Moral Evil,Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy

Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.     

Second-Order Change in Marriage and Family Therapy: A Web-Based Modified Delphi Study

Second-order change is a central concept in Marriage and Family Therapy, but still remains poorly operationalized. We conducted a web-based modified Delphi study with 31 established faculty members currently teaching in COAMFTE-accredited Master's and Doctoral programs in the United States and in Canada to identify consensus regarding second-order change concepts, clinical operationalization, evaluation, and teaching principles. Numerous exemplars of first and second-order change were generated, but consensus on most items was low. Consensus was highest for pedagogy and low regarding concepts and clinical examples of first-order change and evaluation of second-order change. Results suggest clearer definitions and better measurement of systemic change are needed.     

A COMPARISON OF DISCRETE TRIAL TEACHING IMPLEMENTED IN A ONE‐TO‐ONE INSTRUCTIONAL FORMAT AND IN A GROUP INSTRUCTIONAL FORMAT

Discrete trial teaching (DTT) is a systematic form of intervention commonly implemented with children and adolescents diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. Experimenters and clinicians have implemented DTT in both one‐to‐one instructional formats and group instructional formats to teach a wide variety of skills to children and adolescents diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. The purpose of this study was to compare DTT implemented in a one‐to‐one instructional format with DTT implemented in a group instructional format in order to determine which format was more effective, efficient, resulted in higher observational learning, and resulted in better maintenance when teaching a variety of expressive skills. The experimenters utilized a parallel treatment design, and the results indicated that both instructional formats were equally effective, there were mixed results in terms of maintenance and efficiency, and group instruction resulted in observational learning. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Effects of Imagery Training on Swimming Performance: An Applied Investigation

A multiple-baseline design was used to examine the influence of an imagery intervention on the performance of swimmers’ times on a thousand-yard practice set. Performance times for four swimmers were collected over a 15-week period during preseason training. The intervention took place over a 3-week period and was introduced after the fourth week of the study. The results revealed that three out of four participants significantly improved their times on the one thousand-yard practice set after being introduced to the imagery intervention. The results are discussed in terms of the implications of using imagery to improve athlete's performance on continuous tasks.     

Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo

We offer an overview of what we take to be the main themes in Annalisa Coliva’s book, Moore and Wittgenstein: Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense. In particular, we focus on the ‘framework reading’ that she offers of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and its anti-sceptical implications. While broadly agreeing with the proposal that Coliva puts forward on this score, we do suggest one important supplementation to the view—viz., that this way of dealing with radical scepticism needs to be augmented with an account of the meta-sceptical problem which this proposal generates, which we call epistemic vertigo.     

Group Session Rating Scale: Preliminary psychometrics in substance abuse group interventions

Background: Although ultra‐brief outcome and process measures have been developed for individual therapy, currently there are no ultra‐brief alliance measures for group therapy. Method: The current study examined 105 clients in group therapy for issues related to substance abuse or with issues related to the substance abuse of a significant other. We tested whether a newly developed group therapy alliance measure – the Group Session Rating Scale would be related to other commonly used group process measures (Working Alliance Inventory, Group Cohesion, Group Climate) and early change (change over the first four sessions of group therapy). Results: The findings provided support for reliability based on Cronbach alphas and test‐retest coefficients. Additionally, the GSRS was a one‐factor measure that was related to other group process measures as well as predicted early change. Discussion: Clinical implications for how to utilise ultra‐brief outcome and alliance measures are provided.     

The cortisol awakening response: Associations with trait anxiety and stress reactivity

This study investigated the extent to which trait anxiety and state anxiety in response to stress are associated with the cortisol awakening response (CAR).Fifty-one healthy participants were recruited. State anxiety measures were taken in anticipation of and during a laboratory stressor. Salivary cortisol levels were measured immediately upon awakening (at 0, 15, 30, and 45 min) on two consecutive mornings. Cortisol awakening response was assessed by the area under the curve with respect to zero (AUC_G).The magnitude of the CAR was found to be negatively associated with both trait anxiety and anticipatory anxiety. Moreover, regression analysis showed that the effects of trait anxiety on the AUC_G were mediated by anticipatory anxiety.These results suggest that the CAR is influenced by trait anxiety. Moreover, the effect of trait anxiety on the CAR seems to operate by impacting on psychological stress reactivity (i.e., anticipatory anxiety).     

Desire satisfaction,death, and time

Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.     

The unpacking effect in allocations of responsibility for group tasks

Individuals tend to overestimate their relative contributions to collaborative endeavors. Thus, the sum of group members’ estimates of the percentage they each contributed to a joint task typically exceeds the logically allowable 100%. We suggest that this tendency stems partly from individuals’ inclination to regard their fellow group members as a collective rather than as individuals, and that leading people to think about their collaborators as individuals should therefore reduce the perceived relative magnitude of their own contributions. Consistent with this thesis, four experiments demonstrate that people’s tendency to claim more than their fair share of the credit for a group task is attenuated when they “unpack” their collaborators, conceptualizing them as separate individuals, rather than as “the rest of the group.”