Social Cognition Permeates Social Psychology: Motivated Mental Processes Guide the Study of Human Social Behavior

Social cognition provides a metatheoretical approach to understanding the mental underpinnings of human social behavior. This paper reviews some of the major themes in social cognition research, tracing its progression from a methodological hybrid between cognitive and social psychology to a major foundation of social psychology. We stress the most recent trend in social cognition research – the motivated tactician theme – which focuses on the roles of motives and goals in people's mental processes and social behavior; examples from our laboratory illustrate this theme. Our brief historical overview emphasizes diversity within the social cognition approach; its applicability to multiple psychological and social issues; and directions for collaboration with other notable research traditions, particularly cross-cultural perspectives.     

A framework for understanding the allocation of attention in location-precued discrimination

The effects of attention on visual perception are assessed in the location-precuing paradigm. First, we present a review of some current metaphors for attention and relevant data. Then, a framework is suggested that provides an interpretation of the temporal sequence of external and assumed internal processes within a location-cuing trial. Cases when a precue correctly indicates the target location (valid trials) are compared to cases when the precue directs attention to the wrong location (invalid trials) with the cue location either at fixation or peripheral to the target location. Several specific hypotheses are suggested; these concern decrements in performance on invalid trials and effects of the location of a precue. For the most part, these hypotheses are supported by data in the literature and in some new studies. A gradient-filter metaphor for attention, which includes a synthesis of ideas from the gradient model and the attention gate model, is more consistent with the data than is a spotlight metaphor.     

Overconfidence and underconfidence: When and why people underestimate (and overestimate) the competition

It is commonly held that people believe themselves to be better than others, especially for outcomes under their control. However, such overconfidence is not universal. This paper presents evidence showing that people believe that they are below average on skill-based tasks that are difficult. A simple Bayesian explanation can account for these effects and for their robustness: On skill-based tasks, people generally have better information about themselves than about others, so their beliefs about others’ performances tend to be more regressive (thus less extreme) than their beliefs about their own performances. This explanation is tested in two experiments that examine these effects’ robustness to experience, feedback, and market forces. The discussion explores the implications for strategic planning in general and entrepreneurial entry in particular.     

The Argument from Moral Experience

It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.

Exposure-based models of human parsing: Evidence for the use of coarse-grained (nonlexical) statistical records

Several current models of human parsing maintain that initial structural decisions are influenced (or tuned) by the listener's or reader's prior contact with language. The precise workings of these models depend upon the grain, or level of detail, at which previous exposures to language are analyzed and used to influence parsing decisions. Some models are premised upon the use of fine-grained records (such as lexical cooccurrence statistics). Others use coarser measures. The present paper considers the viability of models based exclusively on the use of fine-grained lexical records. The results of several studies are reviewed and the evidence suggests that, if they are to account for the data, experience-based parsers must draw upon records or representations that capture statistical regularities beyond the lexical level. This poses problems for several parsing models in the literature.Aspects of this work were supported by ESRC grant No. R0023 4062 to Don Mitchell, by a Spanish Government grant DGICVT No. PB-92-0656-C04-02 to Fernando Cuetos, and by the Belgian National Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, of which Marc Brysbaert is a Research Associate. We are grateful to Chuck Clifton, Barbara Hemforth, Martin Pickering, Matt Traxler, and an anonymous reviewer-all of whom made helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.     

The availability heuristic in person identification: The sometimes misleading consequences of enhanced contextual information

Three field studies investigated the effects of post-exposure cognitions on person identification. Subjects' beliefs that they could identify someone were significantly increased by the presentation of new information and the rehearsal of old information about the person. Misidentification errors increased as the lengths of the initial exposure duration increased and when subjects received additional contextual information about the target. These frequent misidentifications may reflect the misattribution of familiarity from enhanced contextual knowledge to familiarity arising from perceptual knowledge. Further, performance was enhanced when the identification task capitalized on 'transfer-appropriate rehearsal' post-event strategies. Ancillary findings contradicted research on 'verbal overshadowing', and the relationship between identification accuracy and confidence. The results were generalized to real-world situations that encourage post-event cognitions by eyewitnesses.