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111.
Julian Dodd 《Analysis》1999,59(264):291-299
112.
Julian Dodd 《Ratio》2002,15(2):176-193
John R. Searle (1995; 1998, Ch. 9) claims that P.F. Strawson's well known objections to correspondence theories of truth (Strawson 1950) can be side-stepped, if we regard the correspondence theorist's facts as 'conditions in the world' (1998, p. 392) rather than as complex objects. In response, I claim both that Searle's notion of a 'condition in the world' is obscure, and that such conditions cannot be the facts of a correspondence theorist on account of their being unsuited for truthmaking.
The failure of Searle's attempt to come up with a correspondence theory which evades Strawson's objections does not indicate that we should seek to formulate a correspondence theory in some other way. I argue that that the correspondence theorists's truthmaker axiom is improperly motivated, and, in the light of this, suggest that facts be treated as true propositions rather than as items which make propositions true. The article ends with a defence of this position against two recent objections. 相似文献
The failure of Searle's attempt to come up with a correspondence theory which evades Strawson's objections does not indicate that we should seek to formulate a correspondence theory in some other way. I argue that that the correspondence theorists's truthmaker axiom is improperly motivated, and, in the light of this, suggest that facts be treated as true propositions rather than as items which make propositions true. The article ends with a defence of this position against two recent objections. 相似文献
113.
Dodd W. Cohen 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2007,88(4):883-893
The prevailing notion in the psychoanalytic literature is that Freud's thinking on neonatal object relations is completely captured in terms of his concepts of autoerotism and primary narcissism. Indeed, for Freud, autoerotism and primary narcissism conceptualize the earliest libido distributions, but these concepts do not exhaust Freud's model of early mental life. In this paper, the author endeavors to show that Freud's hypothetical infant arrives at autoerotism and narcissism at the expense of, and secondary to, primitive object-relatedness. More specifically, an appreciation of Freud's views on primitive object relations in light of the self-preservative instinct demonstrates his view that the infant is born into a state of mutual adaptation with the mother. The author makes detailed use of Freud's writings to show his conception of an infant who, from the inception of neonatal life, has the mental sophistication to maintain complex relations with instinctual objects, the sources of gratification or frustration, part-objects confusedly perceived because of cognitive immaturity and/or fantasy distortion. Such complexity includes the infant's capacity for primitive forms of perception, boundary formation, reality testing, and defensive, splitting-based projections and introjections. 相似文献
114.
Maddox WT Bohil CJ Dodd JL 《Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition》2003,29(6):1174-1193
The effects of payoff-matrix multiplication, payoff-matrix addition, the presence of long-run gains versus long-run losses, category discriminability, and base rate on decision criterion learning were examined in 2 perceptual categorization experiments. Observers were found to be sensitive to the effects of payoff-matrix multiplication (and category discriminability) on the steepness of the objective reward function in line with predictions from the flat-maxima hypothesis and contrary to the predictions from the payoff-variance hypothesis. Decision criterion learning was best in base-rate conditions, was worst when losses were associated with incorrect responding, and was intermediate when no losses were associated with incorrect responding. This performance profile was well captured by the competition between reward and accuracy (COBRA) hypothesis. A hybrid model framework that instantiates both the flat-maxima and COBRA hypotheses was necessary to account for the data from both experiments. 相似文献
115.
In two experiments, we investigated whether re-exposure to previously studied items at test affects false recognition in the DRM paradigm. Furthermore, we examined whether exposure to the critical lure at test influences memory for subsequently presented study items. In Experiment 1, immediately following each studied DRM list, participants were given a recognition test. The tests were constructed such that the number of studied items preceding the critical lure varied from zero to five. Neither false recognition for critical lures nor accurate memory for studied items was affected by this manipulation. In Experiment 2, we replicated this pattern of results under speeded conditions at test. Both experiments confirm that exposure to previously studied items at test does not affect true or false recognition in the DRM paradigm. This pattern strongly suggests that retrieval processes do not influence false recognition in the DRM paradigm. 相似文献
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Dylan Dodd 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2016,92(2):355-377
We’ve all been at parties where there's one cookie left on what was once a plate full of cookies, a cookie no one will eat simply because everyone is following a rule of etiquette, according to which you’re not supposed to eat the last cookie. Or at least we think everyone is following this rule, but maybe not. In this paper I present a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox, which is an argument that seems to prove that in any situation in which everyone is truly following the rule, no one eats any cookies at all, no matter how many there are to be eaten. The ‘Cookie Argument’ resembles the more familiar argument that surprise exams are impossible, but it's not exactly the same. I argue that the biggest difference is that, unlike the surprise exam argument, the Cookie Argument is actually sound! I conclude the paper by explaining how it could be possible for a group of people to engage in behavior (eating cookies) that guarantees that at least one of the members of the group will violate a rule, even when it's common knowledge in the group that everyone is committed to following that very rule.
Sometimes me think, “What is friend?” and then me say, “Friend is someone to share the last cookie with.” ‐ Cookie Monster, http://youtu.be/LHh0A_bH5ig 1 1 I’m grateful to Eric Carter for this quote.相似文献
120.
Dylan Dodd 《Synthese》2012,189(2):337-352
Cartesian skepticism about epistemic justification (??skepticism??) is the view that many of our beliefs about the external world??e.g., my current belief that I have hands??aren??t justified. I examine the two most influential arguments for skepticism??the Closure Argument and the Underdetermination Argument??from an evidentialist perspective. For both arguments it??s clear which premise the anti-skeptic must deny. The Closure Argument, I argue, is the better argument in that its key premise is weaker than the Underdetermination Argument??s key premise. Next I examine ways of motivating each argument??s key premise. I argue that attempts to motivate them which appeal to one??s having the same evidence in skeptical scenarios, to skeptical hypotheses?? alleged ability to explain our evidence just as well as real world hypotheses, or to the fact that if skeptical scenarios were true everything would appear just as it does all fail to provide any motivation for the premises or for skepticism. But I close by considering a different argument for the key premises and skepticism that lacks the central defect of these other arguments. Future work on skepticism should focus on this final argument at the expense of the others. 相似文献