Adult age differences in distinctive processing: the modality effect on false recall

Age differences in distinctive processing were investigated by examining the effects of study presentation modality on false recall in younger and older adults using the Deese/Roediger and McDermott paradigm. Participants were presented with study words either visually or auditorily. Older adults did not show the typical reduction in false recall after visual, compared to auditory, study presentation (R.E. Smith & R.R. Hunt, 1998). The authors interpret these results as evidence of reduced distinctive processing on the part of older adults.     

From the lexicon to expectations about kinds: a role for associative learning

In the novel noun generalization task, 2 1/2-year-old children display generalized expectations about how solid and nonsolid things are named, extending names for never-before-encountered solids by shape and for never-before-encountered nonsolids by material. This distinction between solids and nonsolids has been interpreted in terms of an ontological distinction between objects and substances. Nine simulations and behavioral experiments tested the hypothesis that these expectations arise from the correlations characterizing early learned noun categories. In the simulation studies, connectionist networks were trained on noun vocabularies modeled after those of children. These networks formed generalized expectations about solids and nonsolids that match children's performances in the novel noun generalization task in the very different languages of English and Japanese. The simulations also generate new predictions supported by new experiments with children. Implications are discussed in terms of children's development of distinctions between kinds of categories and in terms of the nature of this knowledge.     

Superior performance of blind compared with sighted individuals on bimanual estimations of object size

Five preliminary experiments on sighted individuals revealed marked overestimation on an object size-estimation task using a bimanual response. These experiments ruled out the possibility that overestimation was due to the mode of visual presentation (whether two-dimensional or three-dimensional), the input modality (visual or kinesthetic), or the influence of other visual cues. The main experiment then investigated whether these distortions are due to visual experience by using a variant of the same task to test 24 blind and 24 sighted control participants. Remarkably, the sighted control participants overestimated object size, on average, but the blind participants did not. A follow-up experiment demonstrated that visual memory was the primary influence causing the size over-estimations. We conclude that blind individuals are more accurate than sighted individuals in representing the size of familiar objects because they rely on manual representations, which are less influenced by visual experience than are visual memory representations.     

On the complexity of quantifying construct validity

To validate a measure of a construct is to validate a theory: The process includes theory specification, theory elaboration, choice of methods, choice of research design, reliance on necessary auxiliary theories, and empirical observation. Evaluating the success of the process is likely to be enhanced through quantification. To date, scientists have quantified the final step of empirical observation, but earlier steps in the validation process appear more difficult to measure. In this issue, D. Westen and R. Rosenthal (2005) emphasize that threats to validity are often methodological ones that precede empirical observation. Yet, their earlier attempt to quantify construct validity focused only on the final, empirical observation step of the process. For that reason, it can produce positive results despite real theoretical and methodological threats to validity. Nonetheless, the laudable attempt by these distinguished authors to quantify construct validity reminds us of the complexity of the construct validation process.     

Fragment memories mark the end of childhood amnesia

Adults described and dated two kinds of first remembrances: a personal event memory (the recollection of a personal episode that had occurred at some time in some place) and a memory fragment (an isolated memory moment having no event context and remembered, perhaps, as an image, a behavior, or an emotion). First fragment memories were judged to have originated substantially earlier in life than first event memories--approximately 3 1/3 years of age for first fragment memories versus roughly 4 years of age for first event memories. We conclude that the end of childhood amnesia is marked not by our earliest episodic memories, but by the earliest remembered fragments of childhood experiences.     

Development of a school-wide behavior program in a public middle school: an illustration of deployment-focused intervention development, stage 1

School-wide behavior management systems can improve academic performance and behavior in middle schools, and they should have positive effects on students with ADHD. Unfortunately, evidence-based, school-wide behavior management systems have not been widely adopted because of problems with feasibility, acceptability, and sustainability. The Deployment-Focused Model of Intervention Development and Testing has been proposed as a promising method of bridging the gap between research and practice settings. A key aspect of the model is to involve the persons most likely to deliver the service (e.g., teachers) in the intervention development process from the very beginning. To illustrate this process, the authors describe the planning and implementation of a school-wide program designed to improve behavior in a public middle school.     

Never getting to zero: Elementary school students' understanding of the infinite divisibility of number and matter

Clinical interviews administered to third- to sixth-graders explored children's conceptualizations of rational number and of certain extensive physical quantities. We found within child consistency in reasoning about diverse aspects of rational number. Children's spontaneous acknowledgement of the existence of numbers between 0 and 1 was strongly related to their induction that numbers are infinitely divisible in the sense that they can be repeatedly divided without ever getting to zero. Their conceptualizing number as infinitely divisible was strongly related to their having a model of fraction notation based on division and to their successful judgment of the relative magnitudes of fractions and decimals. In addition, their understanding number as infinitely divisible was strongly related to their understanding physical quantities as infinitely divisible. These results support a conceptual change account of knowledge acquisition, involving two-way mappings between the domains of number and physical quantity.     

Category learning in rhesus monkeys: a study of the Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) tasks

In influential research, R. N. Shepard, C. I. Hovland, and H. M. Jenkins (1961) surveyed humans' categorization abilities using tasks based in rules, exclusive-or (XOR) relations, and exemplar memorization. Humans' performance was poorly predicted by cue-conditioning or stimulus-generalization theories, causing Shepard et al. to describe it in terms of hypothesis selection and rule application that were possibly supported by verbal mediation. The authors of the current article surveyed monkeys' categorization abilities similarly. Monkeys, like humans, found category tasks with a single relevant dimension the easiest and perceptually chaotic tasks requiring exemplar memorization the most difficult. Monkeys, unlike humans, found tasks based in XOR relations very difficult. The authors discuss the character and basis of the species difference in categorization and consider whether monkeys are the generalization-based cognitive system that humans are not.     

What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: a defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists

A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and processes referred to by functionalist cognitive scientists are epiphenomenal. It further contends that the problem lies in functionalism itself, and that, to save the causal significance of mind, it is necessary to re-embrace reductionism. We argue that the prescribed return to reductionism would be disastrous for the cognitive and behavioral sciences, requiring the dismantling of most existing achievements and placing intolerable restrictions on further work. However, this argument fails to answer the metaphysical challenge on its own terms. We meet that challenge by going on to argue that the new metaphysical skepticism about functionalist cognitive science depends on reifying two distinct notions of causality (one primarily scientific, the other metaphysical), then equivocating between them. When the different notions of causality are properly distinguished, it is clear that functionalism is in no serious philosophical trouble, and that we need not choose between reducing minds or finding them causally impotent. The metaphysical challenge to functionalism relies, in particular, on a na?ve and inaccurate conception of the practice of physics, and the relationship between physics and metaphysics.     

Not just standing there: the use of postural coordination to aid visual tasks

Postural control is an integral part of all physical behavior. Recent research has indicated that postural control functions in a manner that facilitates other higher order (suprapostural) tasks. These studies, while showing that postural sway is modulated in a task specific manner, have not examined the form of postural coordination that allows for the achievement of these higher behavioral goals. The current study examined the relation between visual task constraints (viewing distance), environmental constraints (changes in the surface of support), and the postural coordination employed to complete the task. Thirty-one participants were asked to perform a reading task while standing on various surfaces. Postural motion was recorded from the head, cervico-thoracic spine, sacrum (hip), and ankle. It was found that body segment coordination changed as a function of surface characteristics and task constraints. Additionally, the overall pattern of postural sway (head motion) replicated that which was found by Stoffregen et al. [J. Exp. Psychol. Human Percep. Perform. 25 (6) (1999) 1641]. These findings suggest that postural adaptation involves more than basic reduction or increase of motion; it involves the functional coordination of body segments to achieve a particular goal. The data further suggest that there is a need to examine postural control in the absence of external perturbations.