Anxiety and perceptual-motor performance: toward an integrated model of concepts, mechanisms, and processes

Under anxiety, people sometimes perform poorly. This concerns cognitive performance (e.g., taking an important exam) as well as perceptual-motor performance (e.g., picking up a cup from a table). There is still much debate about how anxiety affects perceptual-motor performance. In the current paper we review the experimental literature on anxiety and perceptual-motor performance, thereby focusing on how anxiety affects the perception, selection, and realization of action possibilities. Based on this review we discuss the merits of two opposing theoretical explanations and build on existing frameworks of anxiety and cognitive performance to develop an integrated model that explains the various ways in which anxiety may specifically affect perceptual-motor performance. This model distinguishes between positive and negative effects of anxiety and, moving beyond previous approaches, recognizes three operational levels (i.e., attentional, interpretational, and behavioral) at which anxiety may affect different aspects of goal-directed action. Finally, predictions are formulated and directions for future research suggested.     

The role of novelty in early word learning

What mechanism implements the mutual exclusivity bias to map novel labels to objects without names? Prominent theoretical accounts of mutual exclusivity (e.g., Markman, 1989, 1990 ) propose that infants are guided by their knowledge of object names. However, the mutual exclusivity constraint could be implemented via monitoring of object novelty (see Merriman, Marazita, & Jarvis, 1995 ). We sought to discriminate between these contrasting explanations across two preferential looking experiments with 22‐month‐olds. In Experiment 1, infants viewed three objects: one name‐known, two name‐unknown. Of the two name‐unknown objects, one was novel, and the other had been previously familiarized. The infants responded to hearing a novel label by increasing attention only to the novel, name‐unknown object. In a second experiment in which the name‐known object was absent, a novel label increased infants’ attention to a novel object beyond baseline preference for novelty. The experiments provide clear evidence for a novelty‐based mechanism. However, differences in the time course of disambiguation across experiments suggest that novelty processing may be influenced by contextual factors.     

Constraints on arm selection processes when reaching: degrees of freedom and joint amplitudes interact to influence limb selection

With an interest in identifying the variables that constrain arm choice when reaching, the authors had 11 right-handed participants perform free-choice and assigned-limb reaches at 9 object positions. The right arm was freely selected 100% of the time when reaching to positions at 30° and 40° into right hemispace. However, the left arm was freely selected to reach to positions at -30° and -40° in left hemispace 85% of the time. A comparison between free- and assigned-limb reaching kinematics revealed that free limb selection when reaching to the farthest positions was constrained by joint amplitude requirements and the time devoted to limb deceleration. Differences between free- and assigned-arm reaches were not evident when reaching to the midline and positions of ±10°, even though the right arm was freely selected most often for these positions. Different factors contribute to limb selection as a function of distance into a specific hemispace.     

Self as the Target and the Perceiver: A Componential Approach to Self-Enhancement

In this paper, we review the recent literature on the debate over the value of self-enhancement. Past studies fall into two distinct sets, each in the context of a different research tradition. The componential approach to self-enhancement integrates these two divergent perspectives and takes seriously the interplay of self-perception and interpersonal perception. Instead of global indices, the componential approach identifies specific components of person perception. By partitioning the components in self-perception, the componential approach allows for better understanding of the dynamic interactive effects of self-enhancement bias and other components in self-perception on adjustment. We conclude the paper by discussing the emerging attempts to advance a componential approach to examine self-perception in terms of components and outcomes.     

Spirituality and Severity of Menopausal Symptoms in a Sample of Religious Women

Menopause represents an important life change, particularly for religious women whose identity is significantly related to family. Two competing hypotheses are examined: one, because religious women have their identity focused on family and child rearing, spirituality will be related to increased menopausal symptoms because menopause represents a loss of identity and purpose; and two, because spirituality can provide strength and comfort during difficult times, it will, therefore, be related to decreased menopausal symptoms. To test these competing hypotheses, questionnaires were administered to 218 women (average age 55, 35% premenopausal, 26% peri-menopausal, 39% postmenopausal) who were members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Regression analyses indicated that higher levels of spiritual strength were related to decreased levels of reported menopausal symptoms. Spiritual strength was also related to increased benefit finding during menopause, decreased concern with body appearance, and increased use of adaptive coping strategies. We conclude that finding strength in spirituality may help religious women cope better with the life changes associated with menopause.     

Holding others responsible

Theorists have spent considerable time discussing the concept of responsibility. Their discussions, however, have generally focused on the question of who counts as responsible, and for what. But as Gary Watson has noted, “Responsibility is a triadic relationship: an individual (or group) is responsible to others for something” (Watson Agency and answerability: selected essays, 2004, p. 7). Thus, theorizing about responsibility ought to involve theorizing not just about the actor and her conduct, but also about those the actor is responsible to—and specifically about how these people hold the actor responsible for her conduct. In this paper, I give a topology of the terrain of holding others responsible. Over the course of the paper I disambiguate two very broad senses of holding responsible—regarding another as a responsible agent and holding another responsible for a particular piece of conduct. Next, I argue that the latter sense of holding responsible is a genus with two species—what I will call “holding responsible as deep moral appraisal” and “holding responsible as accountability.” Appreciating these distinctions, I argue, sheds considerable light on a number of questions concerning the scope and nature of our practices of holding others responsible. Finally, illuminating these distinct senses of holding responsible and highlighting their features reveals an awkwardness in the most carefully explicated and influential account of holding responsible, namely R. Jay Wallace’s account in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.     

Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it

Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising.     

Inconsistency in the A-Theory

This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment) and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore want to draw different pictures of reality—showing the objective now in different positions—depending upon the time at which the picture is drawn. In this paper it is argued that the times at which the different pictures are drawn may be taken to be normal times or hypertimes. If they are normal times then the A-theory is inconsistent, or else collapses to the B-theory—and appealing to primitive tense operators will not help A-theorists avoid this conclusion. If the times are hypertimes then the A-theory is consistent, but deeply problematic none the less.