Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge‐how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge‐how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge‐how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti‐intellectualism. Unlike neo‐Rylean anti‐intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge‐how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge‐how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.     

Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart.     

VARIETIES OF EXTERNALISM

Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first the extent to which content externalism is compatible with epistemic externalism; second, whether active externalism entails epistemic externalism; and third whether there are varieties of epistemic externalism that are better suited to accommodate active externalism. Finally, we examine whether the combination of epistemic and cognitive externalism is necessary for epistemology and we comment on the potential ramifications of this move for social epistemology and philosophy of science.     

Goal neglect and knowledge chunking in the construction of novel behaviour

Task complexity is critical in cognitive efficiency and fluid intelligence. To examine functional limits in task complexity, we examine the phenomenon of goal neglect, where participants with low fluid intelligence fail to follow task rules that they otherwise understand. Though neglect is known to increase with task complexity, here we show that – in contrast to previous accounts – the critical factor is not the total complexity of all task rules. Instead, when the space of task requirements can be divided into separate sub-parts, neglect is controlled by the complexity of each component part. The data also show that neglect develops and stabilizes over the first few performance trials, i.e. as instructions are first used to generate behaviour. In all complex behaviour, a critical process is combination of task events with retrieved task requirements to create focused attentional episodes dealing with each decision in turn. In large part, we suggest, fluid intelligence may reflect this process of converting complex requirements into effective attentional episodes.     

Cultural Adaptation of CBT for Aboriginal Australians

This paper provides a commentary and provides international context to the research conducted by J. Bennett‐Levy et al. Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is a highly structured psychological treatment that has unprecedented empirical validation relative to other approaches to therapy. Despite the wealth of evidence supporting its use, the case for CBT is far less compelling for ethnic minority groups. There is however a growing body of international literature supporting the notion of adaptation of CBT for these groups. The research by J. Bennett‐Levy et al. represents a positive step toward validating CBT for use with Australia's indigenous people that is likely to shape the future direction of research in this field. Suggestions are made regarding the next logical empirical steps in this important area of investigation.     

Needs‐Based Assessment: A Model for Profiling,Assisting, and Empowering Job Seekers

Needs‐based assessment (NBA) was developed in New Zealand to assess job seekers’ capacity, willingness, and opportunity to find work. This article outlines the development of NBA from its theoretical underpinnings, evidence from a longitudinal study and the development of an employment adviser–administered computerized profiling tool, and the provision of self‐assessment and support tools. The authors argue that, with a rise in the number of unemployed job seekers and the long‐term unemployed, demands for government resources with less resources available to satisfy those demands, and the widespread adoption of social and interactive media, it is timely to revisit an NBA approach to job seeker profiling and targeted intervention.