Smoking onset in adolescence: a person-centered analysis with time-varying predictors.

Predictions from smoking-specific versus contextual models of smoking onset were tested with data from a 4-wave sample with 1,364 adolescents. Predictor variables were derived from stress-coping theory, social influence theory, and problem-behavior theory. In addition to groups of abstainers and experimenters, cluster analysis of smoking data indicated 3 groups who showed onset either in 7th grade (early onset), 9th grade (intermediate onset), or 10th grade (late onset). Almost all study variables discriminated the smoking groups from the abstainers. The onset groups were discriminated by Group X Time interactions showing differential changes in predictors (increases in risk factors and declines in protective factors), which occurred just prior to onset. The results generally support a contextual model of the onset process.     

Recalling more childhood events leads to judgments of poorer memory: Implications for the recovered/false memory debate

Dissociative disorders that are believed to develop from childhood sexual abuse are often considered to include amnesia for childhood events, particularly the events that involve the abuse itself. One unresolved issue is the extent to which memory recovery attempts can contribute to claims of having amnestic symptoms. Experiments with undergraduate subjects reveal that requiring more reports of childhood events will increase judgments of having poorer memory of one’s childhood. The results are consistent with the use of heuristics when one is reasoning under conditions of uncertainty, as experienced difficulty in remembering more experiences is attributed to the incompleteness of childhood memory. The findings challenge the validity of reports of childhood amnesia that follow memory recovery attempts.     

Aggressive Responding in the Laboratory Maintained by the Initiation of a Provocation-Free Interval

The Psychological Record - Four adults participated in an experiment designed to study how the duration of an interval free from provocation, following aggressive responding, affected the...     

Prior induced affect and sex differences in attraction

Male (N = 90) and female(N = 90) Ss were shown either 12 humorous or 12 serious TV commercials and were asked to rate each commercial on six 7-point personal feelings scales as well as on a 6-point evaluative (like-dislike) scale. The Ss were then shown the purported evaluative responses of a same-sex stranger which were .17, .50, or .83 similar to their own. Analysis of the personal feelings scales indicated expected differences (p < .001) in affect associated with the two sets of commercials. Females who viewed the serious commercials evidenced greater attraction toward the stranger than did females who saw the humorous commercials (p < .05). The similarity attraction function for males in the humorous condition had a greater slope and a lower y intercept than the similarity attraction function for males in the serious condition. A factor analysis of female affective responses to five socially relevant commercials in the serious set suggested the operation of two affective dimensions, one of which appeared to reflect feelings of social concern.     

Behavioral Indicators of Interpersonal Attraction1

The laboratory study of attraction is based almost exclusively on verbal measures of the dependent variable. Various findings suggest that the physical distance separating two individuals indicates the degree of attraction between them. In two experiments, attitude similarity between a subject and two stooges was manipulated. Females were more attracted to and sat more closely beside a similar than a dissimilar stranger (p < .01); males were more attracted to and sat directly across from a similar rather than a dissimilar stranger (p < .02).     

The Brier Rule Is not a Good Measure of Epistemic Utility (and Other Useful Facts about Epistemic Betterness)

Measures of epistemic utility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations of epistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice (by far) among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis (and the probabilities assigned to the other hypotheses stay in the same ratios), but where the Brier rule says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this ‘elimination experiment’ counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure of epistemic utility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles for epistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example.     

Might anything be plain good?

Philosophical Studies - G.E. Moore said that rightness was obviously a matter of maximising plain goodness. Peter Geach and Judith Thomson disagree. They have both argued that ‘good’ is...