A comparison of three methods of fitting the normal ogive

The Mueller-Urban method of fitting the normal ogive is derived, and the inadequacies of its inherent assumptions are discussed. This and the unweighted least squares method are compared to the maximum likelihood solution which is shown to be very close to the ideal least squares solution. As an empirical demonstration of the superiority of the maximum likelihood solution, random ogives are fitted by all three methods and they are compared on the basis of the expected values and the standard errors of the estimates. It is concluded that the maximum likelihood solution is uniformly superior to the others in all respects.This research was done under Contract Nonr-248(55) between the Office of Naval Research and The Johns Hopkins University. This is Report No. 18 under that contract. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government. This paper is part of a dissertation submitted to The Johns Hopkins University. Part of this work was done while the author was a National Institutes of Health Research Fellow.Now at The Biometric Laboratory, The George Washington University. The author is indebted to Dr. Wendell R. Garner for his valuable advice and encouragement, and to Jerome Cornfield for several helpful discussions.     

The roles of the secondary school counselor and the secondary school psychologist as perceived by educators of counselors and by educators of school psychologists

This study has indicated that counselor educators and educators of school psychologists are substantially in agreement regarding their perceptions of the roles of guidance counselors and school psychologists in the secondary school. Functions which are perceived as being performed by both counselors and psychologists have been described. These may lead either to collaborative endeavor or role conflict. Basic counselor and school psychologist roles have been presented. The perceived role of the counselor is broad and extensive; the perceived role of the school psychologist appears narrow and intensive.     

Intense classification training to increase the detection of drowning swimmers

Lifeguards engage in a continuous process of deciding whether swimmers are in danger or not. The variety of behaviours that distressed swimmers show makes it difficult to impart declarative knowledge to this effect during lifeguard training. As an alternative, we propose a novel training tool that requires novice participants to rapidly categorise 3-s video clips of real-life swimmers as either ‘safe’ or ‘drowning’. A control group also completed a sham intervention, with surfers that may ‘fall’. Due to the complex nature of swimming pools, a scaffolded training approach was employed, which gradually increased the amount of background information over subsequent training rounds. Results demonstrated that the drowning classification training improved responses in a subsequent drowning detection test, compared with the active control-group. The scaffolded approach appeared to prepare participants for processing swimmers in the drowning-detection test. The results provide a foundation for a novel training protocol to improve lifeguard skills.     

Risk

In this article it is argued that the standard theoretical account of risk in the contemporary literature, which is cast along probabilistic lines, is flawed, in that it is unable to account for a particular kind of risk. In its place a modal account of risk is offered. Two applications of the modal account of risk are then explored. First, to epistemology, via the defence of an anti‐risk condition on knowledge in place of the normal anti‐luck condition. Second, to legal theory, where it is shown that this account of risk can cast light on the debate regarding the extent to which a criminal justice system can countenance the possibility of wrongful convictions.     

Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge‐how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge‐how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge‐how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti‐intellectualism. Unlike neo‐Rylean anti‐intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge‐how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge‐how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.     

Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge‐how is a kind of knowledge‐that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge‐how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge‐that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge‐how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge‐that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge‐how and knowledge‐that come apart.     

Psychometric Meta‐Analysis of the English Version of the Beck Anxiety Inventory

This meta‐analysis reviewed 192 scholarly works from 1993 to 2013 using the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck & Steer, 1993 ). Aggregated internal consistency (coefficient alpha) was .91 (k = 117), and test–retest reliability was .65 (k = 18). Convergent comparisons were robust across 33 different anxiety instruments and the Beck Depression Inventory–II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996 ). Structural validity primarily supported the original 2‐factor solution proposed by Beck and Steer ( 1993 ), and diagnostic accuracy varied according to the sample size and criterion cutoff score.