Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

Who uses community mental health centres? A study of one health district

A caseload analysis was undertaken to investigate those clients seen by five community mental health centre teams within one healthcare district. The 985 clients are described in terms of demographic and clinical features and questions relating to service provision are discussed.     

Viewpoint and orientation influence picture recognition in the blind

In the first three experiments, subjects felt solid geometrical forms and matched raised-line pictures to the objects. Performance was best in experiment 1 for top views, with shorter response latencies than for side views, front views, or 3-D views with foreshortening. In a second experiment with blind participants, matching accuracy was not significantly affected by prior visual experience, but speed advantages were found for top views, with 3-D views also yielding better matching accuracy than side views. There were no performance advantages for pictures of objects with a constant cross section in the vertical axis. The early-blind participants had lower performance for side and frontal views. The objects were rotated to oblique orientations in experiment 3. Early-blind subjects performed worse than the other subjects given object rotation. Visual experience with pictures of objects at many angles could facilitate identification at oblique orientations. In experiment 5 with blindfolded sighted subjects, tangible pictures were used as targets and as choices. The results yielded superior overall performance for 3-D views (mean, M = 74% correct) and much lower matching accuracy for top views as targets (M = 58% correct). Performance was highest when the target and matching viewpoint were identical, but 3-D views (M = 96% correct) were still far better than top views. The accuracy advantage of the top views also disappeared when more complex objects were tested in experiment 6. Alternative theoretical implications of the results are discussed.