Are measures of self-esteem,neuroticism, locus of control,and generalized self-efficacy indicators of a common core construct?

The authors present results of 4 studies that seek to determine the discriminant and incremental validity of the 3 most widely studied traits in psychology-self-esteem, neuroticism, and locus of control-along with a 4th, closely related trait-generalized self-efficacy. Meta-analytic results indicated that measures of the 4 traits were strongly related. Results also demonstrated that a single factor explained the relationships among measures of the 4 traits. The 4 trait measures display relatively poor discriminant validity, and each accounted for little incremental variance in predicting external criteria relative to the higher order construct. In light of these results, the authors suggest that measures purporting to assess self-esteem, locus of control, neuroticism, and generalized self-efficacy may be markers of the same higher order concept.     

In Defence of Luck Egalitarianism

This paper considers issues raised by Elizabeth Andersons recent critique of the position she terms luck egalitarianism. It is maintained that luck egalitarianism, once clarified and elaborated in certain regards, remains the strongest egalitarian stance. Andersons arguments that luck egalitarians abandon both the negligent and prudent dependent caretakers fails to account for the moderate positions open to luck egalitarians and overemphasizes their commitment to unregulated market choices. The claim that luck egalitarianism insults citizens by redistributing on the grounds of paternalistic beliefs, pity and envy, and by making intrusive and stigmatizing judgments of responsibility, fails accurately to characterize the luck egalitarians rationale for redistribution and relies upon luck egalitarians being insensitive to the danger of stigmatization (which they need not be). The luck egalitarian position is reinforced by the fact that Andersons favoured conception of equality, democratic equality, is counterintuitively indifferent to all unchosen inequalities, including intergenerational inequalities, once bare social minima are met.I am indebted to Catriona McKinnon and Hillel Steiner for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this article. An antecedent of the paper was presented at the Northern Political Theory Association Annual Conference at the University of St Andrews in August 2003. Research for this article was supported by the University of York Alumni Fund and the Arts and Humanities Research Board.     

Transforming animal species: the case of ‘oncomouse’

In this paper I deal with ethical implications arising from animal biotechnology. I analyse some general questions surrounding the production of transgenic animals through a specific case study: the oncomouse. In particular, I explore ethical factors involved in the production of oncomice. This is because biologists genetically modify animals’ germ cells and refuse to modify human germ cells. I will underline how the international community has thus far justified this ‘ethical difference’. The opinions here expressed are personal and do not commit the European Commission. Maurizio Salvi is member of the Scientific Staff of the Higher Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven. Currently he is a Scientific Officer (National Expert Detached) of the European Commission, (Directorate-General XII, Science Research and Development, Directorate B.II.3) dealing with Bioethics research.     

Does the Argument from Realization Generalize? Responses to Kim

By quantifying over properties we cannot create new properties any more than by quantifying over individuals we can create new individuals. Someone murdered Jones, and the murderer is either Smith or Jones or Wang. That “someone,” who murdered Jones, is not a person in addition to Smith, Jones, and Wang, and it would be absurd to posit a disjunctive person, Smith‐or‐Jones‐or‐Wang, with whom to identify the murderer. The same goes for second‐order properties and their realizers. (Kim 1997a, 201)