Optimal sample sizes for precise interval estimation of Welch’s procedure under various allocation and cost considerations

Welch’s (Biometrika 29: 350–362, 1938) procedure has emerged as a robust alternative to the Student’s t test for comparing the means of two normal populations with unknown and possibly unequal variances. To facilitate the advocated statistical practice of confidence intervals and further improve the potential applicability of Welch’s procedure, in the present article, we consider exact approaches to optimize sample size determinations for precise interval estimation of the difference between two means under various allocation and cost considerations. The desired precision of a confidence interval is assessed with respect to the control of expected half-width, and to the assurance probability of interval half-width within a designated value. Furthermore, the design schemes in terms of participant allocation and cost constraints include (a) giving the ratio of group sizes, (b) specifying one sample size, (c) attaining maximum precision performance for a fixed cost, and (d) meeting a specified precision level for the least cost. The proposed methods provide useful alternatives to the conventional sample size procedures. Also, the developed programs expand the degree of generality for the existing statistical software packages and can be accessed at brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/ supplemental.     

Heuristic Value of Eclecticism in Theory Development: The Case of Piagetian-Vygotskian <Emphasis Type="Italic">dialogue</Emphasis> about Proportional Reasoning

Køppe’s proposition of four layers in theoretical building are used here in the exploration of a specific case of eclectic combination, the use of Piagetian and Vygotskian general approaches to the analysis of proportional reasoning as a cognitive mathematical ability. It is proposed here that the eclectic consideration of these contributions depends on the consideration of their specificity, in the sense that they highlight different aspects of the phenomenon under scrutiny, and also on the consideration of the coherence between this eclectic convergence and premises in terms of schools of thought under which each contribution is framed. We conclude proposing in accordance to S. Køppe’s proposal that eclecticism can be valuable and heuristic in theory development, but this contribution will depend largely on the effort in establishing careful relations between the four layers of theory-building.     

Online Responsibility: Bad Samaritanism and the Influence of Internet Mediation

In 2008 a young man committed suicide while his webcam was running. 1,500 people apparently watched as the young man lay dying: when people finally made an effort to call the police, it was too late. This closely resembles the case of Kitty Genovese in 1964, where 39 neighbours supposedly watched an attacker assault and did not call until it was too late. This paper examines the role of internet mediation in cases where people may or may not have been good Samaritans and what their responsibilities were. The method is an intuitive one: intuitions on the various potentially morally relevant differences when it comes to responsibility between offline and online situations are examined. The number of onlookers, their physical nearness and their anonymity have no moral relevance when it comes to holding them responsible. Their perceived reality of the situation and ability to act do have an effect on whether we can hold people responsible, but this doesn’t seem to be unique to internet mediation. However the way in which those factors are intrinsically connected to internet mediation does seem to have a diminishing effect on responsibility in online situations.     

A computer simulation of the argument from disagreement

In this paper we shed new light on the Argument from Disagreement by putting it to test in a computer simulation. According to this argument widespread and persistent disagreement on ethical issues indicates that our moral opinions are not influenced by any moral facts, either because no such facts exist or because they are epistemically inaccessible or inefficacious for some other reason. Our simulation shows that if our moral opinions were influenced at least a little bit by moral facts, we would quickly have reached consensus, even if our moral opinions were affected by factors such as false authorities, external political shifts, and random processes. Therefore, since no such consensus has been reached, the simulation gives us increased reason to take seriously the Argument from Disagreement. Our conclusion is however not conclusive; the simulation also indicates what assumptions one has to make in order to reject the Argument from Disagreement. The simulation algorithm we use builds on the work of Hegselmann and Krause (J Artif Soc Social Simul 5(3); 2002, J Artif Soc Social Simul 9(3), 2006).     

The effects of prior knowledge on the encoding of episodic contextual details

A positive relationship between prior knowledge and item memory is a consistent finding in the literature. In the present study, we sought to determine whether this relationship extends to episodic details that are present at the time of encoding, namely source memory. Using a novel experimental design, we were able to show both between- and within-subjects effects of prior knowledge on source memory. Specifically, the results revealed that the degree of prior knowledge positively predicted memory for source specifying contextual details. In addition, by including two conditions in which attention was divided either at encoding or retrieval, we were able to show that prior knowledge influences memory by affecting encoding processes. Overall, the data suggest that a priori knowledge within a specific domain allows attentional resources to be allocated toward the encoding of contextual details.     

Smaller holistic processing of faces associated with face drawing experience

The type of experience involved with an object category has been regarded as one important factor in shaping of the human object recognition system. Laboratory training studies have shown that different kinds of learning experience with the same set of novel objects resulted in different perceptual and neural changes. Whether this applies to natural real-world objects remains to be seen. We compared two groups of observers who had different learning experiences with faces, using holistic processing as a dependent measure. We found that, while ordinary observers had extensive individuation experience with faces and displayed typical holistic face processing, art students who had acquired additional experience in drawing faces, and thus in attending to parts of a face, showed less holistic processing than did ordinary observers. These results converge with laboratory training studies on the role of type of experience in the development of different perceptual markers for different object categories. It is thus insufficient to categorize expertise simply in terms of object domains (e.g., expertise with faces). Instead, perceptual expertise should be classified in terms of the underlying process or task demand.     

Revisiting backward recall and benchmark memory effects: a reply to Bireta et al. (2010)

When participants are asked to recall lists of items in the reverse order, known as backward recall, several benchmark memory phenomena, such as the word length effect, are abolished (Bireta et al. Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010). Bireta et al. (Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010) suggested that in backward recall, reliance on order retention is increased at the expense of item retention, leading to the abolition of item-based phenomena. In a subsequent study, however, Guérard and Saint-Aubin (in press) showed that four lexical factors known to modulate item retention were unaffected by recall direction. In a series of five experiments, we examined the source of the discrepancy between the two studies. We revisited the effects of phonological similarity, word length, articulatory suppression, and irrelevant speech, using open and closed pools of words in backward and forward recall. The results are unequivocal in showing that none of these effects are influenced by recall direction, suggesting that Bireta et al.’s (Memory & Cognition 38:279–291, 2010) results are the consequence of their particular stimuli.     

Individual differences in the mixture ratio of rotation and nonrotation trials during rotated mirror/normal letter discriminations

Mental rotation is thought to underlie the increase in response times (RTs) for deciding whether rotated letters are normal or mirrored versions. However, mental rotation predicts a linear increase in RTs, whereas the mirror/normal letter discrimination task typically produces a curved function. Recently, Kung and Hamm suggested that this curved function results from a mixture of trials in which mental rotation is employed and trials in which it is not. The mixture ratio may vary between individuals, with some individuals relying more on mental rotation than others. There is no factor in the Kung and Hamm model that reflects such individual differences. In the present study, we suggest that a possible exponent parameter could be added to the Kung and Hamm model to capture individual differences in the mixture ratio. This exponent parameter appears to capture an individual characteristic since the value obtained correlates between the mirror/normal letter task and a left/right object facing task. The development of a quantity that represents the mixture ratio will aid further testing of processes involved in the visual imagery system.     

Centre–surround inhibition is a general aspect of famous-person recognition: Evidence from negative semantic priming from clearly visible primes

A centre–surround attentional mechanism was proposed by Carr and Dagenbach (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 16: 341–350, 1990) to account for their observations of negative semantic priming from hard-to-perceive primes. Their mechanism cannot account for the observation of negative semantic priming when primes are clearly visible. Three experiments (Ns = 30, 46, and 30) used a familiarity decision with names of famous people, preceded by a prime name with the same occupation as the target or with a different occupation. Negative semantic priming was observed at a 150- or 200-ms SOA, with positive priming at shorter (50-ms) and longer (1,000-ms) SOAs. In Experiment 3, we verified that the primes were easily recognisable in the priming task at an SOA that yielded negative semantic priming, which cannot be predicted by the original centre–surround mechanism. A modified version is proposed that explains transiently negative semantic priming by proposing that centre–surround inhibition is a normal, automatically invoked aspect of the semantic processing of visually presented famous names.