Task demands and representation in long-term repetition priming

The effects of task demands on the representation of letter strings in long-term repetition priming (LTRP) were explored in two lexical decision experiments. The stimuli in both experiments were words and nonwords, some presented horizontally and some vertically. The only difference between the two experiments was the response required by the participant. In Experiment 1, the participants pressed one of two buttons, indicating whether or not a given stimulus was a word. In Experiment 2, the participants pressed one of four buttons, indicating both the lexical status and the orientation of a given stimulus. The results were that in Experiment 1, LTRP was not disrupted by a change in stimulus orientation, whereas in Experiment 2 it was, suggesting that the nature of the stimulus representation utilized in LTRP is partially dependent on the demands of the task.     

The ties that bind what is known to the recall of what is new

Cued recall success varies with what people know and with what they do during an episode. This paper focuses on prior knowledge and disentangles the relative effects of 10 features of words and their relationships on cued recall. Results are reported for correlational and multiple regression analyses of data obtained from free association norms and from 29 experiments. The 10 features were only weakly correlated with each other in the norms and, with notable exceptions, in the experiments. The regression analysis indicated that forward cue-to-target strength explained the most variance, followed by backward target-to-cue strength. Target connectivity and set size explained the next most variance, along with mediated cue-to-target strength. Finally, frequency, concreteness, shared associate strength, and cue set size also contributed significantly to recall. Taken together, indices of prior word knowledge explain 49% of the recall variance. Theoretically driven equations that use free association to predict cued recall were also evaluated. Each equation was designed to condense multiple indices of word interconnectivity into a single predictor.     

Mean response times, variability, and skew in the responding of ADHD children: a response time distributional approach

Response time (RT) distributions from three fixed foreperiod conditions (2, 4, and 8 s) in a warned four-choice RT task were obtained for a group of boys with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, combined type (ADHD; n = 17) and for two groups of normal control boys (age-matched, n = 18, and younger-aged, n = 10). Quantitative measures of distributional shape were derived by fitting the ex-Gaussian distributional model to the individual RT data. Statistical results indicate that the ADHD distributions differ from the age-matched control distributions with respect to the size of the tail (larger for the ADHD boys), but differ from the younger control distributions with respect to the location of the leading edge (slower for the younger control boys). Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) results reveal that the ex-Gaussian exponential component is highly diagnostic of the ADHD boys.     

Getting the Big Picture in Community Science: Methods That Capture Context

Community science has a rich tradition of using theories and research designs that are consistent with its core value of contextualism. However, a survey of empirical articles published in the American Journal of Community Psychology shows that community scientists utilize a narrow range of statistical tools that are not well suited to assess contextual data. Multilevel modeling, geographic information systems (GIS), social network analysis, and cluster analysis are recommended as useful tools to address contextual questions in community science. An argument for increased methodological consilience is presented, where community scientists are encouraged to adopt statistical methodology that is capable of modeling a greater proportion of the data than is typical with traditional methods.     

Especial skills: their emergence with massive amounts of practice

Differing viewpoints concerning the specificity and generality of motor skill representations in memory were compared by contrasting versions of a skill having either extensive or minimal specific practice. In Experiments 1 and 2, skilled basketball players more accurately performed set shots at the foul line than would be predicted on the basis of the performance at the nearby locations, suggesting considerable specificity at this distance. This effect was replicated even when the lines on the court were obscured (in Experiment 2). However, the effect was absent when jump shots were executed in Experiment 3. The authors argue that massive levels of practice at 1 particular member of a class of actions produce specific effects that allow this skill to stand out from the other members of the class, giving it the status of an especial skill. Various theoretical views are proposed to account for the development of these skills.     

Cultural Differences in Belief Bias Associated with Deductive Reasoning?

Norenzayan, Smith, Jun Kim, and Nisbett (2002) investigated cultural differences in the use of intuitive versus formal reasoning in 4 experiments. Our comment concerns the 4th experiment where Norenzayan et al. reported that, although there were no cultural differences in accuracy on abstract logical arguments, Koreans made more errors than U.S. undergraduates in judging the logical validity of concrete arguments. Norenzayan et al. concluded that Koreans are less likely than European Americans to decontextualize an argument's content from its logical structure, as Koreans were more likely to consider the believability of the conclusion when assessing an argument's validity (a belief bias). Notably, Korean participants were more conservative (less likely to say an argument is valid) than European American participants when assessing arguments. An analysis of the average of the hit and correct rejection rates in each of the conditions (abstract, concrete–believable, concrete–nonbelievable) revealed that, contrary to conclusions of Norenzayan et al., European Americans were no better than Koreans at determining the validity of concrete deductive arguments with conclusions varying in believability.