Infant's perception of goal-directed actions performed by a mechanical device

The present work investigated whether by the end of the first year, infants interpret actions performed by a mechanical device as goal-directed and why they would do so. Using a modified version of the Woodward (1998) habituation paradigm, 9- and 12-month-old infants were tested in a condition in which they saw a mechanical claw performing an action (Study 1). When infants viewed the claw grasping and transporting objects to the back of a stage, 12-month-old but not 9-month-old infants interpreted the action as goal-directed. In Study 2, 9-month-olds received prior to habituation an information phase showing infants how a human held and operated the claw. This enrichment of infants’ knowledge enabled 9-month-old infants to interpret the action display as goal-directed. The role of the developing means-end understanding and tool-use for infants’ interpretation of actions performed by a mechanical device is discussed.     

Development of inattention, impulsivity, and processing speed as measured by the d2 Test: results of a large cross-sectional study in children aged 7-13.

The development of three aspects of selective attention was studied in 451 Dutch schoolchildren attending second to sixth grade. Selective attention was measured with the d2 Test of attention. The largest age differences were found for processing speed that continued to improve until the sixth grade. Impulsivity, as measured by the percentage of errors of commission, decreased until the fourth grade. Inattention, measured by the percentage of errors of omission, was stable in all grades. Processing speed and impulsivity were correlated with the score on the Attention Problems subscale of the Child Behavior Checklist. These results imply that selective attention continues to develop, at least, until the end of elementary school. The findings are support for a step-wise model of cognitive development (P. Anderson, 2002).     

How does dominance rank status affect individual and social learning performance in the dog (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis familiaris</Emphasis>)?

Dogs can learn effectively to detour around a V-shaped fence after observing a demonstration from either an unfamiliar human or dog demonstrator. We found earlier that there is substantial individual variation between the dogs’ performance, even when using the same experimental conditions. Here, we investigate if the subjects’ relative dominance rank with other dogs had an effect on their social learning performance. On the basis of the owners’ answers to a questionnaire, subjects from multi-dog homes were sorted into groups of dominant and subordinate dogs. In Experiment 1, dominant and subordinate dogs were tested without demonstration and we did not find any difference between the groups—they had similarly low detour performances on their own. In Experiment 2 and 3, dogs from single dog and multi-dog households were tested in the detour task with demonstration by an unfamiliar dog, or human, respectively. The results showed that social learning performance of the single dogs fell between the dominant and subordinate multi-dogs with both dog and human demonstration. Subordinate dogs displayed significantly better performance after having observed a dog demonstrator in comparison to dominant dogs. In contrast, the performance of dominant and subordinate dogs was almost similar, when they observed a human demonstrator. These results suggest that perceived dominance rank in its own group has a strong effect on social learning in dogs, but this effect seems to depend also on the demonstrator species. This finding reveals an intricate organization of the social structure in multi-dog households, which can contribute to individual differences existing among dogs.     

How to like yourself better, or chocolate less: Changing implicit attitudes with one IAT task

The current paper introduces a novel feature of implicit association tests (IATs) by demonstrating their potential to change implicit attitudes. We assume that such changes are driven by associative learning mechanisms caused by carrying out an IAT task. Currently, evaluative conditioning appears to be the only widespread paradigm for changing implicit attitudes. An IAT task could provide an alternative. In two experiments, participants initially reacted to only one IAT task. Implicit preferences subsequently assessed with different implicit measures depended on the initial IAT task. This was shown for implicit self-esteem and for implicit attitudes towards well-known candy brands. Findings are discussed in relation to task-order effects in IATs.     

Mixtures of conditional mean- and covariance-structure models

Models and parameters of finite mixtures of multivariate normal densities conditional on regressor variables are specified and estimated. We consider mixtures of multivariate normals where the expected value for each component depends on possibly nonnormal regressor variables. The expected values and covariance matrices of the mixture components are parameterized using conditional mean- and covariance-structures. We discuss the construction of the likelihood function, estimation of the mixture model with regressors using three different EM algorithms, estimation of the asymptotic covariance matrix of parameters and testing for the number of mixture components. In addition to simulation studies, data on food preferences are analyzed.The authors are grateful to Donald B. Rubin and Michael E. Sobel for critical reading of a first draft of this paper and to three anonymous reviewers ofPsychometrika for their helpful comments and suggestions. The research of the first and the third author was supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.     

An experimental evaluation of tokens as conditioned reinforcers in retarded children

Since the publication of experimental reports by Wolfe (1936) and Cowles (1937), that tokens could be established as conditioned reinforcers, many accounts have appeared on the implementation of token systems in human subjects. Tokens have been successfully used as prosthetic motivational devices in a great variety of situations and subjects, such as retarded children (Birnbrauer, Wolf, Kidder and Tague, 1965), adult psychotics (Ayllon and Azrin, 1969), delinquent children and adolescents (Tyler, 1967; Phillips and Wolf, 1968), low achievers in schools (Clark, Lachowicz and Wolf, 1968), emotionally disturbed children (Hewett, Taylor and Artuso, 1969) and in normal classroom settings (O'Leary, Becker, Evans and Saudargas, 1969). In these reports, administration of tokens usually produced an increase in the frequency of desirable social and productive behavior. However, none of these studies showed that the effect of the tokens depended on their role as conditioned reinforcers based on the standard exchange systems being used. No assessment was provided about the separate contribution of the social reinforcement operations involved in dispensing tokens in a social setting.A suggestion about the possible confounding effects of social reinforcement in token administration comes from the failure to establish token systems in subjects who are partially unresponsive to social reinforcement (Hamblin et al., 1970; Ribes and Souza e Silva, in preparation). The present research was conducted with the aim of isolating the effects of conditioned reinforcement as such—apart from those produced by the social reinforcement provided in the delivery of tokens.     

Freud as Philosopher and Metaphysician: The Case of Dora

The Dora case is examined, for its use of psychoanalytic constructs and concomitant reliance on neurological terminology. Boothby and Robertson are cited as commentators, and it is concluded that both Dora and The Interpretation of Dreams point us in the direction of an intriguing, not-quite-materialistic philosophy of mind.     

Children’s first and second-order false-belief reasoning in a verbal and a low-verbal task

We can understand and act upon the beliefs of other people, even when these conflict with our own beliefs. Children’s development of this ability, known as Theory of Mind, typically happens around age 4. Research using a looking-time paradigm, however, established that toddlers at the age of 15 months old pass a non-verbal false-belief task (Onishi and Baillargeon in Science 308:255–258, 2005). This is well before the age at which children pass any of the verbal false-belief tasks. In this study we present a more complex case of false-belief reasoning with older children. We tested second-order reasoning, probing children’s ability to handle the belief of one person about the belief of another person. We find just the opposite: 7-year-olds pass a verbal false-belief reasoning task, but fail on an equally complex low-verbal task. This finding suggests that language supports explicit reasoning about beliefs, perhaps by facilitating the cognitive system to keep track of beliefs attributed by people to other people.     

Manual training of mental rotation

The aim of this study was to investigate the timing relations between phonological encoding that is, the generation of an abstract phonological representation of a to-be-produced utterance and the initiation of articulation. Previous research (Meyer &; Schriefers, 1991) using a picture-word paradigm suggested that, in the production of simple one-word naming responses, a speaker completes phonological encoding of the complete word before articulation is initiated. In the present study, this question was investigated for the production of German no-determiner noun phrases (e.g. roter Tisch, “red table”;). The results showed reliable facilitation effects for distractors that are identical to the first syllable of the first word of the noun phrase. For the second syllable of the first word, only weak facilitation effects were obtained. For the second word, no significant facilitation effects were obtained. However, additional analyses showed that two groups of speakers can be distinguished, one showing only facilitation effects for the first syllable of the first word, and the other showing an additional facilitation effect for the second syllable of the first word. Together with related results, our findings lead to two conclusions. First, the (phonological) word is not the lower limit of phonological encoding before articulation can be initiated. Second, speakers can adjust the size of the advance planning unit at the phonological level based on the specific speaking context.     

The role of action effects in 12-month-olds' action control: a comparison of televised model and live model

The present study investigated differences in infant imitation after watching a televised model and a live model and addressed the issue of whether action effects influence infants’ action control in both cases. In a 2 × 2 design, 12-month-old infants observed a live or a televised model performing a three-step action sequence, in which either the 2nd or the 3rd action step was combined with an acoustical action effect. We assumed that infants would use the observed action-effect relations for their own action control in the test phase afterwards. Even though results exhibited differences in the absolute amount of imitation between the two demonstration groups, both groups showed similar result patterns regarding the action effect manipulation: infants imitated the action step that was followed by a salient action effect more often and mostly as the first target action, emphasizing the important role of action effects in infants’ action control.