‘Goals’ are not an integral component of imitation

Several theories suggest that actions are coded for imitation in terms of mentalistic goals, or inferences about the actor’s intentions, and that these goals solve the correspondence problem by allowing sensory input to be translated into matching motor output. We tested this intention reading hypothesis against general process accounts of imitation using the pen-and-cups task. The task has three components: participants place a pen in one of two cups, using their right or left hand, and one of two grips. Previous research has revealed a colour minimum error pattern; when one of the components is differentially coloured (e.g., one cup is red and the other blue), accuracy is greatest on the coloured dimension. We found the colour minimum error pattern, not only in the standard version of the task, where participants imitate the actions of a human model, but also in three novel variants of the task, in which participants responded on the basis of spatial or arbitrary stimulus–response mappings to ‘geometric’, non-biological stimuli. These stimuli do not afford the attribution of intentions, and therefore our results support generalist theories of imitation by showing that the colour minimum error pattern is due, not to intention reading, but to the operation of task-general processes of perception, attention and motor control.     

Possible knowledge of unknown truth

Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p, there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unknown. Here I further elaborate that claim and respond to objections by Williamson, who argued that there cannot be non-trivial knowledge of this kind. I give conditions which suffice for such non-trivial counterfactual knowledge.     

The Relation between Individual and Group Conflicts in Psychotherapy

Abstract

I describe three constellations of group life and group process: resistance, rebellion, and refusal. In resistance, an individual or group remains antagonistic to conscious but not unconscious thinking, the latter manifested in derivatives, including symbol and symptom formation, transference–countertransference, and enactment. Rebellion functions on the level of conscious thinking, manifested in challenge, defiance, and the possibility of sociopolitical action. The basic premises and values of the group and/or leader are at the center of the controversy, to be addressed on that level. Refusal establishes a mental boundary between what is considered appropriate and inappropriate. Unconsciousaswellasconscious processes of feeling, thinking, and meaning making are refused entry, left undeveloped, rejected, or obstructed. Working with refusal requires appreciating how and why the mind and its thinking operations are being suspended. The theoretical framework is applied to a case example.     

Childhood Abuse,Head Injuries,and Use of Medical Emergency Services in People with Severe Mental Illness

People with severe mental illness (SMI) report high rates of traumatic experiences. This study analyzes data collected from 183 people diagnosed with SMI on reports of childhood trauma, head injuries, and emergency room (ER) services. More than half the cohort (56.7%) reported 3 to 7 cooccurring categories of childhood abuse (CAB). People who reported 6 and 7 categories of CAB had a 5-fold risk of experiencing a head injury. If they have used the ER for reasons other than psychiatric illness they endorse more traumatic experiences in their childhood when compared to those who did not. People with SMI and cooccurring CAB experiences might be predisposed to a higher risk of head injuries and more frequent use of the ER.     

The sources of skill in seriating cups in children,monkeys and apes

Is a concept of either reversibility or of hierarchical forms of combination necessary for skilled seriation? We examined this question by presenting seriating cups to adult capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees and to 11‐, 16‐ and 21‐month‐old children. Capuchins and chimpanzees consistently created seriated sets with five cups, and placed a sixth cup into a previously seriated set. Children of all three ages created seriated five‐cup sets less consistently than the capuchins and chimpanzees, and were rarely able to place a sixth cup into a seriated set. Twenty‐one‐month‐olds produced more structures containing three or more cups than did the younger age groups, and these children also achieved seriated sets more frequently. Within all participant groups, success at seriating five cups was associated with the frequency of combining three or more cups, regardless of form. The ability to integrate multiple elements in persistent combinatorial activity is sufficient for the emergence of seriation in young children, monkeys and apes. Reliance on particular methods of combination and a concept of reversibility are later refinements that can enhance skilled seriation.