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521.
Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart. 相似文献
522.
523.
Gerta Bardhoshi Kelly Duncan Bradley T. Erford 《Journal of counseling and development : JCD》2016,94(3):356-373
This meta‐analysis reviewed 192 scholarly works from 1993 to 2013 using the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1993 ). Aggregated internal consistency (coefficient alpha) was .91 (k = 117), and test–retest reliability was .65 (k = 18). Convergent comparisons were robust across 33 different anxiety instruments and the Beck Depression Inventory–II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996 ). Structural validity primarily supported the original 2‐factor solution proposed by Beck and Steer ( 1993 ), and diagnostic accuracy varied according to the sample size and criterion cutoff score. 相似文献
524.
Kayla Reed James M. Duncan Mallory Lucier-Greer Courtney Fixelle Anthony J. Ferraro 《Journal of child and family studies》2016,25(10):3136-3149
Helicopter parenting has become an increasing concern among practitioners, college administrators, and professors. Further, some research has indicated that this form of parenting may have a deleterious effect on emerging adult college students’ mental health. This study examines the factor structure of the Helicopter Parenting Behaviors measure, a recent scale developed to examine intrusive and supportive parenting behaviors, by using confirmatory factor analysis. We utilized a self-determination theoretical framework to replicate and expand current research regarding the impact of helicopter parenting and autonomy supportive parenting on emerging adult mental and physical well-being. Further, we examined self-efficacy as a mechanism for helicopter parenting and autonomy supportive parenting to impact well-being, using structural equation modeling with a sample of 461 emerging adult college students from a large southeastern, United States university. The two-factor structure of the Helicopter Parenting Behaviors measure was confirmed, indicating helicopter parenting and autonomy supportive parenting are two unique, but related, constructs. Both autonomy supportive parenting and helicopter parenting were found to have indirect effects on anxiety, depression, life satisfaction, and physical health through self-efficacy. Results also indicated autonomy supportive parenting was directly related to life satisfaction and physical health when accounting for self-efficacy, whereas helicopter parenting was not directly related to well-being. This study adds to the extant literature by its’ application of a family-level lens to the self-determination theory, its’ advancement of parenting behaviors measurement, and its’ exploration of the continued influence of parenting during emerging adulthood. 相似文献
525.
J. Adam Carter Jesper Kallestrup S. Orestis Palermos Duncan Pritchard 《Philosophical Issues》2014,24(1):63-109
Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first the extent to which content externalism is compatible with epistemic externalism; second, whether active externalism entails epistemic externalism; and third whether there are varieties of epistemic externalism that are better suited to accommodate active externalism. Finally, we examine whether the combination of epistemic and cognitive externalism is necessary for epistemology and we comment on the potential ramifications of this move for social epistemology and philosophy of science. 相似文献
526.
This paper provides a commentary and provides international context to the research conducted by J. Bennett‐Levy et al. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is a highly structured psychological treatment that has unprecedented empirical validation relative to other approaches to therapy. Despite the wealth of evidence supporting its use, the case for CBT is far less compelling for ethnic minority groups. There is however a growing body of international literature supporting the notion of adaptation of CBT for these groups. The research by J. Bennett‐Levy et al. represents a positive step toward validating CBT for use with Australia's indigenous people that is likely to shape the future direction of research in this field. Suggestions are made regarding the next logical empirical steps in this important area of investigation. 相似文献
527.
Task complexity is critical in cognitive efficiency and fluid intelligence. To examine functional limits in task complexity, we examine the phenomenon of goal neglect, where participants with low fluid intelligence fail to follow task rules that they otherwise understand. Though neglect is known to increase with task complexity, here we show that – in contrast to previous accounts – the critical factor is not the total complexity of all task rules. Instead, when the space of task requirements can be divided into separate sub-parts, neglect is controlled by the complexity of each component part. The data also show that neglect develops and stabilizes over the first few performance trials, i.e. as instructions are first used to generate behaviour. In all complex behaviour, a critical process is combination of task events with retrieved task requirements to create focused attentional episodes dealing with each decision in turn. In large part, we suggest, fluid intelligence may reflect this process of converting complex requirements into effective attentional episodes. 相似文献
528.
Needs‐based assessment (NBA) was developed in New Zealand to assess job seekers’ capacity, willingness, and opportunity to find work. This article outlines the development of NBA from its theoretical underpinnings, evidence from a longitudinal study and the development of an employment adviser–administered computerized profiling tool, and the provision of self‐assessment and support tools. The authors argue that, with a rise in the number of unemployed job seekers and the long‐term unemployed, demands for government resources with less resources available to satisfy those demands, and the widespread adoption of social and interactive media, it is timely to revisit an NBA approach to job seeker profiling and targeted intervention. 相似文献
529.
530.
Matt Duncan 《European Journal of Philosophy》2018,26(1):66-81
Many people believe that the mind is an epistemic refuge of sorts. The idea is that when it comes to certain core mental states, one's being in such a state automatically puts one in a position to know that one is in that state. This idea has come under attack in recent years. One particularly influential attack comes from Timothy Williamson (2000), who argues that there is no central core of states or conditions—mental or otherwise—to which we are guaranteed epistemic access. In Williamson's words, we are cognitively homeless. In this paper I will argue that Williamson's argument for the conclusion that we are cognitively homeless fails. Then I will show that there is a class of phenomenal states that constitutes a substantial cognitive refuge. When all is said and done, I will have both defended and shed light on our cognitive home. 相似文献