Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck

The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call "veritic" epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call "reflective" epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal.     

Technical note on the joint receipt of quantities of a single good

The joint receipt of x and y is the fact of receiving them both. If x and y are objects that are valued, their joint receipt is valued as well. Assumming joint receipt is a binary operation that satisfies the conditions of extensive measurement, there is a numerical representation that is additive over joint receipt. We consider the case where x and y are quantities of the same infinitely divisible good. Different sets of assumptions are explored. Invariance with respect to multiplication proves to be interesting. Invariance with respect to addition yields a linear form. A relaxation of the latter yields an approximately linear form. Finally, we consider a non-commutative but bisymmetric joint-receipt operation with a representation arising from preferences over gambles.     

A thought on the nature of psychoanalytic theory

In this paper I suggest that much of recent experiment in analytic theory, even widely diverse approaches, has a common denominator the problem of the conceptual vacuum created by the shift away from a central creative position of the idea of psychic mechanisms. I try to illustrate, by comparing theories of Bion and George Klein, that this movement seems to point in the direction of considering now what is uniquely psychoanalytic about our theories. I content that what is unique about psychoanalytic theories is that they are involved in the experiential core-function of the applied science by becoming internalized and used symbolically to aid the analyst inwardly to endure persecutory anxiety and loss of the sense of objective reality, and so maintain the analytic position.