Countering perfectionism in research on clinical practice I: Surveying rationality changes after a single intensive ret intervention

The failure of controlled experimental research on therapy out-come to produce findings of clinical as well as statistical significance seems at least partly due to irrational, perfectionistic, beliefs about how research can be used to infer causes of therapeutic change. Irrational beliefs about controlled experimental designs and about incomplete sampling, in particular, appear to prevent appropriate consideration of probatively valuable quasi-experimental research. Models of more rational alternatives are identified, and an example of the functional advantages of adopting these rational beliefs is explicated. The example demonstrates that single-shot pre-post survey data from self-selected catch-as-catch-can samples can permit legitimate, but not absolutely certain, conclusions about the efficacy and efficiency of RET.Albert Ellis, Ph.D. is executive director of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy in New York City.     

Setting and response generalization in rational-emotive therapy: A case study

A single case study (n=1) conducted during therapy investigated the relationship between disputing irrational beliefs in vivo and setting and response generalization. Irrational beliefs associated with the subject's anger and depression were disputed at different intervals over a ten week period utilizing a multiple baseline design across four classes in a school setting (setting 1). Depression and anger were rated several times each week. The subject's level of anxiety was also rated in setting 1 but the irrational beliefs associated with it were not disputed. Anger, depression, and anxiety were rated without disputation in a separate work setting (setting 2). Affect ratings significantly decreased across both settings throughout the ten week period. Results indicated that 1) disputing irrational beliefs associated with anger and depression in setting 1 led to reductions in anxiety in this setting (response generalization), 2) anger and depression reductions in setting 2 paralleled setting 1 reductions (setting generalization), and 3) anxiety reductionsWilliam J. Ruth, PhD, Staff Psychologist and practicum supervisor, Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, NY City; School Psychologist, Board of Cooperative Educational Services, Southern Westchester.Raymond DiGiuseppe, PhD, ABPP, Director of Training and Research, Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, NY City; Graduate Professor, St. John's University, NY City; co-author,Practitioner's Guide to Rational-Emotive Therapy and RET with Alcoholics and Substance Abusers.     

Computers and commitment to a public management decision: An experiment

Based on results of an experiment, hypotheses are tested concerning the effects of computer use on decision commitment. The experiment required subjects to make an adoption decision regarding a hypothetical government agency's innovation. Subjects could choose from a variety of information sets, some computer based, some not, before making the decision. After their decision the subjects were given “new evidence” that contradicted their initial position. Two experimental treatments included more difficult access to the computer-based information and higher cost for the computer-based information. Results indicate that access difficulty diminishes confidence in decisions and leads to lesser commitment. However, the cost of the computer information seems to have little bearing on decision commitment. Barry Bozeman is director of the Technology and Information Policy Program of the Maxwell School of Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse NY 13244-4010. There he is professor of public policy and administration and affiliate professor of engineering. His research has focused on organization theory and public management, science and technology policy, and the use of technical information in decision-making. R.F. Shangraw, Jr. is vice president of Independent Project Analysis, Inc., Great Falls, Virginia. Previously, he was assistant professor of public administration at Syracuse University. His research interests include information management, decision-making, and public policy applications of expert systems.     

Continuities in the development of the physical and social sciences: Principles of a new social physics

The original concept of “social physics” was built on positivist philosophy and scientific method. Evidence from quantum physics suggests that a postpositivist “social physics” may yet be viable, not because social science should emulate physics, but because physics is more like social science. The five principles of complementarty, uncertainty, the measurement problem, nonlocal causation, and participatory collusion are presented in this article to demonstrate the contemporary convergence of the physical and social sciences into a new social physics. E. Sam Overman is associate professor of public affairs at the Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado at Denver, Denver CO 80204. He recently editedMethodology and Epistemology for Social Science, selected papers by Donald T. Campbell (University of Chicago Press, 1988). He has published other articles on policy physics and social science philosophy, and has conducted research and published extensively in the area of information resource policy and management.     

Robust interactive decision-analysis (RID): Behavioral results and implications

We have proposed a novel interactive procedure for performing decision analysis, called Robust Interactive Decision Analysis (RID), which permits a decision maker (DM) to voluntarily and interactively express strong (viz, sure) binary preferences for actions, partial decision functions, and full decision functions, and only imprecise probability and utility function assessments. These serve as INPUTS TO operators to prune the state probability space and decision space until an optimal choice strategy is obtained. The viability of the RID approach depends on a DM's ability to provide such information consistently and meaningfully. On a limited scale we experimentally investigate the behavioral implications of the RID method in order to ascertain its potential operational feasibility and viability. More specifically, we examine whether a DM can (1) express strong preferences between pairs of vectors of unconditional and conditional payoffs or utilities consistently; (2) provide imprecise (ordinal and interval) state probabilities that are individually as well as mutually consistent with the state probabilities imputed from the expressed strong preferences. The results show that a DM can provide strong individually and mutually consistent preference and ordinal probability information. Moreover, most individuals also appear to be able to provide interval probabilities that are individually and mutually consistent with their strong preference inputs. However, the several violations observed, our small sample size, and the limited scope of our investigation suggest that further experimentation is needed to determine whether and/or how such inputs should be elicited. Overall, the results indicate that the RID method is behaviorally viable.     

Cognitive guidelines for simplifying medical information: Data framing and perception

In this paper, 1 describe psychological guidelines for simplifying medical information — methods to aid the perception and recognition of abnormalities in medical test reports. These techniques resemble natural human editing strategies outlined in prospect theory. The methods pre-edit data as humans do but to reduce human effort. I review empirical studies assessing these techniques and discuss needs for further research.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.