The Necessity of Thinking Historically – Heidegger After Nietzsche

ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with the turning that occurs within the work of Martin Heidegger. In particular it seeks to reveal it as a turning that takes place within the notion of history as it is elaborated by Heidegger in the difference between Nietzsche and Hölderlin, that is, in the difference between philosophy and poetizing. It locates the necessity for such a turning in Heidegger's dissatisfaction with his own thinking up to the early 1930s (as suggested in his Black Notebooks). In particular the paper focuses on Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche over the question of nihilism in the hope of drawing out the different approaches of each thinker in trying to think this problem historically, and how this confrontation helps move Heidegger's thought towards a more poietical way of thinking. The paper concludes that Heidegger, in seeking to distinguish his thought from that of Nietzsche's, not only owes a debt to Nietzsche but that Heidegger's non-public texts of the late 1930s and early 1940s are also formally indebted to him.     

The role of cognitive abilities in children's inferences about social atypicality and peer exclusion and inclusion in intergroup contexts

Children aged 6–7 years judged a loyal and a partially disloyal member of a school in terms of how typical they are within the school group and their likely acceptance by peers from the same school and a different school. Second‐order mental‐state understanding (SOMSU) predicted whether children thought atypical members would be included differently in the two groups. Counterfactual reasoning ability, multiple classification ability, and working memory ability did not predict children's judgements of group members. Moreover, as predicted by the developmental subjective group dynamics model, only children with higher levels of SOMSU and who discerned differences in the typicality of normative and deviant ingroup members inferred that peers would differently include atypical individuals from the same and different groups.     

Children's responses to social atypicality among group members – advantages of a contextualized social developmental account

Abrams, Rutland, Palmer, Ferrell, and Pelletier (2014) showed that better second‐order mental state understanding facilitates 6–7‐year‐olds' ability to link a partially disloyal child's atypicality to inclusive or exclusive reactions by in‐group or outgroup members. This finding is interpreted in terms of predictions from the developmental subjective group dynamics model. We respond to thoughtful commentaries by Rhodes and Chalik, Patterson, and Rakoczy. Children face a significant developmental challenge in becoming able to recognize and interpret social atypicality in intergroup contexts. Researching that ability to contextualize judgements raises new questions about the nature of peer inclusion and exclusion, about children's social cognition, and about the way that social cognitive development and social experience combine. Rather than individual‐focused cognition taking priority over category‐based cognition, we argue the two become more systematically integrated during development. We note that loyalty is but one example of typicality, and we also consider the role of more advanced perspective taking among older children, and the role of multiple classification skill among younger children, as well as potential implications for intervention to reduce peer victimization and prejudice.