Extraversion,Neuroticism, and Face-Name Learning

Previous research has attempted to relate personality traits to paired-associate learning. We tested name recall as a function of extraversion and neuroticism (as assessed by the Eysenck Personality Inventory) and task difficulty. Face photographs were paired with one of three levels of information: names only (an easy task); names and occupations; or names, occupations, and interests (a difficult task). On the easy and difficult tasks, extraverted subjects recalled more names than did subjects scoring at the median or below on that trait. Contrary to expectations, subjects scoring high on neuroticism recalled more names than did subjects scoring low on that trait. Neither trait was significantly related to recall on the moderately difficult task. There was no interaction between traits for name recall, but there was for interests: Neurotic introverts were significantly impaired at recalling interests, whereas the other subjects recalled interests better than names. These findings thus differ from those of paired-associate learning tasks using words and nonsense syllables.     

The Stability of Peer Sociometric Ratings Across Ecological Settings

Although children's peer relations extend beyond the classroom, researchers have focused almost exclusively on evaluting sociometric status within the school setting. In the present study, a roster-and-rating method was used to assess the relationship between the sociometric status of 20 fifth-grade students in the classroom and in adult supervised activity groups outside of school. In addition, the 6-month stability of peer sociometric ratings in school was assessed. The correlational results showed that a child's sociometric standing in the classroom was a strong predictor of his or her standing in outside groups, and that the 6-month stability of peer sociometric ratings at school was quite high. The results are encouraging for researchers who use classroom sociometric ratings as global indices of peer relations.     

The Caveman's Conscience: Evolution and Moral Realism

An increasingly popular moral argument has it that the story of human evolution shows that we can explain the human disposition to make moral judgments without relying on a realm of moral facts. Such facts can thus be dispensed with. But this argument is a threat to moral realism only if there is no realist position that can explain, in the context of human evolution, the relationship between our particular moral sense and a realm of moral facts. I sketch a plausible evolutionary story that illuminates this relationship. First, the sorts of adaptive pressures facing early humans would have produced more than just potent prosocial emotions, as evolutionary antirealists like to claim; it would have produced judgments—often situated within emotions—to the effect that others could reasonably disapprove of some bit of conduct, for an early human who cared deeply about how others might respond to her action enjoyed the benefits of more cooperative exchanges than those early humans who did not. Second, according to objectivist versions of moral constructivism, moral facts just are facts about how others, ideally situated, would respond to one's conduct. Thus if any objectivist moral constructivism story is true, then we can intelligibly assert that a) our capacity for moral judgment is the product of adaptive pressures acting on early humans and b) some moral judgments are objectively true.     

Do temporal processes underlie left hemisphere dominance in speech perception?

It is not unusual to find it stated as a fact that the left hemisphere is specialized for the processing of rapid, or temporal aspects of sound, and that the dominance of the left hemisphere in the perception of speech can be a consequence of this specialization. In this review we explore the history of this claim and assess the weight of this assumption. We will demonstrate that instead of a supposed sensitivity of the left temporal lobe for the acoustic properties of speech, it is the right temporal lobe which shows a marked preference for certain properties of sounds, for example longer durations, or variations in pitch. We finish by outlining some alternative factors that contribute to the left lateralization of speech perception.     

Self Reports of Being Falsely Accused of Criminal Behavior

The occurrence of false accusations of illegal behavior is investigated using cross-sectional, long-term recall data for two generations of a national probability sample of individuals. The analysis examines whether being a “usual suspect” based on past criminal behavior; “guilt by association” based on the illegal behavior of one's friends; academic achievement based on self-reported grades in school; and sociodemographic variables including gender, ethnic majority/minority status, and socioeconomic status have an impact on the likelihood of being falsely accused of illegal behavior. The results indicate some consistency across the different subsamples in the characteristics of those most likely to be falsely accused of illegal behavior. Implications for policy and future research are considered.     

Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation

Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the quasi-realist reading of Hume on causation by showing how quasi-realism does not speak to inductive scepticism. I also offer evidence that Hume takes inductive scepticism to result from his theory of causation, and that his scepticism is tied to his rejection of metaphysical causal realism.     

Nicholas of Cusa’s De pace fidei and the meta-exclusivism of religious pluralism

In response to the fall of Constantinople in 1453, Nicholas of Cusa wrote De pace fidei defending a commitment to religious tolerance on the basis of the notion that all diverse rites are but manifestations of one true religion. Drawing on a discussion of why Nicholas of Cusa is unable to square the two objectives of arguing for pluralistic tolerance and explaining the contents of the one true faith, we outline why theological pluralism is compromised by its own meta-exclusivism.     

Group Session Rating Scale: Preliminary psychometrics in substance abuse group interventions

Background: Although ultra‐brief outcome and process measures have been developed for individual therapy, currently there are no ultra‐brief alliance measures for group therapy. Method: The current study examined 105 clients in group therapy for issues related to substance abuse or with issues related to the substance abuse of a significant other. We tested whether a newly developed group therapy alliance measure – the Group Session Rating Scale would be related to other commonly used group process measures (Working Alliance Inventory, Group Cohesion, Group Climate) and early change (change over the first four sessions of group therapy). Results: The findings provided support for reliability based on Cronbach alphas and test‐retest coefficients. Additionally, the GSRS was a one‐factor measure that was related to other group process measures as well as predicted early change. Discussion: Clinical implications for how to utilise ultra‐brief outcome and alliance measures are provided.     

Effects of Deception on Children's Understanding of Second‐order False Belief

This research examined two questions: effects of deception on children's understanding of second‐order false belief, and possible effects of number of siblings on second‐order performance. Kindergarten children responded to 3 second‐order problems that varied in the presence and the nature of deception. Performance was better on the problems with deception, but significantly so only when the target for the belief attribution produced the deception. This finding helps to clarify differences between the two main paradigms for assessing second‐order false belief. There was no relation between number of siblings and performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.