Infants' discrimination of happy and sad music

Infants can detect information specifying affect in infant- and adult-directed speech, familiar and unfamiliar facial expressions, and in point-light displays of facial expressions. We examined 3-, 5-, 7-, and 9-month-olds' discrimination of musical excerpts judged by adults and preschoolers as happy and sad. In Experiment 1, using an infant-controlled habituation procedure, 3-, 5-, 7-, and 9-month-olds heard three musical excerpts that were rated as either happy or sad. Following habituation, infants were presented with two new musical excerpts from the other affect group. Nine-month-olds discriminated the musical excerpts rated as affectively different. Five- and seven-month-olds discriminated the happy and sad excerpts when they were habituated to sad excerpts but not when they were habituated to happy excerpts. Three-month-olds showed no evidence of discriminating the sad and happy excerpts. In Experiment 2, 5-, 7-, and 9-month-olds were presented with two new musical excerpts from the same affective group as the habituation excerpts. At no age did infants discriminate these novel, yet affectively similar, musical excerpts. In Experiment 3, we examined 5-, 7-, and 9-month-olds' discrimination of individual excerpts rated as affectively similar. Only the 9-month-olds discriminated the affectively similar individual excerpts. Results are discussed in terms of infants' ability to discriminate affect across a variety of events and its relevance for later social-communicative development.     

Influence of deontological versus consequentialist orientations on act choices and framing effects: when principles are more important than consequences

A long tradition in decision making assumes that people usually take a consequentialist perspective, which implies a focus on the outcomes only when making decisions. Such a view largely neglects the existence of a deontological perspective, which implies that people are sensitive to moral duties that require or prohibit certain behaviors, irrespective of the consequences. Similarly, recent research has also suggested that people holding “protected values” (PVs) show increased attention to acts versus omissions and less attention to outcomes. The present research investigates the role of deontological versus consequentialist modes of thought and of PVs on framing effects and act versus omission choices. In a modification of Tversky and Kahneman's ( 1981 ) risky choice framing paradigm, we manipulated the framing of the outcomes (positive, negative), as well as whether the certain outcome was associated with an act or inaction. The main results suggest that act versus omission tendencies are linked to deontological focus and PVs. Framing effects, on the other hand, are driven by a consequentialist focus. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cue usage in memory for location when orientation is fixed

In previous research, it was demonstrated that including one or three cues surrounding a circular field had no effect on spatial memory for dot locations when the field's orientation was fixed, but that there were very large effects when orientation varied across trials (Fitting, Wedell, & Allen, 2007). In four new experiments, we explored the use of external cues in the fixed orientation environment, using 0, 4, 8, or 24 cues and manipulating task difficulty. In Experiments 1-3, the angular bias data supported the use of four quadrant-based prototypes regardless of cue condition, but there were clear cue effects on radial prototype locations. Increasing the number of cues enhanced accuracy of spatial memory for targets closer to cues. In Experiment 4, we severely challenged memory by using multiple targets and a filled delay before estimation. Doing so demonstrated an effect of cues on the categorical structuring of memory. Collectively, findings indicate that when orientation is fixed, cues bolster fine-grain memory, but that they only alter the default categorical scheme when memory demands are high.     

Styles of pulling in trichotillomania: exploring differences in symptom severity, phenomenology, and functional impact

Previous research has examined possible phenomenological differences between “focused” (i.e., with a compulsive quality) and “automatic” (i.e., with decreased awareness) pulling associated with trichotillomania (TTM), but these constructs have not been assessed using psychometrically sound measures. In the current study, differences in TTM severity, phenomenology, comorbid psychiatric symptoms, and functional impact were examined across individuals with varying combinations of “focused” and “automatic” pulling styles. Participants aged 18 and older were recruited via an internet-based survey. Those meeting inclusion criteria and completing the Milwaukee Inventory for Subtypes of Trichotillomania-Adult Version (MIST-A; n=1545) were classified as either high- or low-focused and either high- or low-automatic based on scores obtained from the focused and automatic scales of the MIST-A using a median split procedure. Results showed some significant differences between pulling styles. For example, “high-automatic” pullers reported more severe TTM and greater stress than “low-automatic” pullers, and “high-focused” pullers reported more severe TTM, greater stress and depression, and greater functional impact than “low-focused” pullers. Subsequent analyses suggest that, in comparison to individuals experiencing low levels of both automatic and focused pulling, those experiencing high levels of each pulling style reported greater severity, psychological impact, and functional impact. Clinical and research implications, study limitations, and future areas of research are discussed.     

Styles of pulling in youths with trichotillomania: exploring differences in symptom severity, phenomenology, and comorbid psychiatric symptoms

To date, no studies have examined possible phenomenological differences between the automatic and focused styles of pulling in youths with TTM. The aims of the current study were to examine differences in TTM severity, phenomenology, comorbid psychiatric symptoms, and functional impact across youths with varying degrees of these pulling styles. Youths between the ages of 10 and 17 years (and their parent) were recruited via an Internet-based survey. A total of 186 youths with chronic hair pulling was classified as “high-focused” or “low-focused” and either “high-automatic” or “low-automatic” based upon scores obtained on the Milwaukee Inventory for Styles of Trichotillomania-Child Version (MIST-C) using a median-split procedure. Results demonstrated significant differences between pulling styles. More specifically, “high-focused” pullers reported more severe TTM and greater symptoms of anxiety and depression than “low-focused” pullers, and “high-automatic” pullers reported greater symptoms of depression than “low-automatic” pullers. Subsequent analyses suggest that, in comparison to youths with low levels of both automatic and focused pulling, those experiencing high levels of focused pulling but low levels of automatic pulling reported phenomenological differences and were more likely to engage in additional repetitive behaviors (i.e., skin picking, lip/cheek biting). Clinical and research implications, study limitations, and future areas of research are discussed.     

Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?

In this paper, I argue that those moral theorists who wish to accommodate agent-centered options and supererogatory acts must accept both that the reason an agent has to promote her own interests is a nonmoral reason and that this nonmoral reason can prevent the moral reason she has to sacrifice those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others from generating a moral requirement to do so. These theorists must, then, deny that moral reasons morally override nonmoral reasons, such that even the weakest moral reason trumps the strongest nonmoral reason in the determination of an act’s moral status (e.g., morally permissible or impermissible). If this is right, then it seems that these theorists have their work cut out for them. It will not be enough for them to provide a criterion of rightness that accommodates agent-centered options and supererogatory acts, for, in doing so, they incur a debt. As I will show, in accommodating agent-centered options, they commit themselves to the view that moral reasons are not morally overriding, and so they owe us an account of how both moral reasons and nonmoral reasons come together to determine an act’s moral status.