Using a Training-of-Trainers Approach and Proactive Technical Assistance to Bring Evidence Based Programs to Scale: An Operationalization of the Interactive Systems Framework’s Support System

Bringing evidence based programs to scale was a major initial impetus for the development of the Interactive Systems Framework for Dissemination and Implementation (ISF). The ISF demonstrates the importance of the Support System in facilitating the uptake of innovations in the community (the Delivery System). Two strategies that members of the Support System commonly use are training‐of‐trainers (TOT) models and technical assistance (TA). In this article, we focus on the role of the Support System in bringing evidence‐based programs (EBPs) to scale in the Delivery System using a case example, with special attention on two strategies employed by Support Systems—training‐of‐trainers (TOT) and proactive technical assistance. We then report on findings from a case example from the Promoting Science Based Approaches to Teen Pregnancy Prevention project that furthers our conceptualization of these strategies and the evidence base for them. We also report on the limitations in the literature regarding research on TOTs and proactive TA and provide suggestions for future research on TOTs and proactive TA that will enhance the science and practice of support in the ISF. Special Issue: Advances in Bridging Research and Practice Using the Interactive System Framework for Dissemination and Implementation; Guest Editors: Abraham Wandersman, Paul Flaspohler, Catherine A. Lesesne, Richard Puddy; Action Editor: Emilie Phillips Smith     

Brauchen wir eine ?Neuropsychotherapie“?

The somewhat crude question of whether we need neuropsychotherapy means more precisely whether its neuroscientific perspective can be useful for the psychotherapeutic practice. To answer this question the traditional scientific approaches do not completely suffice. The ??empirical-technical approach?? of quantitative psychotherapy research is of no service here as neuropsychotherapy is only its continuation. Within the framework of this methodology it is not possible to critically reflect on the relevance of neuroscientific research. Such a reflection is, however, the prerequisite for an evaluation of the benefits of neuropsychotherapy. The question about the meaning of neurobiological processes thus leads to the field of epistemology. This ??theoretical approach?? is nonetheless only helpful within limits. It provides an important background of reflection, however it needs to remain abstract compared to psychotherapeutic practice because it does not integrate the specific goals of such practice. What is presented here instead is an ??approach of pragmatic reflection??. This reflection departs from a general purpose of psychotherapy from which the value of neuropsychotherapy can be appropriately estimated. After this clarification the approach of pragmatic reflection can be preliminarily demonstrated with concrete applications of neuroscience in psychotherapy. What is shown hereby is that neuropsychotherapy represents a very specific practice of argumention and action, which implements a logic into psychotherapy that does not fit its contents and goals.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue‐theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck.     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

Reduced extinction of hippocampal-dependent memories in CPEB knockout mice

CPEB is a sequence-specific RNA binding protein that regulates translation at synapses. In neurons of CPEB knockout mice, synaptic efficacy is reduced. Here, we have performed a battery of behavioral tests and find that relative to wild-type animals, CPEB knockout mice, although similar on many baseline behaviors, have reduced extinction of memories on two hippocampal-dependent tasks. A corresponding microarray analysis reveals that about 0.14% of hippocampal genes have an altered expression in the CPEB knockout mouse. These data suggest that CPEB-dependent local protein synthesis may be an important cellular mechanism underlying extinction of hippocampal-dependent memories.