Book reviews

John Christian Laursen (ed.). Religious Toleration: ‘The Variety of Rites’ from Cyrus to Defoe. New York, St Martin's Press, 1999. xx + 252 pp. $45.00. ISBN 0–312–22233–5.

Daniel Garber. Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy through Cartesian Science Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, £40.00 hb; £14.95 pb. xii + 337 pp. ISBN 0–521–00337–7 pb. 0–521–80279–2 hb.

Olli Koistinen and John Biro (eds). Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. x + 255 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0–19–512815‐X.

Paul Abela. Kant's Empirical Realism. Oxford and New York, Clarendon Press, 2002. vii + 303 pp. £40.00. ISBN 0–19–924274–7.

Bruce L. Kinzer. England's Disgrace? J. S. Mill and the Irish Question. Toronto, Buffalo, and London, University of Toronto Press, 2001. 292 pp. $60. ISBN 0–8020–4862–5.

Maria Dimova‐Cookson. T. H. Green's Moral and Political Philosophy: A Phenomenological Perspective. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001. £40.00. xiii + 175 pp. ISBN 0–333–9144–7.

Stephen Mulhall. Inheritance &; Originality. Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001. £40.00. xii + 448 pp. ISBN 0–19–924390–5.

Paul Gorner. Twentieth‐Century German Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000. iii + 225 pp. £12.99. ISBN 0–19–289309–2.

Karen Green. Dummett: Philosophy of Language. Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001. xi + 236 pp. £55.00 (hb), £14.99 (pb). ISBN 0–7456–2294–1 (hb) 0–7456–2295‐X (pb).     

Adults' memories of childhood: Affect,knowing, and remembering

Adult questionnaire respondents reported, for each of a number of events, if they had experienced that event during childhood and, if so, if they remembered the experience or merely knew it had happened. Respondents also rated the emotion of each event and judged whether they would remember more about each reportedly experienced event if they spent more time trying to do so. Study 1 respondents were 96 undergraduates, whereas Study 2 tested 93 community members ranging widely in age. Respondents often reported no recollections of reportedly experienced events. Reportedly experienced events rated as emotional were more often recollected than those rated as neutral, and those rated as positive were more often recollected than those rated as negative. Predicted ability to remember more was related to current memory. Claims of remembering reportedly experienced events increased with age, but predicted ability to remember more about them declined with age.     

Field and observer modes of remembering

Abstract

Nigro and Neisser (1983) contrasted two ways of remembering personal experiences: the rememberer may ‘see’ the event from his or her perspective as in normal perception, or ‘see’ the self engaged in the event as an observer would. Several factors contribute to the determination of perspective, but Nigro and Neisser also reported that many subjects claimed they could change to another perspective at will. We sampled personal memories from several life periods and assessed ability to change the initially reported perspective. Changing was easier for recent or vividly recalled events, harder for older and less vividly recalled events. Memory perspectives may differ in other aspects than their imagery. A second study was conducted to determine whether affective experience is altered when perspectives are changed. The affect experienced decreased when shifting from a field to an observer perspective, but did not change with the converse shift. These studies provide further evidence that remembering is more than retrieval. The information that enters awareness is determined by the information sources in memory and the organisational scheme adopted for recollection.     

On misunderstanding science

Abstract

The paper examines the differences between Kuhn's account, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, of the sciences as necessarily communal activities with internally set standards of procedure and achievement, and that view of the sciences which calls itself ‘Scientific Realism’ and regards them as striving toward, and perhaps asymptotically approaching, some external and objective reality that bestows truth or falsity on scientific theories.

The main argument turns on Poincaré's demonstration that Newton's Second Law (f = ma) is not a testable, provable proposition with a truth value, but something that is simply adopted. It is adopted in the light of experience, certainly, but there is no logical necessity in the adoption. My suggestion is that it is a ‘way of looking’ and ‘a method of analysis’ and that the necessity of its adoption by any individual lies in its being a necessary condition of entry into the scientific community. That community itself adopts ways of looking or methods of analysis for their fruitfulness in dealing with old problems and defining new ones.

Incoherences in the ‘approach’ account of scientific progress are looked at, and the individualistic assumptions that motivate it. These require the sciences to be presented as the source and basis of agreement and community amongst separated individuals. This picture and its requirement inverts reality as well as Kuhn's account, which makes community and agreement the starting point. The notion of reality as a transcendental convergence point becomes redundant.

The old problem of the incommensurability of paradigms is discussed by relating them to the notions of ways of looking and methods of analysis. These may be incompatible in that one cannot look at things in two different ways at once, but at the same time they cannot be measured on any common scale.     

Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity

Abstract

Thomas Polger has argued in favour of the mind–brain type‐identity theory, the view that mental states or processes are type‐identical to states of the central nervous system. Acknowledging that the type‐materialist must respond to Kripke’s modal anti‐materialist argument, Polger insists that Kripke’s argument rests on dubious assumptions concerning the identity conditions of brain states. In brief, Polger claims that one knows that x and y are non‐identical when one knows the identity conditions for both x and y. Replace x and y with ‘brain states’ and ‘sensations’ and it follows that one can know that brain states and sensations are non‐identical only if one knows the identity conditions for brain states. But according to Polger, we do not know the identity conditions for brain states. Hence, we should not be so confident that brain states and sensations are non‐identical after all. But Polger’s account is terribly flawed. Ironically, if Polger’s scepticism is warranted, then Polger himself has no good reasons to be a type‐materialist. But more importantly, Polger’s scepticism regarding the identity conditions of brain states is deeply defective. We do, I submit, understand the identity conditions of brain states. In the end, I submit, Kripke is safe from Polger.     

《心理统计学》教学内容的新探索

本文在对当前国内外主要心理统计学教材进行比较的基础上,指出与上个世纪八十年代的心理统计学教材内容相比较,在内容上的新探索主要体现在（1）由“假设检验”的内容中发展出“统计检验力”和“效果大小”的统计指标和估计方法;（2）引进一般线性模型来统合方差分析和回归分析这两种统计方法;（3）适度增加一些“多元统计分析”的内容等三个方面.本文对前两个方面的新内容作了简要评述,并对教材内容的编排方面提出了新的思路.     

New Horizons: A Center for Research into Information and Religion

This article introduces the creation of a new research center focused on the study of information and religion. The Center, located at Kent State University, provides a new opportunity for scholars in the field of library and information science to collaborate with researchers in other disciplines in the exploration of many potential intersections of information and religion. The Center founders have already begun to present and publish in this area. Planned symposia and an annual conference add to the exposure of interested parties to ongoing studies in this field.     

Relational Spirituality and Dealing With Transgressions: Development of the Relational Engagement of the Sacred for a Transgression (REST) Scale

In the study of spirituality and forgiveness, researchers have begun to look at how dynamic spiritual experiences influence forgiveness. In three studies, we develop the Relational Engagement of the Sacred for a Transgression (REST) Scale, which assesses the extent to which victims actively engage a relationship with the Sacred to deal with a specific transgression. In Study 1, exploratory factor analysis was used to determine the factor structure of the REST. In Study 2, the factor structure was replicated using confirmatory factory analysis. The REST was correlated with religious commitment and negatively related to avoidant attachment to God. In Study 3, evidence supporting the scale's construct validity was adduced. REST scores were correlated with other appraisals of relational spirituality. Structural equation modeling was used to compare theoretical models. REST scores were related to dedication to the Sacred and viewing the transgression as a desecration. In addition, REST scores were positively related to empathy, which was positively related to forgiveness. Furthermore, REST scores predicted forgiveness above and beyond other appraisals of relational spirituality.     

Action,movement, and neurophysiology

Action is to be distinguished from (mere) bodily movement not by reference to an agent's intentions, or his conscious control of his movements (Sect. I), but by reference to the agent as cause of those movements, though this needs to be understood in a way which destroys the alleged distinction between agent‐causation and event‐causation (Sect. II). It also raises the question of the relation between an agent and his neurophysiology (Sect. III), and eventually the question of the compatibility of purposive and mechanistic accounts of human behaviour (Sect. IV). For the two to be compatible it is necessary that, e.g., intentions and brain states be not merely co‐existent but also causal equivalents, in a way which allows for the mechanical explanation of teleological states — or vice versa.     

The power of print: Children’s trust in unexpected printed suggestions

How do children evaluate the veracity of printed text? We examined children’s handling of unexpected suggestions conveyed via print versus orally. In Experiment 1 (N = 131), 3- to 6-year-olds witnessed a speaker either read aloud an unexpected but not completely implausible printed label (e.g., fish for a bird-like animal with some fish features) or speak the label without accompanying text. Pre-readers accepted labels in both conditions. Early readers often rejected spoken labels yet accepted them in the print condition, and in Experiment 2 (N = 55) 3- to 6-year-olds continued to apply them even after the print was obscured. Early readers accept printed testimony that they reject if only spoken, and the influence of text endures even when it is no longer visible.