were sensitive to syllogisms’ validity and conservatism. Overall, they showed a liberal bias, accepting more liberal than conservative conclusions. Furthermore, conservative participants accepted more conservative conclusions than liberal conclusions, whereas liberal participants showed the opposite pattern. Cognitive reflection did not magnify this effect as predicted by a motivated system 2 reasoning account of motivated ideological reasoning. These results suggest that people with different ideologies may accept different conclusions from the same evidence.     

The relationship between resting heart rate and aggression in males is racially variant

Although resting heart rate is thought to be a generalizable risk factor for aggression, very little research has examined whether this relationship varies by race. We addressed this limitation using longitudinal data from the Pittsburgh Youth Study. Current data are from 197 men who participated in a teenage biosocial study (mean age = 15.7 years) and adult follow-up study (mean age = 32.1 years). Teenage resting heart rate interacted with race to predict teenage and adult aggression. The relationship between heart rate and aggression was significant in White, but not in Black males. To our knowledge, this is the first study to find that the relationship between resting heart rate and aggression is racially variant, suggesting that resting heart rate may not be a generalizable biomarker for conduct problems. At an intervention-level, findings could contribute to the development of more accurate risk assessment tools that take into account racial variance in risk factors.     

Mental imagery and fiction

Fictions evoke imagery, and their value consists partly in that achievement. This paper offers analysis of this neglected topic. Section 2 identifies relevant philosophical background. Section 3 offers a working definition of imagery. Section 4 identifies empirical work on visual imagery. Sections 5 and 6 criticize imagery essentialism, through the lens of genuine fictional narratives. This outcome, though, is not wholly critical. The expressed spirit of imagery essentialism is to encourage philosophers to ‘put the image back into the imagination’. The weakened conclusion is that while an image is not essential to imagining, it should be returned to our theories of imagination.