The Secrecy Heuristic: Inferring Quality from Secrecy in Foreign Policy Contexts

Three experiments demonstrate that in the context of U.S. foreign policy decision making, people infer informational quality from secrecy. In Experiment 1, people weighed secret information more heavily than public information when making recommendations about foreign political candidates. In Experiment 2, people judged information presented in documents ostensibly produced by the Department of State and the National Security Council as being of relatively higher quality when those documents were secret rather than public. Finally, in Experiment 3, people judged a National Security Council document as being of higher quality when presented as a secret document rather than a public document and evaluated others' decisions more favorably when those decisions were based on secret information. Discussion centers on the mediators, moderators, and broader implications of this secrecy heuristic in foreign policy contexts.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue‐theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck.     

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001 Ryle, Gilbert 1949. The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson's University Library.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]; Brogaard 2008, 2009 Brogaard, Berit 2009. What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge-Wh, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78/2: 439–67.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011 Brogaard, Berit 2011. Knowledge-How: A Unified Account, in Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, ed. John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett, New York: Oxford University Press: 136–60. [Google Scholar]; Stanley 2011a Stanley, Jason 2011a. Knowing (How), Noûs 45/2: 207–38.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2011b Stanley, Jason 2011b. Know How, Oxford: Oxford University Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.     

Viewpoint and orientation influence picture recognition in the blind

In the first three experiments, subjects felt solid geometrical forms and matched raised-line pictures to the objects. Performance was best in experiment 1 for top views, with shorter response latencies than for side views, front views, or 3-D views with foreshortening. In a second experiment with blind participants, matching accuracy was not significantly affected by prior visual experience, but speed advantages were found for top views, with 3-D views also yielding better matching accuracy than side views. There were no performance advantages for pictures of objects with a constant cross section in the vertical axis. The early-blind participants had lower performance for side and frontal views. The objects were rotated to oblique orientations in experiment 3. Early-blind subjects performed worse than the other subjects given object rotation. Visual experience with pictures of objects at many angles could facilitate identification at oblique orientations. In experiment 5 with blindfolded sighted subjects, tangible pictures were used as targets and as choices. The results yielded superior overall performance for 3-D views (mean, M = 74% correct) and much lower matching accuracy for top views as targets (M = 58% correct). Performance was highest when the target and matching viewpoint were identical, but 3-D views (M = 96% correct) were still far better than top views. The accuracy advantage of the top views also disappeared when more complex objects were tested in experiment 6. Alternative theoretical implications of the results are discussed.     

Autistic defenses in agoraphobic syndrome: "flat" objects and the retardation of projective identification

The function of autistic defenses in the generation of agoraphobic symptoms is explored in the case of a patient treated in psychoanalytic psychotherapy. The therapist's growing awareness of autistic modes of relating in the case facilitated various changes in the transference relationship. Although oedipal concerns are seen as important, a formulation is presented whereby autistic modes of generating experience are viewed as fundamental to an understanding of agoraphobic experience. Clinical findings in the transference-countertransference relationship led to the additional observation that the retardation of defensive forms of projective identification further contributed to the patient's agoraphobic difficulties. This formulation is tied theoretically to the idea that agoraphobic experience occurs when the dialectic between paranoid-schizoid and autistic-contiguous modes of generating experience collapses. The treatment implications of these observations are briefly explored.     

Reinforcement value and substitutability of sucrose and wheel running: implications for activity anorexia

Choice between sucrose and wheel-running reinforcement was assessed in two experiments. In the first experiment, ten male Wistar rats were exposed to concurrent VI 30 s VI 30 s schedules of wheel-running and sucrose reinforcement. Sucrose concentration varied across concentrations of 2.5, 7.5, and 12.5%. As concentration increased, more behavior was allocated to sucrose and more reinforcements were obtained from that alternative. Allocation of behavior to wheel running decreased, but obtained wheel-running reinforcement did not change. Overall, the results suggested that food-deprived rats were sensitive to qualitative changes in food supply (sucrose concentration) while continuing to defend a level of physical activity (wheel running). In the second study, 15 female Long Evans rats were exposed to concurrent variable ratio schedules of sucrose and wheel-running, wheel-running and wheel-running, and sucrose and sucrose reinforcement. For each pair of reinforcers, substitutability was assessed by the effect of income-compensated price changes on consumption of the two reinforcers. Results showed that, as expected, sucrose substituted for sucrose and wheel running substituted for wheel running. Wheel running, however, did not substitute for sucrose; but sucrose partially substituted for wheel running. We address the implications of the interrelationships of sucrose and wheel running for an understanding of activity anorexia.     

Within-modality and cross-modality attentional blinks in a simple discrimination task

Following up on studies of the "attentional blink," we studied interference between successive target stimuli in visual and auditory modalities. In each experiment, stimuli were two tones and four dots, simultaneously presented for 1,800 msec. Targets were brief intensity changes in either a tone or a dot. Subjects gave unspeeded responses. In four experiments, our results showed interference between targets in the same modality, but not across modalities. We conclude that, under our experimental conditions, restrictions in concurrent target identification are largely modality specific.